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PREFACE 
This is a thesis ‘with publications’ and is substantially composed of papers either 
published, in review or in preparation that report the original research undertaken 
throughout the research program. These papers are compiled for this thesis with only 
minor amendments and are collectively preceded by an introduction to the research 
program and followed by a conclusion that draws together the key outcomes and 
findings of the collective research. Each paper is a self-contained account of the 
research that it reports, with its own abstract, introduction, methods, results and 
discussion. This inevitably results in some degree of overlap and repetition, for which I 
ask the reader’s patience. To afford the reader some respite from this format, references 
from each chapter have been consolidated and provided at the end of the thesis, 
immediately before the appendices. 
The work presented here is predominantly my own. Publications and contributions from 
others are detailed below. 
The work presented in Chapter 2 is an edited version of the paper in preparation: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Prep). How should 
private property rights be framed in the promotion of private land 
conservation? 
Co-author Fiona Fidler provided advice on the research design and the data analysis. All 
co-authors provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial 
assistance. 
The work presented in Chapter 3 is an edited version of the paper in preparation: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Prep). Economically 
framed information about ecosystem services can crowd-out intrinsic 
motivations for protecting nature. 
In addition, Dr Adrian Camilleri provided help and advice in using Mechanical Turk, 
and Michelle Sier undertook the second coding of the qualitative data. All co-authors 
provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial assistance. 
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Strategic framing of the benefits of conservation participation could increase 
landholder engagement. Environmental Science & Policy 61, 124-128. 
Co-authors Christopher Raymond and Mathew Hardy provided advice in developing the 
research method, and undertook the second coding. All co-authors provided feedback 
on study design, interpretation of results and editorial assistance. 
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Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Review). Decline of 
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authors provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial 
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Mathew Hardy undertook the second coding.  
The work presented in Chapter 6 is an edited version of the paper in preparation: 
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for more effective biodiversity conservation messages. 
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misplaced assumptions, lazy thinking and poor writing are my own. This thesis was 
compiled using a template developed by Kayla Friedman and Malcolm Morgan. 
  
 Introduction 
   vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
There are many people whose support has made this thesis possible, and I thank you all. 
Foremost of these are my supervisors, Sarah Bekessy, Fiona Fidler and Ascelin Gordon. 
Your advice support and encouragement has been essential, and is greatly appreciated. 
This includes a special thanks to Sarah and Ascelin for giving me this opportunity in the 
first place. 
I am of course grateful to the many people who have provided direct contributions to 
this work, as outlined in the preface. Thanks also to others who have offered advice or 
support along the way, including Adrian Camilleri, and Karyn Bosomworth, both of 
whom served as independent advisers at my milestone conferences. Thanks also to 
Mathew Hardy for helping undertake the secondary coding in chapters four and five.  
This research would not have been possible without the support of an Australian 
Government Research Training Scholarship and a scholarship funded by the Australian 
Government’s National Environmental Research Program and the Australian Research 
Council Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions. 
Essential also, were my anonymous research participants, whom I thank for giving their 
time to take my surveys. 
I have also had the privilege of being a member of the Interdisciplinary Conservation 
Science Research Group throughout my PhD journey; this group of researchers have 
provided support, friendship and essential camaraderie, for which I thank you all. This 
includes a special thanks to my cohort compatriots, Laura and Mat, with whom I have 
shared the meandering and sometimes maddening course that maps the PhD journey. 
I also offer heartfelt thanks to my friends and family whose love and support has always 
been forthcoming and greatly appreciated. Special mentions here for my Mum and to 
my eternal Best Man, Simon. 
Most of all, I would like to express appreciation for the love and support of my 
wonderful wife Michelle, you have been a truly invaluable source of encouragement 
and essential to my completing this thesis. 
 
  
 
viii   
  
 Introduction 
   ix 
CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 3 
1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF FRAMING ...................................................................................... 5 
1.2 NON-EQUIVALENCE FRAMES ..................................................................................... 6 
1.3 EQUIVALENCE FRAMES ............................................................................................. 7 
Risky choice framing ................................................................................................. 8 
Attribute framing ..................................................................................................... 10 
Goal framing ........................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 FRAMES ARE MIXED ................................................................................................ 12 
1.5 PROSPECT FOR STRATEGIC USE OF FRAMING ........................................................... 13 
1.6 PREVIOUS FRAMING STUDIES IN BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION .............................. 14 
1.7 THESIS OUTLINE ...................................................................................................... 19 
2 HOW SHOULD PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS BE FRAMED IN THE 
PROMOTION OF PRIVATE LAND CONSERVATION? ...................................... 23 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... 23 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 24 
Property rights and framing ................................................................................... 25 
2.2 METHODS ............................................................................................................... 28 
Participant recruitment ........................................................................................... 29 
Measuring property rights and utilitarianism ........................................................ 30 
Acceptance measure ................................................................................................ 32 
Construction of the frames ...................................................................................... 33 
Correlations ............................................................................................................ 33 
2.3 RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 33 
Study 1 ..................................................................................................................... 33 
Study 2a and 2b ....................................................................................................... 34 
2.4 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 38 
The impact of response scales ................................................................................. 39 
Valence framing not property paradigms framing ................................................. 39 
Unintended framing effect ....................................................................................... 41 
Correlations between property rights strength, utilitarianism and acceptance ..... 41 
Implications for private land conservation ............................................................. 42 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 42 
 
x   
3 ECONOMICALLY FRAMED INFORMATION ABOUT ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES CAN CROWD-OUT INTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS FOR 
PROTECTING NATURE ............................................................................................ 45 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... 45 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 46 
Motivational crowding and conservation incentives .............................................. 46 
The ‘ecosystem services’ framing of nature ............................................................ 47 
How ecosystem service frames may cause motivational crowding ........................ 47 
3.2 METHODS ............................................................................................................... 49 
Participants ............................................................................................................. 49 
Survey design and procedure .................................................................................. 50 
Response Coding ..................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 51 
How does ecosystem services information affect motivations to conserve whales or 
bees? ....................................................................................................................... 51 
How does ecosystem services information affect the ranking of 
intrinsic/instrumental motivations? ........................................................................ 53 
3.4 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 56 
Implications for conservation communication ........................................................ 58 
4 FRAMING THE PRIVATE LAND CONSERVATION CONVERSATION: 
STRATEGIC FRAMING OF THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVATION 
PARTICIPATION COULD INCREASE LANDHOLDER ENGAGEMENT ....... 61 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... 62 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 62 
Background to value orientations: egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric ........ 63 
4.2 METHODS ............................................................................................................... 65 
4.3 RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 66 
4.4 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 68 
Market-based schemes ............................................................................................ 69 
Framing failure ....................................................................................................... 69 
Future directions for PLC communications ........................................................... 70 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 71 
5 DECLINE OF ‘BIODIVERSITY’ IN CONSERVATION POLICY DISCOURSE 
IN AUSTRALIA ............................................................................................................ 73 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... 73 
 Introduction 
   xi 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 74 
5.2 METHODS ............................................................................................................... 76 
5.3 RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 79 
5.4 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 82 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 84 
6 STRATEGIC FRAMING FOR MORE EFFECTIVE BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION MESSAGING ............................................................................... 85 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... 85 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 86 
6.2 FRAMING ................................................................................................................ 87 
6.3 STRATEGIC USE OF FRAMING .................................................................................. 89 
Audience .................................................................................................................. 92 
Biases ...................................................................................................................... 93 
Emotional appeals ................................................................................................... 94 
Psychological distance ............................................................................................ 96 
Norms and agency ................................................................................................... 97 
6.4 TEST (FOR ADVERSE EFFECTS) ................................................................................ 99 
Boomerang effects ................................................................................................. 100 
Misguided norms ................................................................................................... 100 
Crowding-out ........................................................................................................ 100 
6.5 REPORT RESULTS .................................................................................................. 101 
6.6 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 102 
7 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 103 
7.1 FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................................................. 108 
7.2 CLOSING REMARKS ............................................................................................... 108 
8 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 111 
9 APPENDICES .......................................................................................................... 129 
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................... 131 
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................... 133 
APPENDIX C ............................................................................................................... 135 
APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................... 141 
APPENDIX E ................................................................................................................ 143 
APPENDIX F ................................................................................................................ 145 
APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................... 149 
APPENDIX H ............................................................................................................... 151 
xii   
APPENDIX I ................................................................................................................. 153 
APPENDIX J ................................................................................................................ 155 
APPENDIX K ............................................................................................................... 157 
 
 
  
 Introduction 
   xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE   2.1. SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY 2A AND 2B ................ 35 
TABLE 2.2. SPEARMAN’S RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES OF 
INTEREST ACROSS THREE DATASETS AND SUMMARY EFFECT SIZE OF THE 
COMBINED DATASETS. SHADED CORRELATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH WERE 
MEANINGFUL ACROSS ALL DATASETS ................................................................... 38 
TABLE 3.1. EXAMPLES OF REASONS PROVIDED BY PARTICIPANTS THAT WERE CODED AS 
RELATING TO EITHER INTRINSIC OR INSTRUMENTAL VALUES. ............................... 52  
TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF THE KEY RESULTS FROM EACH SURVEY, INCLUDING 95% CIS 
WHERE APPLICABLE. ............................................................................................. 54 
 
 
  
 
xiv   
  
 Introduction 
   xv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.1. SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF STRATEGIC 
FRAMING, AND WHERE THEY SIT IN RELATION TO ONE ANOTHER ON A SPECTRUM 
BETWEEN SEMANTIC FRAMING AND STORY FRAMING. SEMANTIC FRAMING REFERS 
TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE WORDS AND PHRASES TO DESCRIBE AN ASPECT OF 
REALITY, WHEREAS STORY FRAMING USES A MORE SOPHISTICATED NARRATIVE TO 
DO SO, AND MAY INCLUDE SEMANTIC AND OTHER FRAMING. THE DIFFERENT TYPES 
OF EQUIVALENCE FRAMES ARE SIMILAR TO SEMANTIC FRAMES AND LOCATED AT 
THAT END OF THE SPECTRUM. EMPHASIS/ISSUE FRAMING CAN BE USED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH FRAMING AT ANY SCALE FROM SEMATIC TO STORY FRAMING 
AND IS GENERALLY USED TO CREATE A PARTICULAR CONTEXT OR THEME (E.G. THE 
CLAIM “90% FAT FREE” USES ATTRIBUTE FRAMING (I.E. A TYPE OF EQUIVALENCE 
FRAME) IN CONJUNCTION WITH A HEALTH-ORIENTED EMPHASIS/ISSUE FRAME).. ... 6 
FIGURE 2.1. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO PREFERRED THE DISCRETE ASSET 
FRAMED DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY (OPTION A) AND THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS 
FRAMED DESCRIPTION (OPTION B) (N=76). ERROR BARS REPRESENT 95% 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS. ..................................................................................... 34 
FIGURE 2.2. RESULTS OF STUDY 2A. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPTED, 
REJECTED, AND NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE REGULATIONS, FOR BOTH 
FRAMING CONDITIONS (N=203). ERROR BARS REPRESENT 95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVALS. .......................................................................................................... 36 
FIGURE 2.3. RESULTS OF STUDY 2B. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPTED, 
REJECTED, AND NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE REGULATIONS, FOR BOTH 
FRAMING CONDITIONS (N=218). ERROR BARS REPRESENT 95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVALS. .......................................................................................................... 37 
FIGURE 3.1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRAMING CONDITIONS OF THE AVERAGE 
PROPORTION OF TOP 2 REASONS THAT ARE INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED, WITH 95% 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS. ‘ELICITED’ REFERS TO THE ORDER IN WHICH 
RESPONDENTS LISTED REASONS AND ‘RANKED’ REFERS TO THE ORDER OF 
IMPORTANCE THAT RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENTLY RANKED THOSE REASONS. THE 
DIFFERENCES PLOTTED ARE ANALOGOUS TO EFFECT SIZE. .................................... 56 
FIGURE 4.1. AVERAGE PROPORTIONS OF BENEFITS THAT ARE FRAMED AS EGOISTIC, 
SOCIAL-ALTRUISTIC AND BIOSPHERIC BENEFITS. SOLID BARS SHOW THE 
PROPORTION ACROSS 20 AUSTRALIAN PLC SCHEMES. ERROR BARS ARE 95% 
 
xvi   
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS. TRANSPARENT BARS SHOW THE PROPORTION FOR 5 
AUSTRALIAN MARKET-BASED PLC SCHEMES (N INSUFFICIENT FOR ERROR BAR 
CALCULATION). .................................................................................................... 67 
FIGURE 5.1. METHODOLOGICAL FLOW CHART FOR ANALYSING MEDIA RELEASES FROM 
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO AND THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION (ACF). ALL RELEASES WERE SUBJECTED TO A TEXT 
SEARCH FOR ‘BIODIVERSITY’ AND ‘ECONO’ AND A SUBSAMPLE OF THE RELEASES 
WERE SUBJECTED TO CONTENT ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY USE OF ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES LOGIC. TO ENSURE THAT THE SUB-SAMPLE OF AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO RELEASES WERE RELEVANT, ONLY 
THOSE WITH AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE OF THE TERMS ‘ECOSYSTEM’, ‘ECOLOG’, OR 
‘CONSERVATION’ WERE SELECTED. THE ACF SUB-SAMPLE WAS A RANDOM 
SELECTION... ......................................................................................................... 78 
FIGURE 5.2. PERCENTAGE OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS CONTAINING ‘BIODIVERSITY’ 
AND ‘ECOSYSTEM SERVICES’. DATA DERIVED FROM WEB OF SCIENCE 
(HTTP://APPS.WEBOFKNOWLEDGE.COM). .............................................................. 80 
FIGURE 5.3. PERCENTAGE OF 3553 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT 
PORTFOLIO MEDIA RELEASES THAT CONTAIN ‘BIODIVERSITY’, ‘ECONO’ AND 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FRAMING OVER TIME. ERROR BARS ARE 95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVALS FOR THE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FRAMING SUB-SAMPLE (N=516).. ...... 81 
FIGURE 5.4. PERCENTAGE OF THE 745 AUSTRALIAN CONSERVATION FOUNDATION 
MEDIA RELEASES THAT CONTAIN ‘BIODIVERSITY’, ‘ECONO’ AND ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES FRAMING OVER TIME. ERROR BARS ARE 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FRAMING (N=229). ..................................................... 81 
FIGURE 6.1. STRATEGIC FRAMING IS A PROCESS THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO THE SHAPING 
OF ANY COMMUNICATION THAT CONSIDERS HOW KEY ASPECTS OF FRAMING MAY 
BE LEVERAGED OR AVOIDED IN ORDER THAT A MESSAGE IS AS EFFECTIVE AS 
POSSIBLE FOR ITS PURPOSE. THIS PURPOSE NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO ADVOCACY, 
AND THE FRAMING ASPECTS CONSIDERED NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO THOSE 
INCLUDED IN THE FIGURE. UNDERSTANDING THE INTENDED AUDIENCE SHOULD 
ALWAYS BE THE FIRST STEP AND TESTING AND REPORTING THE MESSAGE WILL 
OCCUR LAST, HOWEVER THE REMAINING STEPS MAY BE UNDERTAKEN IN ANY 
ORDER. ................................................................................................................. 91 
 
 
 Introduction 
   1 
ABSTRACT 
Biodiversity loss is one of the most serious of contemporary environmental problems. 
As human activities are the primary driver of biodiversity loss, changes to human 
behaviour will be an essential component of species conservation strategies. Research in 
communication, sociology, psychology, and political science has shown that the way in 
which an issue is ‘framed’ can influence judgements, attitudes and behaviours. As such, 
communications intended to promote behaviour change in favour of biodiversity 
conservation may be made more effective by the strategic use of framing. Although a 
sizable framing literature exists across many research areas, there is little research on 
the use of framing to promote biodiversity conservation, and practically no guidance for 
those involved in communicating conservation messages. This thesis builds an 
understanding of the use of framing to promote biodiversity conservation by: 
empirically testing several alternatively framed conservation communications; 
investigating the degree to which framing is strategically used in the Australian private 
land conservation sector to promote conservation programs; considering how the 
framing of biodiversity has changed over the last decade within public policy discourse; 
and providing guidance to communicators on how to strategically frame their messages 
for greater effect. 
This thesis begins by empirically testing several alternatively framed conservation 
messages. I test how framing ‘property’ as either a ‘discrete asset’ or as a ‘bundle-of-
rights’ can influence attitudes to regulations that would interfere with property rights in 
order to achieve conservation outcomes. I find that the alternative property ‘frames’ can 
influence attitudes, but only when used to activate cognitive biases (in this case the 
endowment effect). I also test how framing nature in terms of ‘ecosystem services’ 
influences the way in which people think about and value nature, and find that 
information framed to emphasise economic aspects of ecosystem services can crowd-
out (i.e. displace) intrinsic motivations for conservation. Such ‘ecosystem service’ 
framed messages thereby have the potential to promote a mindset that the only nature 
worth preserving is that with a demonstrable and quantifiable value.  
The thesis then examines the degree to which framing is strategically used in the 
Australian private land conservation sector to promote participation. By examining the 
websites of a range of Australian schemes and categorising stated participation benefits 
as either benefits to landholders, to society or to the environment, I gain insight into the 
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types of landholders mostly likely to be engaged by these messages. The results indicate 
a predominance of environmentally-framed benefits, which arguably indicates a lack of 
strategic framing, whereby appeals are aimed chiefly at those landholders who are 
already most likely to participate in conservation. 
The thesis then considers how the framing of biodiversity has changed over the last 
decade within public policy discourse by examining media releases from the Australian 
Government environment portfolio and the Australian Conservation Foundation. I find 
that the term ‘biodiversity’ has become less prevalent while the use of economic 
language has increased. This may reflect a strategic response by these agencies to better 
engage with both the general public and decision makers within what is an increasingly 
dominant neoliberal paradigm. However, this change in discourse is likely also to 
generate its own influence on the way people think about biodiversity conservation, 
including the potential for ‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic values. 
Finally, the thesis presents a synthesis of these research findings including key concepts 
from the framing and related literature to provide some guidance to conservation 
communicators on how to strategically frame their messages for greater impact and 
effect. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Biodiversity loss is recognised as one of the most critical environmental problems 
(Gordon 2006; Gustafsson 2013), not least because human wellbeing depends upon it 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). This loss continues in spite of substantial 
efforts to tackle it (Butchart et al. 2010). Human activities are the primary agent of 
biodiversity loss, driving key threatening processes such as habitat loss due to 
overexploitation of natural resources, agriculture, urban development, damage from 
introduction of invasive species and pollution, etc. (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
2005; Maxwell et al. 2016). While many people perceive ‘nature’ as being something 
separate from the controlled urban environment that most of the world’s population 
inhabit (particularly in Western societies) (Vining, Merrick and Price 2008), there is a 
growing awareness amongst researchers and policy makers that humans interact with 
nature via complex social ecological systems (e.g. Folke et al. 2005; Walker et al. 
2006). While such understanding can help guide policy to address biodiversity loss, the 
protection of biodiversity is a social and political process, which must include changes 
in human behaviour (Brechin et al. 2002; Schultz 2011). As such, communication and 
advocacy that more effectively influence attitudes and behaviour are an important 
component of efforts toward addressing conservation problems (e.g. Dayer et al. 2015).  
Research in communication, sociology, psychology, and political science has shown 
that the way in which an issue is ‘framed’ can influence judgements, attitudes and 
behaviours (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987). As 
such, communications intended to promote environmental advocacy both generally and 
in relation to specific issues such as biodiversity conservation may be made more 
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effective by the strategic use of framing. This has the potential to benefit governments, 
non-governmental organisations, and environmental advocates in presenting their 
message in a more persuasive and ultimately more effective manner. 
Framing is relevant to communication at various scales; from the semantic e.g. 
referencing immigrants as ‘illegal’ versus ‘undocumented’ (see Merolla et al. 2013) or 
the use of different descriptions for fees e.g. ‘levy’ versus ‘tax’ or ‘surcharge’ versus 
‘convenience fee’; to the framing of entire issues e.g. climate change may be framed as 
either an environmental issue, a public health issue or a national security issue (see 
Myers et al. 2012). Although framing has been used in health promotion campaigns and 
increasingly so in energy and water conservation initiatives (e.g. Berk et al. 1980), it has 
not been well studied in biodiversity conservation communications, and is largely 
absent from the literature.  
Much advocacy, including within conservation biology, has traditionally used the 
knowledge-deficit model, which essentially assumes that people will adopt the targeted 
behaviour if they can be informed about that behaviour and why it is ‘better’. This can 
be problematic, as behaviour results from the interaction of numerous factors, notably a 
person’s values, attitudes and relevant social and personal norms, rather than resulting 
simply from rational thought (Ajzen 1991). There is a growing awareness that various 
factors that influence behaviour can be leveraged by social ‘nudges’ in order to promote 
public policy (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 2008), including biodiversity conservation 
(Akerlof and Kennedy 2013). Many of these factors may also be leveraged by the 
strategic use of framing. By understanding framing effects in the context of biodiversity 
conservation, communicators and advocates may be able to strategically shape their 
messages for greater effect.  
This thesis explores a number of aspects of framing, in the context of biodiversity 
conservation communication. Through this research, I seek to provide some insight into 
how framing techniques may be used to promote conservation attitudes, as well as 
investigating some contemporary trends in the framing of conservation policy. I begin 
here by introducing the concept of framing, categorising the different framing 
approaches and including an overview of its use in biological conservation. I will then 
outline the particular objectives of my research and provide an outline of the thesis 
structure. 
 Introduction 
   5 
1.1 An overview of framing 
 ‘Framing’ is not a universal term and is used differently across disciplines (Cappella 
and Jamieson 1997; Druckman 2001). Generally speaking, to practise framing is to 
“select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text” (Entman 1993, pp 52). However, framing is also used to refer to 
the way issues are conceptualised and has been used synonymously with the similar 
concepts of a ‘schema’, ‘script’, ‘package’, or ‘theme’ (Zhou and Moy 2007). That is, 
framing can also be the framework with which people understand the world and how 
they “locate, perceive, identify, and label” information and events (Goffman 1974, pp 
21).  Similarly, Gamson and Modigliani (1989), in relation to media discourse, consider 
a frame to be the central organising idea which makes sense of relevant events, and 
highlights what is at issue.  According to Hallahan: “[f]raming puts information into a 
context and establishes frames of reference so people can evaluate information, 
comprehend meanings and take action” (Hallahan 1999, pp 224).  
In some fields, the term ‘frame’ is used more broadly and intended to capture the 
process by which actors such as politicians, interest groups, community leaders and 
other ‘elites’ interact with news media to frame issues, and how this subsequently 
shapes opinion (Entman 1993). Much of the difficulty in defining framing comes from 
the conflation of distinct phenomena, to which the holistic use of the label ‘framing’ 
may be misleading (Druckman 2004; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998; Fagley and 
Miller 1997). Notwithstanding this diversity of use, Fisher summarised things well 
when she stated that “a study of framing informs the study of how societies process 
information to generate meaning” (Fisher 1997 para 1.5). 
It is possible to categorise various uses of the term ‘frame’. An initial distinction may be 
made between those frames that are “embedded in discourse” (or other communication) 
or frames that are “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990 pp74). 
Druckman (2001) re-casts these as ‘frames in communication’ and ‘frames in thought’. 
Frames in communication (herein ‘communication frames’) refer to those words, 
phrases or other elements of communication that a communicator uses when relaying 
information. That is, the frame relates to what the communicator is saying. For example, 
a politician who emphasises environmental issues when campaigning might be said to 
be using an ‘environmental frame’. In this vein, framing has been widely used in 
discourse analysis. In contrast to communication frames, frames in thought (herein 
‘thought frames’) relate to what an individual is thinking. For example, a voter 
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concerned with environmental issues might respond positively to the communications 
made by the politician who uses the environmental frame. Communication frames and 
thought frames are inevitably intertwined, but where a communication frame influences 
a thought frame, this gives rise to a framing effect (Druckman 2001).  
The alternative types of framing can be divided broadly into equivalence frames, and 
non-equivalence, with semantic and story frames at either end of a spectrum of frame 
complexity (see figure 1.1). In reality, messages will rarely consist of any single type of 
frame, but will almost inevitably be composed of a variety of different types of frame. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the different types of strategic framing, and 
where they sit in relation to one another on a spectrum between semantic framing and 
story framing. Semantic framing refers to the use of alternative words and phrases to 
describe an aspect of reality, whereas story framing uses a more sophisticated narrative 
to do so, and may include semantic and other framing. The different types of 
equivalence frames are similar to semantic frames and located at that end of the 
spectrum. Emphasis/issue framing can be used in conjunction with framing at any scale 
from sematic to story framing and is generally used to create a particular context or 
theme (e.g. the claim “90% fat free” uses attribute framing (i.e. a type of equivalence 
frame) in conjunction with a health-oriented emphasis/issue frame). 
 
1.2 Non-equivalence frames 
The key non-equivalence frame identified by Druckman (2001) is emphasis framing, in 
which potentially relevant considerations may be emphasised such that a person will 
focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions. This is also often 
referred to as ‘issue framing’ which is the term that I will use here. This kind of framing 
can emerge in an ad hoc fashion or by the careful and strategic actions of high profile 
and influential communicators (generally referred to as ‘elites’) and/or the media 
(Entman 1993; Entman and Page 1994; Hallahan 1999). This is often undertaken in 
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order to serve certain interests; for example the proposed Australian Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme of 2010 was championed by its proponents as an important 
environmental policy, but framed by its detractors as bad economic policy. Such issue 
frames may be present in a single communication or emerge as a recurring or dominant 
theme within a particular discourse. 
Other non-equivalence frames include semantic frames and story frames (Hallahan 
1999; Fig 1.1). Story framing is simply a more complicated way of seeking to influence 
an audience’s attitudes and behaviours. In the context of promoting action on social and 
political issues, Entman (1993) suggests that the key functions of effective story frames 
are to define a problem, attribute blame for the problem, make a moral appeal to fix the 
problem, and to propose a solution. In contrast to story frames, semantic framing simply 
involves the replacement of one form of words for another form that is substantially 
similar or which achieves a similar purpose in the particular context, for example, in 
describing immigrants as ‘illegal’ versus ‘undocumented’ (Merolla et al. 2013). In this 
sense, semantic frames can appear to be similar to equivalent frames. However, owing 
to the imprecise nature of language, words and phrases often are not truly equivalent 
and can add subtle inferences, depending on the context. A contemporary example is the 
semantic considerations involved in the naming of driver assist modes in some cars; the 
label of ‘autopilot’ used by one manufacturer has been blamed for the death of a 
motorist who made the inference that the car was capable of driving itself. In contrast 
another manufacturer has chosen the label ‘pro-pilot’ (Hern 2016). Druckman (2001, pp 
235) argues that emphasis (issue) frames influence people’s preferences “because a 
substantively different consideration is brought to bear on the issue at hand”. This 
seems equally applicable to all non-equivalent frames (i.e. emphasis/issue frames, 
semantic frames and story frames).  
1.3 Equivalence frames 
Equivalence frames can result in dramatically different reactions to objectively 
equivalent statements (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998; Fig 1.1). These involve the 
use of different but logically equivalent words or phrases to alter a person’s preference. 
A simple and common example is the presentation on food products of information 
about the fat content. For example, labelling minced beef as ‘75% lean’ is objectively 
the same as labelling it ‘25% fat’, but the former approach elicits more favourable 
perceptions than the latter (Levin 1987). The effects of this type of framing can be 
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strong and can influence not only purchasing decisions but even the taste experience of 
consumers (Levin and Gaeth 1988; Braun, Gaeth and Levin 1997). Equivalence frames 
are often also referred to as valence frames. The term ‘valence’ refers to the intrinsic 
attractiveness or aversiveness of an event, object or situation (Frijda 1986), and so a 
valence frame attempts to cast the same information in either a positive or negative light 
(Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998 pp 150). However, semantic framing can also be 
used to paint information in a positive or negative light, and thus, even though it is not 
necessarily logically equivalent, can be used to perform the same function and it would 
seem reasonable to include this within the realm of ‘valence framing’. As such, it might 
be better to think of ‘valence framing’ as a result rather than a method or typology of 
framing, in that many (perhaps all) types of frame can be used to generate a positive or 
negative valence with respect to a particular issue or object. 
There are three distinct types of equivalence frames, for which the key property is that 
the alternative frames are ‘logically equivalent’ (Druckman 2004): risky-choice 
framing, attribute framing, and goal framing (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998).  
Risky choice framing  
The genesis of equivalence framing as a whole lies in the work of Kahneman and 
Tverskey (1979), although it is now better recognised as one particular kind of 
equivalence frame. Their work demonstrated that people will make different decisions 
depending upon whether potential gains or potential losses of a situation are made more 
salient (Myers 2010). This understanding from Tversky and Kahneman’s empirically 
derived ‘prospect theory’, explains how people violate expected utility theory 
(Kahneman and Tverskey 1979) and also change their decision preferences when 
possible outcomes are framed as either relative gains or relative losses. The key insight 
of prospect theory is that, while according to expected utility theory, the decision maker 
considers the final (objective) states of nature, prospect theory recognises that the 
decision maker considers the subjective values and subjective probabilities (Myers 
2010).  This has the outcome that when potential losses of a situation are made salient 
and a choice involves uncertainty, people will tend to be risk-seeking.  On the other 
hand, where potential gains are made salient and the choice offers minimal uncertainty, 
people are generally risk averse (Myers 2010). Risk-seeking and risk-averse in this 
context refers to the willingness of the person to accept or to avoid risk, respectively. 
These kinds of framing effects have been observed in medical and clinical decisions, 
perceptual judgements, consumer choices, social dilemma responses, bargaining 
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behaviours, auditing evaluations and other situations (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
1998). Despite the value of prospect theory in understanding these frame effects, it does 
not explain all framing effects (Myers 2010).  It is worth noting that prospect theory is 
just one of many known cognitive biases. 
Risky choice framing effects are categorised as those analogous to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1984) well-known ‘Asian disease problem’ (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
1998). In this famous experiment the researchers asked participants the following 
question: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:  
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, 
there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-
thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs 
would you favor? (Kahneman and Tversky 1984 pp 343). 
Despite the outcomes being identical (i.e. 200 people being saved), 72 percent of people 
chose option A. An equivalent follow up question reversed the ‘framing’ by focussing 
on deaths rather than lives saved. Despite equivalent outcomes between alternatives, the 
frame that presented the smaller number of deaths was preferred by 78 percent.   
Studies that make use of this form typically involve the posing of a hypothetical 
decision scenario for which there are two choices: 1) a prospect without risk, and 2) a 
two-outcome all or nothing risky prospect with numerically specified probabilities 
(Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998). A positive message frame describes both prospects 
in terms of gains, and a negative message frame describes both prospects in terms of 
losses. The theory (backed by evidence) predicts that people are more likely to take 
risks when options focus attention on the chance to avoid losses than when options 
focus on the chance to realise gains (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998).  
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) use an insurance example to illustrate how the theory 
may be applied to promote a particular behaviour; an insurance policy that covers fire 
but not flood may be framed as ‘a full protection against the specific risk of fire’ or as ‘a 
reduction in the overall probability of property loss’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, pp 
456). Prospect theory suggests that the insurance policy should appear more attractive 
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when described as an elimination of risk, than as a reduction of risk (though I note that 
insurance is actually about financial protection in the case of property loss and can do 
nothing to influence the actual likelihood of property loss itself). In turning its 
application to the promotion of pro-environmental or conservation attitudinal behaviour, 
risky-choice framing will be limited to those applications in which the framing of risk 
will induce the desired behaviour (either risk seeking or risk averse).  A meta-analysis 
of risky-choice framing studies by Kuhberger (1998) found that this kind of framing is a 
reliable phenomenon with a small to moderate effect size. 
Attribute framing 
Attribute framing involves only a single attribute within the context that is the subject of 
the framing manipulation (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998). Rather than the decision 
maker being posed with a risky choice, they are simply presented with alternative 
descriptions of an attribute which is what results in the framing effect. The “75% lean” 
versus “25% fat” example discussed earlier is a typical and common example. 
Presuming that low fat is something that the target audience cares about, the decision 
maker (i.e. consumer) is more likely to have a positive view of the ‘lean’ emphasis 
framing of the same information. Many examples of attribute framing occur in the 
marketing of pre-packed foods. While this example may be appropriately described as 
an ‘attribute frame’ (i.e. one kind of equivalence frame), to alternatively represent the 
same product as being either “lean” or containing “fat”, is to create a corresponding set 
of semantic frames. It is easy to see here how semantic framing in conjunction with 
other frames is both inevitable and also non-trivial. For example, which of the following 
claims would best motivate people to buy the product? That it: (i) is lean; (ii) is low in 
fat; (iii) has little fat; or (iv) is not high in fat? 
This demonstrates how different types of frames may co-occur. The alternative attribute 
frames provide equivalent factual information about a food product, but do so in a way 
that frames the product as a healthy choice. That is, the alternative attribute frames are 
both presented within a healthy choice ‘issue frame’ (this is also the case for the 
corresponding semantic frames). From an advertising perspective, the most carefully 
crafted attribute or semantic frame may be unhelpful if these are themselves presented 
within an issue frame that does not engage the intended audience. In the case of this 
hypothetical food product, it may be that consumers are more interested in taste than 
health. As such, an alternative issue frame that presents the product within a ‘tasty 
choice’ frame may be more effective. Such advertising may use a story frame to weave 
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this information together, e.g. “Twice as much taste than our competitor, with less than 
10% fat”.  
Goal framing 
 Goal framing is directed toward “enhancing the evaluation of some situation or 
behaviour” such that a positive frame focuses attention on the potential benefit or gain 
and the negative frame focuses attention on the potential to prevent or avoid loss (Levin, 
Schneider and Gaeth 1998 pp 167).  Although they did not recognise it as goal framing 
at the time, Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s (1987) well-known framing study concerning 
breast self-examination (BSE) provides a good example of goal framing. In that case, 
the positive frame states:  
“Research shows that women who do BSE have an increased chance of 
finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stages of the disease.” 
While the complementary negative frame states: 
“Research shows that women who do not BSE have a decreased chance of 
finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stages of the disease.” 
The study found that the negative frame stressing the negative consequences of not 
engaging in BSE was more effective at eliciting BSE behaviour. The question in goal 
framing is which frame will have the greater persuasive impact on achieving the same 
end result (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998). This question may depend on the types 
of benefits/harms contemplated, the emotive strength of the language used and the 
personal relevance to each message receiver (Spence and Pidgeon 2010) as well as an 
appreciation for which attribute relevant to the behaviour is most likely to be of 
influence.   
Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s study was originally conceived of and interpreted from the 
perspective of risky-choice framing and prospect theory. This was predicated on the 
basis that the advocated behaviour (breast self-examination) was the risky-choice 
because it carried the risk of finding a lump and that it was not preventative in nature, 
but was only to do with disease detection (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987). Because 
prospect theory predicts that people are risk averse when dealing with gains as in a 
positive frame and risk seeking with negative or ‘loss’ frames, then the negatively 
framed statement ought to be more persuasive, as it was found to be. On this basis, a 
negative frame ought to generally be more persuasive where the decision maker 
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perceives the advocated behaviour to carry some risk. However, this is not always the 
case and it is likely that there are cognitive influences other than prospect theory that 
influence decision making in these circumstances (Myers 2010; Levin, Schneider and 
Gaeth 1998). For example, goal-framing research by Morton et al. (2011) concerning 
pro-environmental behaviour related to climate change found that positive frames were 
more effective owing to their ability to enhance participants’ sense of efficacy. Frames 
can also be effective at reaching some demographics and not others (see Van de Velde 
et al. 2010 and Grankvist, Dahlstrand and Biel 2004 for examples concerning pro-
environmental behaviours related to goal and attribute framing, respectively). 
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) identified that the kind of application of prospect 
theory to framing as used by the BSE example above was different to the risky-choice 
framing of Tversky and Kahneman and which gave rise to prospect theory. Many health 
related studies have used prospect theory to test and understand framing effects aimed at 
promoting health related behaviours, but this does not sufficiently explain the observed 
effects (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998; Myers 2010). These kinds of applications 
should prove instructive to the design of pro-environmental behaviour related framing 
campaigns. It is also worth noting that in goal-framing both the positively and 
negatively framed messages promote the behaviour. In the BSE example above, both 
messages use attribute framing to ‘sell’ the benefit of undertaking the behaviour. In this 
sense there is a convergence between attribute and goal framing, as well as an 
interaction with prospect theory, although this may not always be significant or the 
dominant effect.  
1.4 Frames are mixed 
I’ve described above how attribute frames can at times be indistinguishable from 
semantic frames. If you consider that non-equivalence frames occur on a continuum 
between semantic frames and story frames, then it is possible to conceive of equivalence 
frames (with include attribute frames) as a particular category of frames that sit towards 
the semantic end of the continuum (figure 1.1). Although it is possible to distinguish 
between discrete types of framing, as I have sought to do, owing to the imprecise nature 
of language it is difficult in the real world to create such ‘thoroughbred’ examples of 
specific frame types. Certainly, in most real world cases, communications are going to 
contain multiple different frames. Even the examples given above inevitably incorporate 
degrees of semantic and story framing. Although not as elaborate as Entman’s (1993) 
‘framing functions’, these examples use a narrative to emphasize a particular view of 
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reality, with the differences between the alternative frames comprising semantic 
differences that also effect the narrative. 
For a ubiquitous example, consider the food product claim “90% fat free” which seeks 
to paint the product in better light than “contains 10% fat”. This simple example 
provides an illustration of both logically equivalent framing and semantic framing (i.e. 
‘fat’ versus ‘fat free’), as well as of issue framing (i.e. food as health). The issue frame 
arises from the receiver’s connection of the fat-related claim to the discourse on public 
health wherein high-fat foods have been labelled as problematic. This discourse has 
been framed by various actors, including news and other media, with actors often 
presenting information within frames that support vested interests. Hence a range of 
actors, influences, and types of framing will be at play in most situations. 
Note that even in the carefully contrived example of Tversky and Kahneman’s Asian 
Disease problem outlined above, that although objectively equivalent, the alternative 
descriptions of either ‘200 people saved’ or ‘one-third probability that 600 people will 
be saved’ unavoidably introduces semantic differences that cannot easily be excluded as 
contributing to the observed framing effect.  
1.5 Prospect for strategic use of framing 
Irrespective of the category to which they belong, frames influence people’s preferences 
“because a substantively different consideration is brought to bear on the issue at hand” 
(Druckman 2001, pp 235). Because “framing puts information into a context and 
establishes frames of reference so people can evaluate information, comprehend 
meanings and take action” (Hallahan 1999, pp 224), the way an author frames 
information can influence the way that it is understood and acted upon by the audience. 
It stands to reason therefore that a strategic approach to the use of framing can help 
enhance the salience of a particular message. Such framing can be undertaken by 
shaping different aspects of a communication, for example situations, attributes, 
choices, actions, issues, responsibility and news can all be the subject of framing 
(Hallahan 1999). In order to begin to bring collective understanding of various framing 
research together, it is important to understand how the different uses and applications 
of previous framing research sit alongside each other, how they are similar, and where 
they differ. Despite the widespread reporting of framing effects, they often depend 
heavily on context, are complex and can be unreliable. Yet even semantic differences 
can never be assumed to be of no consequence. As such, it is not possible to choose to 
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communicate without a frame, and it is both naïve and futile to strive for some kind of 
objectively neutral frame in which to communicate information. Communicators cannot 
escape framing effects, but they can choose whether or not to use framing strategically 
to enhance their message.  
Despite the varied and extensive study of framing across many research areas, there is 
no existing list of principles or rules of thumb to guide communicators who are 
interested in using strategic framing. This is a consequence of the varied use of 
‘framing’ and related concepts across disciplines, as well as the context-specific nature 
within which frames tend to exert their influence. Notwithstanding this, the overarching 
goal of my research is to investigate how aspects of framing may be applied 
strategically to the communication of biodiversity conservation in order to more 
effectively connect with an audience.  
1.6 Previous framing studies in biodiversity conservation 
Although a variety of framing approaches have been used to investigate the efficacy of 
differently framed messages in a variety of environmental behaviour change contexts, 
very few exist in the context of biodiversity conservation. For example, the strategic 
framing of messages to drive behaviour change has been investigated in the context of 
energy consumption (e.g. van de Velde et al. 2010; Steinhorst, Klöckner and Matthies. 
2015), recycling (e.g. Davis 1995; White, MacDonnell and Dahl 2011), climate change 
mitigation (e.g. Myers et al. 2012; Gifford and Comeau 2011; Morton et al. 2011; 
Spence and Pidgeon 2010) and the purchase of environmentally friendly products (e.g. 
Grankvist, Dahlstrand and Biel 2004; Tu, Kao and Tu 2013). This may be because most 
of this research is focussed on behaviour change, and thus requires a rather specific 
problem that is caused by identifiable behaviour that can be a target of the message. 
Biodiversity loss is caused by multitude human activities, only some of which are 
specifically attributable to individual behaviour and suitable for specific behavioural 
campaigns that promote people to, for example, buy product x instead of product y, or 
donate to this conservation charity, or to not take a certain fish species, etc. Other 
potential targets for biodiversity conservation communication and advocacy include 
providing information and influencing attitudes over time or generating public support 
for government (or other) conservation action. Such communications are likely to be 
enhanced by a strategic approach to their framing. 
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Very few studies have directly tested the efficacy of differently framed messages in the 
context of biodiversity conservation. Gregory, Lichtenstein and MacGregor (1993) 
demonstrated that loss/gain framing operated according to prospect theory in the context 
of environmental policy (although not specifically biodiversity conservation). By 
framing policy alternatives as either a restored environmental health gain (relative to a 
previously experienced loss) or alternatively as an environmental health gain compared 
to the status quo, they showed that changes in reference points can alter how people 
evaluate policy options. This demonstrates that prospect theory is applicable in these 
contexts which are arguably more complex than many previous applications. This not 
only has applications for strategic message framing, but is also relevant to the 
communication of policy options more broadly. In a somewhat similar vein, Wilson and 
Bruskotter (2009) examined how emphasising the past success or failure of previous 
wolf restoration efforts influenced future attitudes toward wolf restoration. Although 
provision of information about failed restoration resulted in more negative attitudes to 
wolf restoration, this did not influence voting or donation behaviour.  
It is interesting to note that the restored loss versus new gain investigation of Gregory, 
Lichtenstein and MacGregor (1993) involves what are substantially ‘equivalence 
frames’, although their reliance on written language introduces numerous semantic 
elements. It is also tempting to consider the wolf restoration example of Wilson and 
Bruskotter (2009) as a positive versus negative framing, however this application 
involves semantic elements as well as the idea of success and failure as issues. This 
illustrates that ‘real world’ examples of framing, or at least those that are likely to be 
relevant to biodiversity conservation and policy contexts, are unlikely ever to be able to 
be described solely in terms of semantic, equivalence or issue frames, but are likely to 
be composed of elements of multiple types of frame. 
A further example of empirical testing of alternative frames in a biodiversity context is 
provided by McComas et al. (2015). The authors tested alternatively framed messages 
about a fictitious oyster bacteria framed either as a public health issue or as an oyster 
health issue, caused by either ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’. They found that the 
public health frame was more effective at eliciting support for marine policy and that 
participants with lower environmental values were more supportive of marine policy 
when exposed to the climate change/oyster health frame combination. This is consistent 
with previous research that has shown public health issue frames to be effective at 
increasing support for mitigating climate change (e.g. Myers et al. 2012). This study 
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also highlights how alternative words and terms can influence the way people respond 
to information, even in the case of apparent synonyms such as ‘climate change’ versus 
‘global warming’ (McComas et al. 2015). 
These were all the examples I could find in the literature of empirical tests of alternative 
biodiversity conservation frames given a thorough search. However, such research can 
be difficult to find, given that the term ‘framing’ is not universal. However, it is clear 
that there are comparatively few such studies.  
The most common kind of framing research reported within biodiversity conservation is 
that which uses framing as a tool for understanding relevant discourse or concepts. Like 
empirically tested alternatively framed messages, this information can also help guide 
the strategic framing of communications for greater effect; it is important to be aware of 
the role that discourse can have in shaping a community’s perception and attitudes (e.g. 
Fairclough 1992). A particularly strategically attuned example is that of Apostolopoulou 
and Adams (2015) who considered the influence of biodiversity offsetting policies on 
the politics of biodiversity loss. Because offsetting policy re-frames nature as units of 
biodiversity that are easily measured and exchanged, by presenting this as a technical 
issue, the problem of biodiversity loss is de-politicised. They argue that this inhibits the 
possibility of opposing and challenging the ongoing biodiversity loss that is inherent in 
the policy. Analysis such as this is useful in contemplating how particular frames may 
arise unintentionally from policy and discourse, and for conservation advocates to 
foresee the potential for such frames to ultimately be counter-productive, or to provide 
guidance on effective ways to engage with such frames once they have become 
established. 
There are also a number of studies in the literature that examine the frames with which 
key conservation stakeholders and actors view the world. Although they do not directly 
test the efficacy of alternative frames, these kinds of analyses are important for 
understanding how messages might best be framed to engage or influence key actors or 
a target audience. For example Wilhelm-Rechmann and Cowling (2011) investigated 
how biodiversity and similar issues were understood by government decision makers in 
South Africa. In that context they discovered that ‘conservation’ was typically regarded 
as a socially unjust endeavour because it was seen to oppose socio-economic 
development. This meant that conservation messages tended to generate opposition or 
be ignored. Analysis such as this provides valuable information to inform the strategic 
re-framing of not only individual messages within a particular context, but also of an 
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entire policy approach. For example, Tacaks (1996) analyses how conservation elites 
have influenced conservation discourse and policy, in part by contesting established 
frames. Similar examples have examined the different frames held by stakeholders 
about conservation or natural resource management problems influences attitudes and 
behaviours and which can lead to conflicting goals or policy preferences (e.g. Dewulf, 
Craps and Dercon 2004; Fischer and Bliss 2009). Such research is complemented by 
analyses that examine how conservation issues are framed in the media (e.g. Arvai and 
Mascarenhas 2001), including specifically how this relates to matters of trust (e.g. 
Dikou and Dionysopoulou 2011) and human-wildlife conflict (e.g. Jacobson et al. 2012; 
Bhatia et al. 2013; Muter et al. 2013). Although these examples provide a good basis to 
inform strategically framed communication strategies, it is unclear how often this 
happens, and how effective any attempts to do this are. Park and Kleinschmit (2016) 
investigated the roles that forest conservation stakeholders play in framing forest 
conservation issues within media reports and found that conservation actors do not seek 
to strategically re-frame forest conservation issues once they are established by 
journalists. This suggests that there is an opportunity here for conservation advocates to 
engage more strategically in influencing the framing process.  
For communicators to best make use of strategic framing within their messages, they 
need to understand how their intended audience will likely respond to differently framed 
information. This includes all types of framing, whether it be semantic framing, 
equivalence framing or issue framing. However, there is no comprehensive treatment of 
this in the literature. Rather, previous framing research tends to approach particular 
issues or cases with specific frames in mind, regardless of whether or not it uses the 
term ‘framing’, and irrespective of the subject matter to which it relates. This may be in 
terms of whether messages framed in terms of ‘hope’ versus ‘fear’ are more effective, 
or losses versus gains, or framed as a health versus security issue (or some other issue). 
Certainly there is no cohesive framework or guidance that considers how the different 
types of framing interact or may best be used to create effective messages. Some useful 
efforts towards this have been attempted. For example Lakoff (2010) provides a useful 
introduction to the way in which frames are inherent in all communication, and provides 
a few rules of thumb to aid environmental communication. However, these are largely 
indistinguishable from oft-given advice for good communication, such as to talk about 
values, tell stories rather than listing facts, and to relate the message to the concerns of 
your audience, providing little guidance on the strategic framing of conservation issues. 
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The most comprehensive strategic analysis of frames in biodiversity conservation sits 
within the grey literature. Blackmore et al. (2013) analyse the communication and 
advocacy material of thirteen conservation organisations across the United Kingdom, 
principally on the basis of whether the appeals are framed as extrinsic (i.e. appealing to 
self-interest) or intrinsic (i.e. highlighting the intrinsic values of nature). The authors 
found that the organisations used extrinsic appeals more often than intrinsic appeals. 
Blackmore et al. (2013) also provide a range of communication recommendations, 
including avoiding making appeals that are rooted in self-interest. This echoes the work 
of Maio et al. (2009) which demonstrates that the engagement of one type of value can 
suppress opposing values. This is the basis of the mission of the Common Cause 
Foundation (http://valuesandframes.org) which works across public and private sectors 
to promote values that they consider will best support community, environment and 
equality across cultural, political and civic institutions. However their vision is one of 
generally transforming society, rather than of strategic framing for greatest 
contemporary effects. Perhaps the best ‘practical guide’ to message framing for 
communicators is that of Hine et al. (2014) which also draws on relevant literature to 
provide easy to follow guidance for the framing of messages designed to influence 
behaviours as they relate to invasive pest management. Hine et al. (2014) echo 
Blackmore et al. (2013) and recommend that appeals be limited to intrinsic values only, 
and specifically recommend that the mention of extrinsic values be avoided. On the 
other hand, Metz and Weigel (2013) specifically encourage the linking of conservation 
to extrinsic benefits in their recommendations on “how to communicate effectively to 
build support for conservation” (pp 1) for The Nature Conservancy. Based on polling of 
US voters Metz and Weigel (2013) provide a list of issue frames anticipated to be 
effective at promoting conservation to the public, as well as a list of issue frames to be 
avoided. The marketing group Futerra (2015) also provide some guidance on how to 
apply a marketing approach to promote the concept of biodiversity conservation. Said to 
be drawn from the psychology literature, Futerra’s advice provides a simple guide for 
conservation communicators, although this seems to be chiefly aimed at encouraging 
charitable donations. Like Metz and Weigel, Futerra suggests using extrinsic appeals 
that relate to the economic value of biodiversity, but caution how it is used, noting its 
capacity to undermine the argument in some cases.  
Thus, between these few documents aimed at would-be strategic framing 
communicators, there is a spectrum of recommendations on the use of extrinsic 
motivations, ranging from ‘deliberately use these’ to ‘use these wisely’ to ‘don’t even 
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mention these’. This typifies the lack of clear guidance within the literature on how the 
framing of conservation messages ought to be undertaken for greatest effect. Hine et al. 
(2014) direct communicators to the use of other social phenomena such as social norms 
that may be a useful mechanism for strategic framing that, while considered in the more 
recent (and related) arena of ‘social nudges’ (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 2008), has 
generally not been considered within the framing literature. 
1.7 Thesis outline 
The aim of this research is to begin to develop an understanding of how framing 
concepts may be used strategically to improve the effectiveness of biodiversity 
conservation messages. Although framing has received a lot of attention across a range 
of disciplines, as outlined above, there is very little application of it to biodiversity 
conservation and little guidance as to how the variety of framing approaches could be 
used strategically to enhance communication effectiveness. To begin building an 
understanding of the use of framing in the context of biodiversity conservation, my first 
research goal is to undertake empirical testing of alternatively framed conservation-
related messages. It is perhaps unsurprising that equivalence frames have not been 
applied to conservation contexts, particularly given that these tend to require highly 
specific settings that involve a choice between alternatives or are intended to promote a 
specific behaviour. To apply and examine such equivalence frames in the context of 
conservation would add little in this area, given that that prospect theory upon which 
these types of frames chiefly rely is well understood. Instead I seek to test novel issue 
frames (i.e. non-equivalence frames) that are highly applicable to biodiversity 
conservation communication. The first such investigation involves testing the effect of 
the alternative frames on attitudes to a government policy in a conservation context, via 
a series of online surveys, and is reported in Chapter 2. This research also considers the 
effect of semantic framing in the operationalisation of the alternative concepts. 
Thinking strategically about the influence of framing on a message not only concerns 
techniques for enhancing messages, but also avoiding framing effects that may be 
unhelpful. As such, and noting the increasing prominence of framing the rationale for 
conservation in terms of ‘ecosystem services’ (i.e. an issue frame in which nature 
provides the goods and services necessary to human survival), I next investigate how 
this influences the way in which people think about and value nature, also using a series 
of online surveys. This research, reported in Chapter 3, links ecosystem service framing 
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with the motivational crowding literature and engages with discussion of the relative 
merits and perils of extrinsic appeals identified in the existing conservation 
communication guidance identified above. 
I am also interested in understanding the degree to which framing is strategically 
considered by conservation communicators. Using content analysis, I examine the 
degree to which the websites of key Australian private land conservation organisations 
strategically frame the benefits of participation in their conservation schemes when 
trying to engage prospective landholder participants. I do this using a value-orientation 
framework to analyse how the benefits of program participation are framed, 
categorising these as either benefits to landholders, to society or to the environment. 
Each way of framing the participation benefits can be considered as alternative issue 
frames, each corresponding to one of three value orientations that people are known to 
hold, and which can influence pro-environmental behaviours. In order to be relevant and 
engaging to as broad a range of landholders as possible, all three kinds of benefits 
should be well represented. However, a large predominance or minority of any of the 
three benefits types may indicate a lack of strategy in the way benefits are framed 
within these communications, and certainly will provide valuable insight. This research 
is reported in Chapter 4. 
Understanding how the framing of public conservation policy discourse has changed 
over time can provide insight into how policy makers think about these issues and how 
it may influence the thinking of the public. In Chapter 5 I examine the degree to which 
an ecosystem services frame is used (explicitly or implicitly) to explain or justify 
environmental policy, and how this has changed over the past ten years. I also examine 
how use of the term ‘biodiversity’ and presence of economic language has changed over 
the same period. This is investigated by way of key-word search and discourse analysis 
of media releases from the Australian Government environment portfolio and the 
Australian Conservation Foundation. 
In order to provide useful guidance on how framing concepts could be strategically used 
to enhance conservation communications, I draw together the key lessons from the 
research reported herein with key understandings from the existing literature in Chapter 
6. This chapter serves as a general discussion for the thesis, and is presented in the form 
of an overview research article aimed at empowering communicators to engage with 
and begin to make strategic use of key framing concepts to enhance their conservation 
communications.  
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Lastly, Chapter 7 reiterates the key findings of this research, including implications for 
conservation messaging, and important areas for future research.  
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2 HOW SHOULD PRIVATE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS BE 
FRAMED IN THE PROMOTION 
OF PRIVATE LAND 
CONSERVATION? 
This chapter is an edited version of the submitted paper: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Prep). How should private 
property rights be framed in the promotion of private land conservation?  
Abstract 
It is well established that the way in which information is presented and framed can 
significantly affect how people understand and respond to this information. This means 
the strategic framing of messages can improve the effectiveness of information 
campaigns; a fact well utilised in health promotion. However, there has been little 
research on effective ways of framing information to promote biodiversity conservation. 
Here, I present the results of three online surveys that explore how alternative 
conceptualisations of property ownership can influence attitudes towards an urban 
conservation program. I find that the alternative conceptualisations of property rights 
offered no framing advantage, but that a beneficial framing effect can arise from use of 
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these concepts in conjunction with semantic framing and cognitive biases. The results 
suggest that communications that strategically use property concepts to minimise 
landholders’ sense of interference with their property rights, could offer an advantage 
compared to communications that are not strategically framed. Given that conservation 
on private land is both very important for achieving conservation outcomes, and 
requires the prioritising of conservation actions by landholders over their own property, 
this research may inform more effective approaches for communications that promote 
private land conservation. 
2.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that the traditional protected area system is insufficient for the 
conservation of biological diversity at a global scale (Rodrigues et al. 2004; Gallo et al. 
2009). In part this is due to the large proportion of threatened species and ecosystems 
that occur only on private property (Cooke et al. 2012), and various schemes for private 
land conservation (PLC) have been increasingly utilised over recent decades as a means 
of implementing conservation beyond the public protected area network (Cooke et al. 
2012). Internationally, PLC is implemented through a range of instruments, including 
direct payments, tax incentives, cap and trade markets, voluntary markets, auctions and 
certification programs (Pascual and Perrings 2007; Yang et al. 2010; Pirard 2012). 
Conservation on private land is essential if real gains in protecting threatened vegetation 
and wildlife communities are to be made (Gallo et al. 2009), including within urban and 
peri-urban landscapes (Goddard, Dougill and Benton 2010). 
Although much research seeks to understand what drives participation in PLC programs 
(e.g. Ervin and Ervin 1982; Lynne, Shonkwiler and Rola 1988; Adesina and Zinnah 
1993; Negatu and Parikh 1999; Greiner, Patterson and Miller 2009; Moon and Cocklin 
2011), questions remain regarding best approaches to maximising both participation and 
conservation gains that result from participation. Ultimately this is a question of human 
behaviour (Brechin et al. 2002; Bennet and Roth 2015) as all PLC programs deal with 
private landholders and seek to change the way they use their land. Different schemes 
will appeal differently to landholders depending on the landholder’s interests, values 
and circumstances.   
Some PLC programs offer landholders no direct rewards or incentives, but through 
outreach support interested landholders to engage in conservation practices, and to also 
promote the community and landholder co-benefits of undertaking conservation 
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practices on their own land, largely in conjunction with their regular income generating 
activities (e.g. Landcare Australia International, www.alci.com.au). In contrast, 
incentive schemes often involve payments or other financial inducements (including 
various market-based approaches) to incentivize landholders to manage parts of their 
land for conservation, often in place of traditional income generation (i.e. grazing, 
cropping, etc.) (e.g. BushTender, www.depi.vic.gov.au; Ferraro and Kiss 2002). 
Another approach involves creating enforceable restrictions on land use (i.e. easements 
or covenants) which prohibit vegetation clearing, stocking, cropping and other uses (e.g. 
Kabii and Horwitz 2006). Although entered into voluntarily by a landholder, these are 
enforceable against later title holders. Alongside these opt-in schemes, most Western 
countries have top-down regulations that impose some restrictions on the permitted uses 
of private land, centred on preserving habitat for threatened species or regulating 
vegetation clearing (Cooke et al. 2012).  
Property rights and framing 
It is well established that the way information is presented and framed can significantly 
affect the way people understand and respond to that information (e.g. Harris 1973; 
Tverskey and Kahneman 1981; Gamson and Modiglian 1989; Entman 1993). The term 
‘framing’ is used to refer to the way an issue is described, or the way in which a 
problem is conceived, articulated or packaged with other contextual information. 
Framing theory has been used to understand communication and related behaviour in a 
wide range of disciplines including psychology, speech communication, organisational 
decision making, economics, health communication, media studies and political science 
(Hallahan 1999). Because the way something is framed can emphasise certain aspects, 
while minimising others (Entman 1993; Myers et al. 2012), much research has focussed 
on the effects on attitudes and behaviours from describing the same objective 
information in either a positive or negative light (often referred to as ‘valence framing’). 
Much of this research has assumed that Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) ‘prospect 
theory’, one particular cognitive bias which in part suggests that losses may be more 
salient than equivalent gains, drives a choice preference despite the objective 
equivalence of two ways of framing the same information (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
1998). However it is reasonable to expect that other cognitive biases may also generate 
choice preferences when activated by alternatively framed yet objectively equivalent 
information. Semantic framing has been shown to influence attitudes that result from 
describing, for example, immigrants as ‘illegal’ versus ‘undocumented’ (Merolla et al. 
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2013) or people as “tall” versus “short” (Rugg 1941) or as something that occurs 
“frequently” versus “occasionally” (Harris 1973). However, framing can also be used to 
articulate whole issues, for example describing climate change as a public health issue 
or alternatively as a national security problem (Myers et al. 2012), amongst many 
others; these are often referred to as ‘issue frames’ or ‘emphasis frames’ (Hallahan 
1999; Druckman 2001). 
Property rights can be conceived of in two different ways: the ‘bundle-of-rights’ 
paradigm and ‘discrete asset’ paradigm. The ‘discrete asset’ paradigm is generally what 
is understood by the layperson (Nash 2009) and which emphasises the ‘thing’ aspect of 
property over which the owner has dominion (Nash and Stern 2009). For example, the 
thought-logic may be thus: ‘I own this car, and it is mine to use as I like’. In contrast, 
the ‘bundle-of-rights’ paradigm represents the legal theoretical approach in which 
property rights are simply a bundle of separate rights, for example a right to occupy, 
use, sell, or exclude others from property in some way (Alchian and Demsetz 1973; 
Nash and Stern 2009). In the example of the car, the typical owner enjoys dominion 
because they usually hold these separate rights in their ‘bundle’. However the bundle 
may be separated; it is possible for one person to hold the rights of disposal for the car 
(i.e. they can sell it to another party) whilst another holds the right to use and operate 
the car. This applies also to land and realty; for example when an owner rents their 
house or office etc. to a tenant, the owner assigns the right to occupy the house or office 
to that tenant. The landlord retains ownership, but does not have the right to occupy the 
house or office while the lease remains in place. 
In this conceptualisation, having a legal interest in a property is simply possessing one 
or more ‘rights’. A conservation covenant thereby involves a landholder giving up 
certain land use rights to that part of their land over which the covenant is placed and 
this right is thereafter held by the state (or other authority), which exercises this use 
right for the purpose of conservation (e.g. The Nature Conservancy, www.nature.org). 
This does not involve the giving up of all of the landholders use rights, and neither does 
it change the ownership of the land that is subject to the covenant; it simply modifies 
how the landholder’s use rights may be exercised over the land that is subject to the 
covenant.   
The alternative property paradigms can be considered as alternative emphasis frames, 
though the effects of such property frames on attitudes have not been widely studied. 
Nash (2009) and Nash and Stern (2009) demonstrated that by describing the prospective 
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purchase of laptop computers to students in either of the alternative property frames, 
they could alter the perceptions, attitudes and reactions of participants. In that case the 
bundle-of-rights framing was found to induce a more favourable response to the 
prospect of a later restriction of use rights over the laptop (i.e. a top-down curtailing of 
the rights inherent in the laptop ‘ownership’), compared to the discrete asset frame.  
This capacity for the bundle-of-rights frames to influence attitudes about one’s own 
property and reactions to limitations in use of that property may have value to the 
private land conservation sector. PLC schemes are essentially appealing to landholders 
to sacrifice some of their property rights (e.g. conservation covenants and easements), 
their potential income (e.g. opportunity cost), or labour and other resources in favour of 
what is essentially a public good (biodiversity; Ferraro and Kiss 2002). In addition, top-
down regulatory measures often effectively extinguish certain private property rights, 
for example by prohibiting the clearing of certain vegetation, and landholders are 
typically not compensated for this loss (e.g. in Australia government buy-backs of water 
licences and fishing rights involve compensation, but loss of rights to clear remnant 
vegetation typically do not). Conservation covenants (or easements) are voluntary 
agreements between a landholder and a conservation organisation in which the 
landholder permanently revokes aspects of their property rights over their land (or part 
thereof), in order to protect the biodiversity or other conservation values. Although a 
conservation covenant (or easement) is one of the few PLC mechanisms in which the 
property rights of a landholder are permanently restricted for the benefit of 
conservation, arguably all PLC programs implicitly conceive of a ‘bundle-of-rights’ 
approach to property rights by their assertion of public interest (i.e. in conservation) 
over the privately owned land (i.e. that the public interest of conservation should curtail 
aspects of the individual rights held in the bundle, but not in a way that interferes with 
the landholder’s ownership per se). However, the layperson generally understands 
property in the discrete asset terms (Nash 2009).  
I was therefore interested in exploring whether the bundle-of-rights framing of property 
rights could be advantageous to promoting PLC. Here I build on work by Nash and 
Stern (2009) and test the effect on attitudes of residents concerning a proposal to limit 
the rights of property owners. Similar to Nash and Stern’s ‘forewarning’ example, I 
investigate whether alternative property frames could influence the attitudes of home 
owners and residents toward a nature conservation-related property restriction. If the 
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property frames can influence this attitude, then they may offer a useful approach to 
enhancing the effectiveness of some PLC communications. 
To investigate this I undertook three separate studies, all via an online web survey. 
Given that urban areas are important for conservation (Goddard, Dougill and Benton 
2010) but often overlooked as a target for private land conservation programs, I used an 
urban context for this research. Urban residents are also more easily accessible through 
online recruitment. Although this research looks specifically at the framing of property 
concepts, it is worth noting that framing in general has not been well studied in 
biodiversity conservation communications, and there appears to be little strategy 
employed in the framing of private land conservation messaging (Kusmanoff et al. 
2016). I conclude by discussing the potential for message framing to be used 
strategically to improve conservation advocacy. 
2.2 Methods 
I conducted three studies to investigate the role of property framing in influencing 
attitudes of home-owners and residents in Australia concerning the degree to which they 
would accept a conservation-related property restriction. This consisted of two different 
studies (study 1 and 2a), and a repetition of the second study with an alternative 
recruitment method (study 2b). This research was conducted according to the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research and approved by the RMIT 
University College of Design and Social Context Human Ethics Advisory Network 
(17091-01/14 and 19479-06/15, Appendix A). The preliminary information provided to 
participants is available at Appendix B. All studies involved participants providing 
demographic information and information about attitudes concerning their preference 
for collective versus individual rights (herein referred to as ‘utilitarianism’) and their 
attitudes to the strength of property rights (herein referred to as ‘property rights 
strength’).  
Study 1 asked participants to choose between two policy options for the regulation of 
trees on private land. The policy options were framed alternatively in the discrete asset 
and bundle-of-rights paradigms, but each described the same objective policy, and 
thereby investigated the extent to which either paradigm resulted in a choice preference. 
Here, the alternative options used a combination of semantic framing (i.e. different 
language) to describe the same objective policy in a way that emphasised a) the discrete 
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asset frame, and b) the bundle-of-rights frame. The wordings of the alternative options 
are provided below, and the complete surveys are provided in Appendix C.  
In study 2a and 2b participants were randomly assigned to one of two framing 
conditions. All study 2 participants read a legalese statement of a hypothetical 
regulation to limit how trees may be dealt with on private land.  Participants were 
provided with explanatory information framed in either the discrete asset paradigm or 
the bundle-of-rights paradigm. Participants then indicated their degree of acceptance of 
the hypothetical regulation (see ‘acceptance measure’ below). Although the alternative 
policy descriptions necessarily used different language, the language was carefully 
chosen not to create any obviously discernible valence between the alternatives (see 
‘Construction of the frames’ below). This allowed me to test the influence of the 
alternative property paradigms in their own right, without any combined effect due to 
semantic framing. In addition, this scenario in which a regulation (or other conservation 
action) is described in terms of either property frame is a more realistic example for 
‘real world’ use than as a choice between alternatively framed options, as tested in study 
1 (refer to Appendix C for the exact wording). 
Participant recruitment 
In the interest of enlisting as many participants as possible, both studies were 
undertaken via a web-based survey instrument, hosted by Qualtrics 
(www.qualtrics.com), and using a hypothetical regulation applicable across Australian 
(and other Western nations) urban regions. For both studies, participants were first 
asked to provide basic demographic information, such as age, education and occupation, 
as well as whether they had ever owned property and if their current home had a yard. A 
composite method for recruiting participants that combined both convenience and 
snowball sampling was used. This involved using email and social media to send 
invitations to undertake the survey to my own network, both personal and professional, 
as well as requesting those recipients to forward the request to their own networks. 
Because the results of study 2a suggested a ceiling effect (indicated by high 
‘acceptance’ of the proposed regulation across the sample), this study was repeated 
using an alternative recruitment method (see study 2b). For the repeated study (2b), I 
engaged a professional social research company to provide a broad sample of 
participants drawn from across Australia that were incentivized for their participation. 
This ensured that the participants were not self-selected on the basis of topic interest or 
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altruism, and that they represented a range of ages and locations. This enabled me to 
verify that the results obtained in study 2a were reliable and not an artefact of the 
recruitment method. 
Measuring property rights and utilitarianism 
I hypothesised that attitudes towards utilitarianism and property rights would influence 
the choice preference in each of the studies. To measure these attitudes, respondents 
were asked to indicate on a 7 point Likert-scale the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements:  
 It is sometimes necessary to limit personal freedoms for the benefit of society as 
a whole; and 
 I should be able to do whatever I like with my own property, so long as I don’t 
harm anyone. 
Responses to these questions were used to investigate a number of correlations within 
the data (see ‘correlations’ section of the results) and are herein referred to 
‘utilitarianism’ and ‘property rights strength’, respectively. The order in which the two 
questions were presented to respondents was counterbalanced (i.e. alternated) in order 
to minimise order effects (Schuman and Presser 1981).  
Study 1 
Participants were asked to select their preference between two alternative hypothetical 
approaches to regulating removal of native trees, based on the brief descriptions 
recreated below: 
Please imagine that you are a property owner and that your local 
government plans to regulate the removal of trees.  Imagine that the two 
following options are being considered: 
Option A would modify private property rights by taking away the right of 
property owners to freely manage their own land through prohibiting the 
removal of native trees greater than 2 metres in height, other than with a 
permit. 
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Option B would not change private property rights other than to require a 
permit before property owners may remove native trees greater than 2 
metres in height. 
Based only on this information, which option would you prefer? 
Both options describe the same regulation, but in different frames. Option A is framed 
in the discrete asset concept, wherein ownership is all-encompassing and interference 
with the associated rights implicitly threatens that ownership. Option B is framed in the 
bundle-of-rights paradigm in which ‘ownership’ is bestowed by a number of separate 
and severable rights, and that should one of these be interfered with, it need not threaten 
the ownership as a whole. Participants were then asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert 
scale the degree to which they were confident that their choice was the better 
alternative, in which a value of 1 indicated ‘not at all confident’ and a value of 5 
indicated ‘very highly confident’ (herein referred to as ‘sureness’). The full survey is 
provided in Appendix C.  
Study 2a and 2b 
This investigation was undertaken using an ‘independent groups design’ wherein 
respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups: the ‘discrete asset frame’ 
group, or the ‘bundle-of-rights frame’ group. Respondents were first asked to imagine 
that the local council proposed to introduce the following regulation: 
Unless in accordance with a permit, a person must not remove, damage, kill 
or destroy a Valuable Tree. A Valuable Tree is a native tree greater than 2 
metres in height. 
This is similar to ‘significant tree’ regulations already been introduced by many local 
government areas across Australia, but modified here to provide added and specific 
protection to ‘native trees’ for the purposes of biodiversity conservation. The 
hypothetical regulation would apply to many trees, owing to the 2 metre height 
threshold; this was intentional to ensure significant likelihood that the homes of many 
respondents would be affected by the regulation. After reading this ‘legalese’ version of 
the hypothetical regulation, respondents were told that in order to help explain the 
proposed regulation, the local government had provided further information. At this 
point, the ‘discrete asset frame’ group received information that explained the regulation 
framed in that frame, and the ‘bundle-of-rights frame’ group received information 
framed in that frame (see Appendix C for the text used). 
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Respondents were then asked a number of questions about their attitudes to the policy, 
in order to measure their degree of ‘acceptance’ of the policy (this scale is described in 
further detail below). I hypothesised that respondents who were given the explanatory 
information framed in the bundle-of-rights paradigm would report greater ‘acceptance’ 
of the hypothetical regulation. 
Acceptance measure 
The acceptance measure comprised three questions designed to measure attitudes 
related to separate aspects of acceptance of the hypothetical regulation. Respondents 
were asked to indicate on a 7 point Likert scale (with the same labels as that used to 
measure utilitarian and property strength rights attitudes) the degree to which they 
agreed with the statements: “I think this policy is fair”; “I would comply with this 
policy”; and “I would protest this policy”. Each response option on the Likert scale was 
given a numerical value which allowed scores to be added (with the protest question 
reverse-scored) to generate a scale of acceptance that ranged from 3 to 21. Although the 
statements about compliance and protest may seem to be alternative ways of answering 
the same question, there is a distinction between mere non-compliance and active 
protest, and this allows stronger negative feelings to be registered.  This also allows 
evaluation of the internal consistency of the acceptance scale, by calculating Cronbach’s 
alpha (Cronbach 1951), which is the most widely used objective measure of reliability 
for social surveys (Tavakol and Dennick 2011). This measure relates to particular 
responses to the scale used, and should thus be measured each time data is collected via 
any scale, even where the scale is widely used and accepted as reliable. Cronbach’s 
alpha is obtained by correlating the score for each question on the scale with the total 
score for each participant and comparing that to the variance for all individual item 
scores (University of Virginia Library 2016). This gives an indication of the degree to 
which the items measure the same concept, and the higher the score (between 0 and 1), 
the greater the consistency and thus the reliability (Tavakol and Dennick 2011). 
Although these attitudes are measured as a predictor of behaviour, they cannot be 
considered determinative of behaviour, as behaviour is also heavily influenced by a 
range of other factors (Heberlein 2012). Nonetheless, attitudes are important influencers 
of behaviour (Ajzen and Madden 1986; Ajzen 1991) and the correlation between 
attitudes and behaviour is stronger where attitudes relate to a specific behaviour and 
where participants are asked if they plan to carry-out the specific behaviour (St John, 
Edwards-Jones and Jones 2011).  
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Construction of the frames 
In order to operationalize the alternative property paradigms in study 2, the frames for 
each were written so as to emphasise those aspects of each paradigm that are key to that 
paradigm’s world view. As such, the discrete asset frame sought to focus on the 
property itself as a whole, and with an emphasis upon the owner’s dominion over the 
asset, such that there is the implication that any trespass upon the dominion (even a 
relatively minor one) is a threat to that ownership. In contrast, the bundle-of-rights 
frame sought to emphasise that property rights are actually about relationships between 
people, about property, and which gives rise to numerous discrete and severable rights. 
The implication is that a minor trespass need not be a threat to the broader ownership or 
the rights that this entails. The frames intentionally did not provide any contextual or 
advocacy material to promote the merits of the regulation. The full surveys are provided 
in Appendix C. 
Correlations  
Correlation between several parameters of interest across both studies were 
investigated. Because data was collected via Likert scales, non-parametric statistical 
methods were required, and Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation (rho) was used in both 
studies to measure correlation. The summary effect size (including 95% confidence 
intervals) of the correlations for all three datasets was also calculated. This involved 
converting the correlation between each pair of variables tested (rho) to Fisher’s z, for 
each data set, and then calculating the summary Fisher’s z for each pair of variables 
(Borenstein et al. 2009). The summary Fisher’s z for each pair of variables is the 
average of the Fisher z for that pair of variables across the three data sets, weighted by 
the number of participants (Field 2001). These values were then transformed back into 
Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation for comparison with the other correlation data, 
presented in Table 2.2. 
2.3 Results  
Study 1 
The resulting participants from the snowball sampling comprised a non-random sample 
of 76 women and men aged between 29 to 70 years (M = 41.2 years, SD = 13.9). Of the 
participants, 41 (55.4%) were female and 33 (44.6%) were male, and two participants 
declined to indicate their gender. Of the participants, 40 (53.3%) either currently owned, 
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or had previously owned property, and 53 (77.9%) currently lived in a home with a 
yard.  
The choice of approaches showed a strong framing effect in favour of the ‘bundle-of-
rights’ description of the hypothetical regulation, with 49 respondents (64%) choosing 
option B (bundle-of-rights frame), and 27 (36%) choosing option A (discrete asset 
frame) (figure 2.1). When asked how confident they were that their choice was the 
better alternative, irrespective of their choice, respondents reported a mean sureness 
value of 2.5 (SD = 1.19); a value close to ‘reasonably confident’. For those who chose 
option A, the mean sureness was greater at 2.78 (SD = 1.19) than those who chose 
option B at 2.39 (SD = 1.19), although this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Proportion of respondents who preferred the discrete asset framed 
description of the policy (Option A) and the bundle-of-rights framed description 
(Option B) (n=76). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Study 2a and 2b 
Respondents were non-random convenience samples of 203 women and men aged 
between 22 and 70 years (M = 38.4 years, SD = 11.0) (study 2a) and 218 women and 
men aged between 19 and 90 years (M = 48.5, SD = 18.0) (study 2b).  A summary of the 
demographic information for the participants of both study 2a and study 2b are provided 
in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of descriptive statistics for study 2a and 2b. 
 Study 2a Study 2b 
Total respondents 203 218 
Age range 22 to 70 years 19 to 90 years 
Mean age 38.4 years (SD = 11) 48.5 years (SD = 18) 
Female  126 (62%) 122 (56%) 
Male  77 (38%) 96 (44%) 
Owned current home 100 (49%) 136 (62%) 
Owned or previously owned 
property 
122 (60%) 169 (78%) 
Never owned property 81 (40%) 49 (23%) 
Current home had a yard 161 (79%) 183 (84%) 
Received discrete asset framed 
info 
100 (49%) 101 (46%) 
Received bundle-of-rights framed 
info 
103 (51%) 117 (54%) 
 
Acceptance measure 
The acceptance measure is designed to measure the degree to which respondents accept 
the hypothetical policy by measuring three separate aspects of ‘acceptance’. The typical 
measure of internal consistency and thus the reliability of such measures is Cronbach’s 
alpha. For these studies, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.89 (study 2a) and 0.85 (study 2b). 
Values greater than 0.7 are generally regarded as acceptable, although there is no 
absolute rule (e.g. Cortina 1993); as such, it is both convenient and appropriate to use 
the calculated acceptance values as a single metric of participants’ acceptance of the 
hypothetical regulation. 
Framing effects for study 2a 
Responses were categorised into three categories using their acceptance scores (see 
Methods): those who accepted the regulation (acceptance scores of 13 to 21); those who 
rejected the regulation (acceptance scores of 3 to 11) and those who neither accepted 
nor rejected the regulation (acceptance scores of 12). The results are summarized in 
Figure 2.2. Overall, 77% of respondents accepted the regulations, 18% rejected the 
regulations, and 5% neither accepted nor rejected the regulations. For those respondents 
who received the information in the discrete asset frame, 75% accepted the regulation 
compared to 79% of those who received the bundle-of-rights frame. Consistent with 
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this, 21% of respondents who received the discrete asset frame rejected the regulation 
whilst only 15% who received the bundle-of-rights frame rejected the regulation. Four 
per cent of respondents who received the discrete asset frame neither accepted nor 
rejected the regulations, whilst 7% who received the bundle-of-rights frame neither 
accepted nor rejected the regulations (figure 2.2).  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Results of study 2a. Percentage of respondents who accepted, rejected, and 
neither accepted nor rejected the regulations, for both framing conditions (n=203). Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Here, there is no clear framing effect, although the results could be interpreted as being 
consistent with a very small framing effect such that the bundle-of-rights frame is 
facilitating greater acceptance of the regulations. Given that participants are already 
generally favourable to the proposed regulations (mean acceptance of 15.4 out of a 
minimum score of 3 and a maximum score of 21, with ‘acceptance’ being scores greater 
than 12), there is only a limited scope for the alternative framing to influence the 
respondents’ acceptance of the regulation. On this basis, I speculated that a ceiling 
effect might be limiting the apparent framing effect of this sample (Lewis-Beck 2003). 
This is likely due to self-selection bias arising from the convenience/snowball sampling 
method. To test this, I repeated the survey using a commercial research panel provider 
to avoid self-selection bias (study 2b). 
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Framing effects for study 2b 
Use of a commercial research panel provider for study 2b was successful at recruiting a 
respondent sample with a lower mean acceptance (13.9 compared to 15.4 for replicate 
1), although ‘acceptance’ of the regulation is still the most common response. Once 
again there is no clear framing effect; there is an apparent effect of similar magnitude 
but opposite direction to that of Study 2a (figure 2.3). In light of this, rather than a small 
but real framing effect present in survey 2a, both results are likely to be peculiar to their 
particular data sets with neither representing an effect. Overall for the repeated study, 
63% of respondents accepted the regulations, 21% rejected the regulations and 17% 
neither accepted nor rejected the regulations. For those respondents who received the 
information in the discrete asset frame, 64% accepted the regulation, compared to 60% 
of respondents who received the bundle-of-rights frame. Of respondents who received 
the discrete asset frame, 16% rejected the regulation whilst 26% of those who received 
the bundle-of-rights frame rejected the regulation. Thirty-six per cent of respondents 
who received the discrete asset frame neither accepted nor rejected the regulations, 
whilst 15% who received the bundle-of-rights frame neither accepted nor rejected the 
regulations (figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Results of Study 2b. Percentage of respondents who accepted, rejected, and 
neither accepted nor rejected the regulations, for both framing conditions (n=218). Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2.2. Spearman’s Rank Order Correlations between variables of interest across 
three datasets and summary effect size of the combined datasets. Correlations that were 
meaningful across all datasets are shaded. 
 
Correlations  
(Spearman’s Rho) 
Survey 1 
(n=76) 
Survey 2a  
(n=203) 
Survey 2b 
(n=218) 
Summary effect 
size 
Age and property rights 
strength (95% CI) 
-0.53  
(-0.675, -0.346) 
-0.16 
(-0.291, -0.023) 
0.03 
(-0.103, 0.162) 
-0.223 
(-0.484, 0.075) 
Age and utilitarianism 0.21 
(-0.016, 0.415) 
0.15 
(0.013, 0.281) 
0.09 
(-0.043, 0.22) 
0.133 
(0.045, 0.219) 
Age and acceptance of 
the regulation 
N/A -0.08 
(-0.215, 0.058) 
0.13 
(-.002, 0.258) 
0.026 
(-0.0179, 0.229) 
Property rights strength 
and utilitarianism 
-0.24 
(-0.441, -.016) 
-0.23 
(-0.356, -0.096) 
-0.05 
(-0.181, 0.083) 
-0.163 
(-0.29, -0.029) 
Having owned property 
and utilitarianism 
0.29 
(0.07, 0.483) 
-0.06 
(-0.96, 0.078) 
0.11 
(-0.023, 0.239) 
0.098 
(-0.083, 0.273) 
Having owned property 
and property rights 
strength 
-0.42 
(-0.589, -0.215) 
0.11 
(-0.028, 0.244) 
0.05 
(-0.083, 0.181) 
-0.079 
(-0.341, 0.194) 
Having a yard and 
property rights strength 
-0.26 
(-0.458, -0.037) 
-0.07 
(-0.205, 0.068) 
0.15 
(0.018, 0.277) 
-0.046 
(-0.26, 0.171) 
Having a yard and 
utilitarianism 
0.24 
(0.016, 0.441) 
-0.01 
(-0.147, 0.127) 
0.091 
(-0.042, 0.221) 
0.084 
(-0.04, 0.205) 
Property rights strength 
and acceptance of the 
regulation 
N/A -0.20 
(-0.328, -0.065) 
-0.08 
(-0.21, 0.053) 
-0.139 
(-0.254, -0.020) 
Utilitarianism and 
acceptance of the 
regulation 
N/A 0.30 
(0.17, 0.42) 
 
0.24 
(0.111, 0.361) 
 
0.269 
(0.178, 0.356) 
 
Correlations  
The correlations investigated are shown in Table 2.2. There are only four that were 
meaningful across all three datasets. These comprised: (i) a small negative correlation 
between property rights strength and acceptance of the regulation; (ii) a small negative 
correlation between property rights strength and utilitarianism; (iii) a small to medium 
positive correlation between utilitarianism and acceptance of the regulation; and (iv) a 
small positive correlation between age and utilitarianism (highlighted rows in Table 
2.2). 
2.4 Discussion 
Study 1 suggests that alternative property paradigms can create a strong framing effect. 
However, studies 2a and 2b showed no such effect. Although these results appear to 
contradict each other, they may in fact highlight the subtlety and frailty of framing 
effects. The key to understanding the differences between the studies lies not in the 
property paradigm frames themselves, but in the operationalization of these frames in 
each study. Here I propose two alternative explanations for the phenomenon. These 
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explanations are not in competition, or mutually exclusive. Rather, I suggest that they 
each contribute to the difference in outcomes between study 1 and studies 2a and 2b. 
The impact of response scales  
An obvious structural difference between the two studies is that study 1 involved a 
single forced choice by respondents, whereas study 2 measured the acceptance of the 
regulation using a three-question measure of a number of attitudes concerning the 
regulation and which allowed for neutral responses. This data was collected via Likert 
scales for which people have a tendency to avoid extreme responses (Schwarz et al. 
1985) and therefore this data when aggregated into ‘accept’/’reject’/’neutral’ categories 
may not capture a framing effect if it is subtle. However, there is also little difference 
between the mean values of acceptance, and thus no evidence for even a subtle framing 
effect.  
Study 1 also differed in that it was a choice between two alternative versions of the 
regulation, and thus it did not seek to influence or measure the degree to which 
respondents favoured the policy, but rather, how they viewed the alternatively framed 
regulations in comparison to each other. This is quite a different question. Property is 
something that people often feel strongly about, particularly if they have strong views in 
favour of property rights, and although the respondents in study 2 were generally in 
favour of the regulation, it is likely that this is the sort of issue that people are likely to 
already have an opinion about, and thus likely to be more resistant to the influence of 
framing (Chong & Druckman 2007). Thus, strategic uses of framing in communications 
would be most effective when aimed at people without strong opinions about the 
relevant issue. These considerations also highlight the importance of context in the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of framing, and that a successful frame in one context 
cannot be assumed to be effective in another. 
Valence framing not property paradigms framing 
Related to context is the mechanism by which the alternative frames may be anticipated 
to affect perceptions and attitudes. While much of the previous research on framing has 
relied on prospect theory to drive a choice preference (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
1998), there is no reason that this effect should be limited to this cognitive bias alone. In 
the case of alternative property paradigms, it is likely that these interact with a related 
bias; the ‘endowment effect’. This bias results in a tendency for people to place greater 
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value on something when they own it, than if they do not own it, even if they have only 
owned it for a brief period (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990). I suggest that it is the 
endowment effect that is operationalized by Nash and Stern (2009) with their bundle-of-
rights frame, forewarning prospective laptop purchasers of the limited nature of the 
ownership that they would enjoy. In contrast, the discrete asset frame permitted an 
expectation of dominion by the purchaser, thus leading to more negative attitudes when 
the use restrictions were later contemplated. Similarly, in study 1, option A creates an 
impression that there is something of importance or value that is being lost as a result of 
the regulation, whereas option B, whilst describing the same objective outcome, seeks 
to minimise any apprehension of loss and describes the regulatory impost in a 
minimalist fashion. Option A specifically states that owners’ rights will be ‘modified’ 
and that an aspect of those rights will be taken away. In contrast, option B explicitly 
states that it “would not change private property rights”. As such, even though they are 
describing the same policy, option A emphasises that the regulation would trespass 
upon property rights and that it would result in some kind of loss, whereas option B 
minimised the perception of trespass and any resulting loss. This essentially evokes the 
endowment effect to create a valence effect in which one option is represented in a more 
positive light. This is reinforced by the semantic framing that uses negative language in 
option A such as “taking away” and “prohibiting”; in contrast option B employs neutral 
language such as “not change” and “other than…”. 
Compared to study 1, the operationalisation of the alternative property frames in study 2 
is rather different. Being cognisant of the valence between the frames in study 1, I 
deliberately designed the frames in study 2 to reflect the different concepts in each 
property paradigm, but without creating a valence between the alternative frames. In 
this way, I intended to test only the influence of the alternative property concepts on the 
relative agreement of respondents to the hypothetical regulation. Given this, it makes 
sense that there were no framing effects in study 2; by not establishing a valence 
between the frames, I have effectively removed any framing potency. As such, I 
conclude that there is no evidence that the alternative property concepts have an 
inherent influence on attitudes. It is only when the bundle-of-rights frame is used to 
generate a valence by evoking the endowment effect and through semantic framing that 
a preference was induced.  
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Unintended framing effect 
Although it was anticipated that study 1 would generate a framing effect in favour of 
option B, it is interesting that respondents indicated such a degree of confidence in their 
choice, irrespective of which option they chose, despite both options describing the 
same objective policy. Had participants been cognisant that the alternatives were 
equivalent, even though the format of the survey required that they make a choice, it is 
reasonable to expect that they would have indicated a low-sureness that their choice was 
the better choice. This suggests that participants tended to have some degree of 
conviction in their choice, and indicates that the framing effect is genuine and not 
simply an artefact of the survey structure. This also suggests that for those who chose 
the minority option (A), that this choice was, for them, their genuine preference. This 
raises the intriguing possibility that the framing of option A may have acted to generate 
a choice preference for a minority of participants.  
Correlations between property rights strength, utilitarianism and acceptance 
Only four meaningful correlations were observed across the three datasets. As 
hypothesised, there was a (small) negative association of property rights strength with 
acceptance of the regulation, and a (small to medium) positive association with 
utilitarianism and acceptance of the regulation (and therefore also a small negative 
association between property rights strength and utilitarianism). Although these 
correlations were anticipated and make intuitive sense, their empirical confirmation 
verifies their potential value as a subject of strategic message framing. They provide a 
foundation for future work in this area to build upon. In addition, a (small) positive 
association was identified between age and utilitarianism, such that older respondents 
reported greater agreement with the notion that limiting personal freedoms may 
sometimes be beneficial to society as a whole.  
Interestingly there are a number of significant correlations that occur across both studies 
with self-selected participants (for both study 1 and study 2) that do not exist in the data 
for the panel supplied (i.e. rewarded) respondents (study 2b). It is unclear exactly why 
this is the case, although is likely related to self-selection bias. Because study 2a used a 
convenience/snowball recruitment method, it likely recruited more altruistically minded 
participants, as well as those with awareness or strong opinions on private property or 
biodiversity conservation (Eysenbach and Wyatt 2002). 
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Implications for private land conservation 
Framing can influence how people react to information, including in the context of 
private land conservation. Indeed, the framing effects associated with the alternative 
conceptualisations of property, demonstrated by Nash and Stern (Nash 2009; Nash and 
Stern 2009) can be used as a means of doing this. However, the alternative property 
frames do not influence attitudes on their own, but can be used in conjunction with 
other framing effect(s) to do so; in this case the endowment effect and semantic 
framing. Semantic framing may be applied to either property paradigm (indeed to any 
communication) but it is the discrete asset paradigm that is likely to evoke the 
endowment effect. This is because it lacks nuance and views ownership as a single 
binary concept; one either owns an object, or they do not own that object. Thus, when 
the government or other party interferes with their enjoyment of the object, something 
has been taken away. In contrast, the bundle-of-rights concept of property is better 
placed to avoid evoking the endowment effect because of its nuanced perception of 
property i.e. even if one’s enjoyment of an object has been curtailed by government, it 
only relates to one aspect of that enjoyment. The perception of loss is more easily 
minimised in the context of the bundle-of-rights view of property than in the discrete 
asset view. However, the results of this research stress the need to deliberately minimise 
(or maximise) the perception of loss; the alternative property paradigms cannot do this 
of themselves. As such, the bundle-of-rights property frame may be useful, but only 
where minimisation of the endowment effect is advantageous.  
Use of property concepts may be also informed by the observed (and largely intuitive) 
tendency of strong property rights to coincide with lower support for regulatory 
measures that interfere with those rights, and for utilitarian attitudes to be associated 
with acceptance of such regulatory measures. Communications that jointly use property 
concepts to minimise perceptions of interference by an advocated regulation, coupled 
with conservation arguments that emphasise the value to society of biodiversity may 
offer an advantage compared to those generated ad hoc and without strategic framing.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Participants were more likely to respond favourably to the idea of a tree clearing 
regulation when framed as an impact to one of a bundle-of-rights, rather than to a 
discrete asset.  However, this reflects different responses to the options as presented, 
and may not be attributed specifically to the use of either property frame within each 
option. Rather, the collective results suggest that the property paradigm framing effect 
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occurs by the alternative property conceptualisations interacting differently with the 
endowment effect and subsequently generating a preference for one option over another 
(study 1) or tempering expectations of what ownership comprises (Nash 2009; Nash and 
Stern 2009). This suggests that the alternative property concepts alone are of little use 
from a framing perspective, but must be used with other framing techniques (i.e. 
semantic framing, promoting biases etc.) to promote the goal at hand. The results also 
stress the importance of context, and that it should not be assumed that a framing effect 
will occur simply because it has done so previously in a similar setting. Therefore, any 
strategic use of framing should also be tested both for effectiveness and for unintended 
effects, prior to being implemented. Ultimately, strategic framing of communications 
(including how property concepts are articulated) are likely to make them more 
effective. However, whilst a theoretical underpinning is important to guide this framing, 
this is not sufficient to be sure that the message is optimised or even effective; testing 
messages (e.g. focus groups) is important before they are released into the wild. 
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3 ECONOMICALLY FRAMED 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES CAN 
CROWD-OUT INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATIONS FOR 
PROTECTING NATURE 
This chapter is an edited version of the submitted paper: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Prep). Economically framed 
information about ecosystem services can crowd-out intrinsic motivations for protecting 
nature. 
Abstract 
The ecosystem services concept is increasingly prominent in conservation policy, 
particularly in determining the value of biodiversity in monetary terms. It is well 
established that monetary incentives can result in the crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivations for conservation behaviour. Here, I explore whether including economically 
framed ecosystem service information about nature could result in the crowding-out of 
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intrinsic motivations to protect it, even without an actual monetary incentive. Using an 
independent groups design, I undertook separate surveys concerning whales and bees. 
Both surveys were divided into two participant groups, both groups receiving a 
collection of facts about whales (or bees), and one group receiving additional 
economically framed information about the value of ecosystem services they provided. I 
found that the economically framed ecosystem services information resulted in the 
crowding-out of intrinsic motivations for whale and bee conservation. These results 
raise questions about the long-term impacts of economically framed ecosystem-service 
based conservation messages on people’s motivations for protecting nature. 
3.1 Introduction 
Standard economic theory posits that increasing monetary incentives for a product or 
service will lead to an increase in supply of that product or service (i.e. the more you 
offer to pay people to do something, the more people are likely to do it). However, 
because standard economic theory does not distinguish between internal and external 
sources of motivation, anomalies to this assumption are often seen. Extrinsic 
motivations are those that come from outside a person, such as monetary rewards or 
praise, whereas intrinsic motivations are internal to a person, such as moral or ethical 
beliefs, which often have no apparent external reward associated with them (Frey and 
Regen 2001 following Deci 1971). The ‘motivational crowding effect’ is seen when 
intrinsic (arguably altruistic) motives are replaced or ‘crowded out’ by extrinsic 
motivations (Frey and Jegen 2001; Bekessy and Cooke 2011).  
Motivational crowding and conservation incentives 
A simple example of motivational crowding-out is the child who is paid by her parents 
to mow the lawn; once the child expects to receive money for the task, they are willing 
to do it again only if they receive a similar monetary reward (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
Such crowding-out has been shown to occur in many settings, including conservation, 
particularly where landholders receive financial incentives to engage in conservation 
activities (Bekessy and Cooke 2012; García-Amado et al. 2013; Rode, Gómez-
Baggethun and Krause 2015). For the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation to occur, 
there must be an intrinsic motivation to crowd-out; it cannot occur with respect to tasks 
for which a participant sees no intrinsic value (Deci, Koester and Ryan 1999; Frey and 
Jegen 2001). Tangible rewards also do not crowd-out intrinsic motivation when the 
reward is unexpected or is not contingent upon the behaviour, but only when the reward 
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is perceived as controlling (Frey and Jegen 2001; Stern 2008). That is, crowding-out 
occurs only where the actor undertakes the activity because of a reward that is expected 
and contingent upon the behaviour. Whilst money is the most common example of an 
external tangible reward, it’s likely that any kind of external ‘payoff’ is capable of 
having a similar effect, so long as the payoff is a controlling factor (consideration) in the 
decision to undertake the behaviour.  
The ‘ecosystem services’ framing of nature 
The ‘ecosystem services’ concept has become an increasingly prominent way of 
framing the environmental and conservation discourse. Originally developed in the 
1970s as a communication tool to attract public interest in biodiversity conservation 
(Westman 1977), it has now become a prominent guiding concept for policy makers, 
facilitating the valuation of biodiversity in monetary terms (Costanza et al. 1997; 
Silvertown 2015). Ecosystem services are the useful and essential services that nature 
provide to humans, for example, a supply of clean air, drinking water, food, building 
materials, pollination, etc. (Costanza et al. 1997), and form the basis of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005). The term has since achieved global prominence and has 
evolved to focus on economic dimensions, facilitating the valuation of biodiversity in 
monetary terms (Costanza et al. 1997) and coincides with the broader rise (and 
dominance) of neoliberal ideology in public policy (Silvertown 1991) including within 
environmental policy (Coffey 2015). As such, the ecosystem services concept is an 
increasingly dominant frame within conservation policy for both informing 
conservation priorities, as well as for communicating the rationale for biodiversity 
conservation to stakeholders, including the general public (Goldman and Tallis 2009).  
How ecosystem service frames may cause motivational crowding 
The ecosystem services approach to communicating the value of nature is based upon 
an anthropocentric perspective that reinforces the view that nature is important only to 
the extent that it provides goods and services of value to humans (McCauley 2006; 
Coffey 2015). This ignores any intrinsic values people may have for nature (e.g. Schultz 
2001), with its persuasive value relying on an assumption of human rationality informed 
by the ‘value’ that is attributed to the services provided by nature. Given that humans 
are not strictly rational and their behaviour is influenced by the interaction of numerous 
factors (e.g. Ajzen 1991) and seldom change views owing only to being presented with 
48   
new information (consider climate change for example – see Kahan et al. (2012)), the 
effectiveness of the ecosystem services approach as a communication tool should be 
evaluated.  
An emphasis on anthropocentric benefits may have the capacity to act as extrinsic 
motivations to society at large for practicing biodiversity conservation. Here the eco-
services are analogous to an external payment that nature provides to society for 
undertaking conservation behaviours. As such, describing nature in terms of ecosystem 
services (‘ecosystem service frames’ - herein ‘ES frames’) may, in certain contexts, 
have the effect of crowding-out intrinsic motivations to care for the environment. 
According to motivation crowding theory, ES frames could result in crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivations where a person’s appreciation of the ecosystem services provided 
are the dominant factor in their motivation for conservation. Thus, the people most 
likely to experience motivational crowding-out are those people that have some level of 
intrinsic care for nature, but who are not necessarily supportive of conservation 
generally. This is the very audience that messages containing ES frames are likely to be 
targeted towards. The risk of crowding-out intrinsic motivations is that it may create an 
expectation that the only nature worth preserving is that with a demonstrable and 
quantifiable anthropocentric value, with ES framed messages leading to the reduced 
care and concern of organisms and ecosystems that cannot demonstrate such value. 
Here I aim to directly test how economically framed ecosystem service information 
about nature affects motivations for protecting nature, and whether the emphasis of 
ecosystem services in conservation messages may have a crowding-out effect. García-
Amado et al. (2013) demonstrated that conservation schemes which paid money to 
people for the ecosystem services generated from their land had a crowding-out effect in 
that it changed their perceived reasons for engaging in conservation, from intrinsic 
motivations towards utilitarian and monetary motivations. However, such an effect has 
not previously been demonstrated in the absence of a tangible external payoff, and so it 
is not clear whether this dynamic can be induced by ES frames alone. In addition, 
conservation advocacy is often concerned with influencing attitudes rather than 
promoting a specific behaviour, and as such, information framing is not a typical 
example of where crowding-out has previously been studied or encountered.  
ES frames can be expressed in a variety of ways; an ES frame could simply involve 
highlighting the anthropocentric benefits provided by nature, or alternatively could 
reduce such benefits to a monetary value (e.g. perhaps the economic contribution of a 
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fishery or the cost of building a water treatment facility to provide equivalent water 
filtration to natural processes). While all ES frames may have the potential to crowd-out 
intrinsic motivations in certain contexts, those ES frames that include monetary values 
of nature are more strongly emphasising the financial incentive inherent in such framing 
of the rationale for conservation.  
Here I present empirical research into the effect of ES frames on intrinsic motivations, 
starting with ES frames that emphasise monetary values of nature. Using an 
independent groups design, I undertook two surveys to test whether economically 
framed ES information can crowd-out intrinsic motivations for protecting aspects of 
nature, specifically focussing on whales and bees. I chose whales and bees as I expected 
that people would generally have a high degree of care for whales, and a lower degree 
of care for bees, this would allow me to examine any crowding-out effects for different 
degrees of ‘care’. 
3.2 Methods 
This research employed two online surveys that each used an independent groups 
design to test participant responses to the presence (and absence) of economic-based 
ecosystem services information about an aspect of nature. One survey concerned 
whales, and the other bees. This research was conducted according to the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research and approved by the RMIT 
University College of Design and Social Context Human Ethics Advisory Network 
(19480-06/15, Appendix D). 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) and paid a small 
incentive for completing one of two online survey instruments hosted by Qualtrics 
(www.qualtric.com) (refer to Appendix E for the participant information sheet). 
Mechanical Turk is a web-based tool that links registered ‘workers’ with small paid 
tasks. Recruiting participants in this way allowed me to avoid problems of self-selection 
bias that would likely occur if otherwise completed exclusively by non-recompensed 
volunteers. 
Different participants were recruited for each survey and in each survey participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two independent groups. Participants were asked to 
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complete basic demographic information, such as age and gender, and asked to indicate 
on a 10-point scale the degree to which they cared for whales or bees. Four surveys 
were conducted with 110 respondents for the whales survey without the economically 
framed ecosystem services information (ES absent); 88 respondents for the whales with 
the economically framed ecosystem services information (ES present); 106 respondents 
for the bees with ES absent and 101 respondents for the bees with ES present.  
Survey design and procedure 
Both the whale and bee surveys provided participants with information about these 
respective organisms. This information included facts about their intelligence, 
communication methods, experience of emotions, their long history on Earth and 
several other qualities. This information did not include any promotion of conservation. 
Participants in non-ES frame groups saw only the information and questions described 
thus far. Participants in the ES frame groups saw the information described above 
immediately preceded by economically framed ecosystem service information about the 
economic value of bees or whales (see Appendix F for the information provided to 
participants). 
Participants were then asked to list as many reasons that they could think of for 
protecting whales (participants could list up to 10 reasons and were encouraged to list at 
least three). They were subsequently asked to rank their own elicited reasons in order of 
most to least important. This allowed examination of fluency effects (number of reasons 
provided) and order effects (the order of reasons provided). These orderings of the 
reasons are referred to herein as elicited and as ranked, respectively. 
Analysing the responses of the participants from each group in each survey allowed me 
to investigate whether the inclusion of economically framed ecosystem service 
information influenced the reasons participants later give for why protection of whales 
or bees is important, or the relative importance that these reasons were assigned by 
participants. Given the affection for whales often shown by humans, I expected that 
whales would generate greater intrinsic motivations for protection than bees; by 
undertaking this experiment for both whales and bees, I could also examine how the 
degree of intrinsic care for an aspect of nature influences any crowding-out effects. 
A final question asked participants to rank the following reasons for protecting whales 
or bees in order of most important to least important: (i) because they have the right to 
exist; (ii) because they help the economy; (iii) because they provide humans with 
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natural goods and services; or (iv) because they are important to the health of the 
ecosystem. The order in which these options were listed was counter-balanced to avoid 
order effects, whereby the order that response options are presented in can influence 
participant choice (Schuman and Presser 1981). Refer to Appendix G for the complete 
questionnaire completed by participants. 
Response Coding 
To undertake the analysis, each elicited reason was coded for whether it reflected an 
intrinsic motivation or an instrumental motivation. In this case intrinsic values are those 
in which either the whales or bees are seen to have value for their own sake. In contrast, 
instrumental values are those in which the whales or bees are seen to have value by 
virtue of their use in achieving something else, for example in providing food or 
polination. Examples of the kinds of reasons given by participants that were coded as 
intrinsic and instrumental are provided below (Table 3.1). A handful of responses were 
unable to be coded as either intrinsic or instrumental and were not included in the 
analysis. A typical example of a statement that couldn’t be coded was: “we should not 
throw trash in the waters”. To ensure reliability in the coding, 20% of all reasons 
elicited across both versions of each survey were double-coded (358 out of 1751 
reasons), for which the secondary coder agreed with the primary coder in 91% of 
instances (i.e. for 324 of 358 reasons). 
3.3 Results 
How does ecosystem services information affect motivations to conserve 
whales or bees? 
Fewer intrinsic responses were elicited from participants who received the economically 
framed ecosystem services information (ES information) (14% fewer for whales and 5% 
fewer for bees). This corresponds to an identical increased elicitation of instrumental 
reasons, and because approximately the same numbers of responses were given per 
participant across all conditions, this means that when ES information is present, 
instrumental reasons displace intrinsic reasons. Approximately the same number of 
reasons were given on average per participant across all groups. Although participants 
were able to list up to 10 reasons, the average number of reasons given was 4.3 for all 
conditions, except for bees (ES present) which was 4.4.  
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Because I am interested in how the number and ranking of intrinsically motivated 
reasons for protecting whales/bees is influenced by the economically framed ES 
information, the results are expressed in terms of percentage of intrinsic reasons, with 
the figures for instrumental reasons omitted. However, by virtue of the binary coding 
system, the corresponding instrumental reasons are the remainder of the proportion (i.e. 
20% intrinsic reasons correspond to 80% instrumental reasons). 
Table 3.1. Examples of reasons provided by participants that were coded as relating to 
either intrinsic or instrumental values. 
 
Intrinsic values 
Whales Bees 
They're intelligent Communicate with pheromones 
They are sentient  They feel anxiety 
They are an animal Have been around a long time 
It is hard to imagine our world without whales.  Intelligence 
I love them Moral reasons 
To prevent extinction Are a special part of nature 
Have been around for 55 million years Because they're dying 
kindness, animal rights Conservation of species 
Instrumental values 
Whales Bees 
Valuable to local economies They help the economy 
Whale watching creates jobs Bees are critical for the food chain 
For future generations Pollination 
Historically significant. Help flowers 
Interesting to study For the ecosystem 
Genetic diversity Produce honey 
Important to the ecosystem Bees are vital to human existence 
Help people forge a connection to nature Are hardworking 
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The mean reported degree of care (i.e. reported on a scale between 1 and 10) for whales 
was 7.2 (ES absent, with SD=1.9) and 7.3 (ES present, with SD=2.1), and the 
proportion of intrinsically motivated reasons for their protection was 72% (ES absent) 
and 58% (ES present) (table 3.2). For bees the average reported care was 6.9 for both 
conditions (with SD=2.3 for ES absent and SD=2.5 for ES present) and the proportion 
of intrinsically motivated reasons for their protection was 25% (ES absent) and 20% 
(ES present) (table 3.2). The effect size of the crowding-out of intrinsic reasons was 
determined using Cohen’s d, which gives a standardised difference between two means. 
For the whales Cohen’s d=0.58 (elicited) and d=0.47 (ranked); for the bees this was 
d=0.41 (elicited) and d= 0.23 (ranked) (table 3.2). There was no meaningful difference 
between the framing conditions for the final question that asked participants to rank the 
reasons listed by me for protecting whales/bees. 
How does ecosystem services information affect the ranking of 
intrinsic/instrumental motivations? 
Although this result confirms the hypothesized crowding-out effect of the economically 
framed ecosystem services information, I am also interested in how this information 
affects both the elicitation order and subsequent rankings of conservation reasons. 
Essentially, I am interested in whether those reasons elicited most readily (i.e. elicited 
earlier and thus appearing higher in the elicited order of reasons) and those ranked as 
most highly important, also demonstrate a bias induced by the economically framed 
ecosystem services information. This is important because while the framing effect 
promotes elicitation of instrumentally motivated reasons for conservation, it may be that 
participants consider these as less important and subsequently tend to rank them lower 
than intrinsically motivated reasons. 
I examined this by comparing the number of participants in each frame that listed an 
intrinsic reason as their top reason. In the case of the whales, 70% of participants ranked 
an intrinsic reason for protecting whales as their most important reason in the absence 
of the economic ecosystem services information; this drops to 61% when the economic 
ecosystem services information is present. Similarly in the case of the bees, 20% ranked 
an intrinsic reason as their most important motivation in the absence of the economic 
ecosystem services information, dropping to 15% in its presence.  
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Table 3.2. Summary of the key results from each survey, including 95% CIs where 
applicable. 
 
 Whales Bees 
Ecosystem services info absent present absent present 
Participants 110 88 106 101 
Average reported ‘care’ 
7.2  
(SD=1.9) 
7.3 
(SD=2.1) 
6.9 
(SD=2.3) 
6.9 
(SD=2.5) 
Total reasons 473 380 451 446 
Total intrinsic reasons 341 223 113 89 
Total instrumental reasons 132 157 338 357 
Ave number of reasons per 
participant  
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 
Proportion of all reasons that are 
intrinsic (95% CI) 
72% 
(68, 76) 
59% 
(54, 64) 
25% 
(21, 29) 
20% 
(17, 24) 
Proportion of first elicited reasons 
that are intrinsic (95% CI) 
76%  
(67, 83) 
55% 
(44, 65) 
19% 
(13, 28) 
5% 
(2, 11) 
Proportion of top ranked reasons 
that are intrinsic (95% CI) 
70% 
(61, 78) 
61% 
(50, 71) 
20% 
(14, 29) 
15% 
(9, 23) 
Mean intrinsic proportion of first 2 
elicited reasons that are intrinsic 
(95% CI) 
77% 
(71, 83) 
58% 
(50, 65) 
19% 
(13, 25) 
8% 
(5, 12) 
Effect size:  
Cohen’s d = 0.58 (0.29,0.87) 
Effect size:  
Cohen’s d = 0.41 (0.14, 0.69) 
Mean intrinsic proportion of first 
two ranked reasons that are 
intrinsic 
75% 
(69, 81) 
59% 
(51, 66) 
20% 
(13, 27) 
13% 
(8, 24) 
Effect size:  
Cohen’s d = 0.47 (0.19, 0.76) 
Effect size:  
Cohen’ d = 0.23 (0.04, 0.51) 
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I also compared the relative proportion of intrinsic motivations of the top two reasons 
given, for each condition. This is likely a more robust indicator, as it accounts for those 
people who might have had difficulty choosing between rankings of their top two 
alternative reasons. In addition, given that the average number of reasons per participant 
is (approximately) four, this method accounts for the possibility that some participants 
may have ranked the (greater number of) instrumental reasons elicited when the 
economic ecosystem services information was present, to be of lower importance. 
Rather than simply comparing the overall percentage of the top two ranked responses 
that are intrinsic (for each group), a more robust approach is to consider the mean 
intrinsic proportion of the top two ranked responses of each participant. Taking this 
approach, the difference between frames is apparent (figure 3.1). For whales, the 
average percentage of intrinsic reasons in the top two ranked responses was 75% when 
no ecosystems services information was provided, compared to 59% when it was. For 
bees, the corresponding figures were 20% and 13% (figure 3.1).  
The difference between the two conditions for both whales and bees, including for both 
elicited and ranked orders, are shown in figure 3.1 with 95% confidence intervals. These 
values are greater than zero, indicating a meaningful difference between each condition 
(notwithstanding a slight overlap with zero for the 95% CI for the ranked bee responses, 
owing to the reduced effect size here). This shows that in the presence of economic 
ecosystem services information, intrinsic reasons for protecting whales/bees are indeed 
crowded-out by instrumental reasons. 
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Figure 3.1. Difference between framing conditions of the average proportion of top 2 
reasons that are intrinsically motivated, with 95% confidence intervals. ‘Elicited’ refers 
to the order in which respondents listed reasons and ‘ranked’ refers to the order of 
importance that respondents subsequently ranked those reasons. The differences plotted 
are analogous to effect size. 
 
3.4  Discussion 
Here I demonstrate that economically framed ecosystem services information can 
influence the way that people think about an aspect of nature, including underlying 
motivations for conservation. The greater emphasis on instrumentally motivated reasons 
elicited when economically framed ecosystem services information is present, 
demonstrates a clear framing effect. This makes sense, as the economic ecosystem 
service concept was explicitly mentioned to participants who received the version of 
survey that included this information. This is similar to the way in which leading 
questions can influence responses (e.g. Harris 1973) which here may be explained as an 
availability bias (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Schwarz et al. 1991) whereby 
people use examples readily available in their mind to help them evaluate a specific 
issue. However, that motivational crowding is also at play is confirmed in the analysis 
of the relative intrinsic proportion of the top two reasons given by each participant. This 
demonstrates that as well as resulting in elicitation of more instrumentally motivated 
reasons to conserve nature, participants were more likely to rank instrumentally 
motivated reasons as being of greater importance when economically framed ecosystem 
services information was present.  
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Having established that there is a crowding-out effect, it would also be useful to 
understand how permanent or transient this effect is. While further research is needed to 
test this definitively, I can gain some understanding by considering the change of the 
effect size of the crowding-out for the mean intrinsic proportion of top two reasons in 
the order elicited, compared to as subsequently ranked by the participants. For both the 
whales and the bees, the initial crowding effect on the elicited order of reasons is greater 
than when those reasons are subsequently ranked (table 3.2). A large decrease in the 
effect size could indicate that the framing effect is short-lived and potentially mitigated 
by the ranking processes (i.e. that perhaps after reflection, participants were of the view 
that the intrinsic reasons were more important to them). However the persisting effect 
size is significant and meaningful (figure 3.1). Nonetheless, there was no apparent 
framing effect on the subsequent ranking of the reasons for protecting whales/bees that I 
provided to participants (Appendix H). This may be because the method used did not 
capture any framing effects, or because the effects had entirely diminished at this point 
in the survey. 
There are some differences between the results for whales and bees. Although the 
average reported degree of care for both whales and bees was similar, whales elicited a 
much greater proportion of intrinsically motivated reasons for their protection compared 
to bees (table 3.2). This indicates that people think about bees in a more instrumental 
way than they do for whales. The crowding-out of intrinsic reasons is also less 
pronounced in the case of the bees than the whales (figure 3.1). This is consistent with 
crowding theory, in that because bees are regarded with a lower intrinsic value (relative 
to whales) (table 3.2), there is less intrinsic value to be crowded out. There is also an 
indication that the crowding effect may be shorter lived in the case of the bees, as the 
decrease in effect size between the elicited values and the ranked values is greater in the 
case of the bees (table 3.2). This may suggest that the dynamics of crowding-out are 
different between the examples of the whales and the bees. 
The similar reported ‘care’ for both whales and bees, despite the clearly greater degree 
of intrinsic care for whales indicates that self-reported care is not a good indicator of the 
intrinsic care that people may have for an aspect of nature. This makes sense, as there 
are many different reasons and ways for which people may care for nature. Any future 
research that relies on self-reported ‘care of nature’ (or similar construct) should bear 
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this in mind and critically examine what exactly is intended for measure, and how this 
may best be done. 
Implications for conservation communication 
 This research shows that the inclusion of economically framed ecosystem 
services information, amongst other facts about an aspect of nature, can result in a 
different set of values being recalled and articulated by participants. Though further 
research may be needed to confirm the mechanism, we speculate a mild form of 
motivational crowding out is responsible. This goes beyond a simple framing effect and 
actually influences the importance that people place on intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons for protecting nature. Although it has previously been demonstrated that 
activating a particular set of values can suppress opposing values (Maio et al. 2009), to 
my knowledge, this is the first study to indicate that crowding-out may occur in the 
absence of a tangible external reward. 
Importantly, this study showed that when the additional economically framed ecosystem 
services information is provided, it did not result in elicitation of a greater number of 
reasons for protecting whales or bees (table 3.2).  
There is empirical evidence for motivational-crowding effects occurring across a range 
of settings including labour supply, service provision, and common pool resources (see 
Frey and Jegen (2001) for a summary), including conservation (García-Amado et al. 
2013; Rode, Gómez-Baggethun and Krause 2015). This is a phenomenon that policy 
makers should have awareness of in order to avoid unintended adverse effects of policy 
that involves financial incentives. Here I have demonstrated that a single instance of 
receiving economically framed ecosystem services information can result in a 
crowding-out effect. Although untested, it seems likely that this may be exacerbated 
when such information is a dominant part of the discourse (e.g. Dryzek 2013; 
Gustafsson 2013) or is implicit in all apparently available policy solutions (see Entman 
1993). As such, this research has implications for conservation communicators who 
seek to use ecosystem services to gain support for conservation.  
The emphasis in conservation communications of a variety of benefits of nature will 
likely help engage a range of people, and not simply those with an intrinsic care for 
nature (Kusmanoff et al. 2016). However, doing so in a manner that results in the 
crowding-out of intrinsic motivations in others could be counter-productive. There may 
be a risk that in focussing on the value of nature to humans, an expectation is 
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established that the only nature worth preserving is that with a demonstrable, and 
perhaps economically quantifiable, value. Further research is needed to understand how 
best to use such messages in a manner that does not also risk potential crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivations. Further development of this research would be to investigate the 
crowding effect for a wider range of aspects of nature, as well as to test the effects of 
different types of ecosystem services (for example ‘provisioning services’ versus 
‘regulating services’). It would also be interesting to understand how the order in which 
the information is presented affects crowding-out (in this study the economically framed 
ecosystem services information was listed first, when present). It may be possible to 
develop methodology for articulating the many benefits of nature in a way that is less 
likely to result in the crowding-out of intrinsic motivations (perhaps by using a 
particular ratio of extrinsic to intrinsic reasons, or by using extrinsic reasons that are 
abstract in combination with intrinsic reasons that are personally relevant). In the 
meantime, conservation communicators ought to be mindful of how they are framing 
their messages, lest the use of extrinsically motivated appeals inadvertently undermines 
future intrinsic motivations to care for nature. While such extrinsic appeals might be 
effective in the short term, particularly for engaging people who do not hold strong 
intrinsic value for nature, over time they risk undermining the intrinsic motivations of 
the wider audience. 
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Abstract 
How conservation messages are framed will impact the success of our efforts to engage 
people in conservation action. This is highly relevant in the private land conservation 
(PLC) sector given the low participation rates of landholders. Using a case study of PLC 
schemes targeted at Australian landholders, I present the first systematic analysis of 
communication strategies used by organisations and government departments delivering 
those schemes to engage the public. I develop a novel approach for analysing the 
framing of conservation messages that codes the stated benefits of schemes according to 
value orientation. I categorised the benefits as flowing to either the landholder, to 
society, or to the environment, corresponding to the egoistic, altruistic and biospheric 
value orientations that have been shown to influence human behaviour. I find that 
messages are biased towards environmental benefits. Surprisingly, this is the case even 
for market-based schemes that have the explicit objective of appealing to production-
focussed landholders and those who are not already involved in conservation. The risk 
is that PLC schemes framed in this way will fail to engage more egoistically oriented 
landholders and are only likely to appeal to those who are already conservation-minded. 
By understanding the frame in which PLC benefits are communicated, we can begin to 
understand the types of people who may be engaged by these messages, and who may 
not be. Results suggest that the framing of the communications for many schemes could 
be broadened to appeal to a more diverse group (and thus ultimately to a larger group) 
of landholders. 
4.1 Introduction 
Private land conservation has become increasingly common over the last twenty years 
as a means of implementing conservation action beyond the protected area network. 
Internationally, PLC is implemented through a range of instruments including direct 
payments, tax incentives, cap and trade markets, voluntary markets and auctions and 
certification programs (Pascual and Perrings,\ 2007; Pirard 2012; Yang et al. 2010). 
Despite widespread implementation, there has been mixed success in engaging rural 
landholders in conservation initiatives (e.g. Posthumus, Gardebroek and Ruben 2010; 
Prager and Posthumus 2010). Thinking strategically about how PLC messages to rural 
landholders are framed could help increase engagement. To understand how messages 
are currently framed, I use an Australian case study to examine how PLC organisations 
currently promote the benefits of landholder participation. My purpose here is to 
critically analyse the current information provided to this target group, and discuss 
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alternative framings that may improve participation rates. Communications strategies 
are important for informing landholders about the purpose of a PLC program, how they 
can become involved, and the benefits of participation. Within this, there is much scope 
for promoting the benefits of any PLC scheme in a variety of frames. Previous studies 
indicate that a range of factors influence a landholder’s decision to participate in PLC, 
for example, economic considerations, the adoptability of new practices, and the 
characteristics of landholders themselves have all been shown to be relevant (e.g. Ervin 
and Ervin 1982; Lynne, Shonkwiler and Rola 1988; Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Negatu 
and Parikh 1999; Greiner, Patterson and Miller 2009; Kuehne et al. 2013). I propose 
that social value orientation also plays an important role. Below I discuss what I mean 
by social value orientation, and explain why I have used this concept to critically 
analyse existing PLC messages. 
Background to value orientations: egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric 
The value orientation concept builds on the homo economicus (with apologies for the 
dated, sexist language) model of human behaviour that underpins traditional economics 
(see Persky 1995 for an overview), recognising that narrow self-interest alone does not 
always guide human decision-making. The value orientation concept identifies two 
general approaches that people take when allocating resources in a social dilemma 
scenario, reflecting the differing degrees of self-interest that individuals show for others. 
People tend to either maximise their own payoff (i.e. exhibit narrow self-interest) or 
maximise the joint payoff (i.e. display altruism) (Gärling 1999). People who display 
these alternative behaviours (i.e. ‘value orientations’) are referred to as non-co-operators 
(or pro-selves) and co-operators (or pro-socials), respectively. In the context of 
undertaking pro-environmental behaviours, a third value orientation, the ‘biospheric’ 
orientation in which an individual places primacy on the intrinsic value of the 
biosphere, is also relevant (De Groot and Steg 2007, 2008).  
In this three value orientation framework, the pro-self value orientation is akin to the 
egoistic value orientation, while the pro-social value orientation is supplanted by both 
the social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations (De Groot and Steg 2007). This 
framework describes how values inform individual choices; with egoistically oriented 
people tending to weigh the cost and benefits for them personally; social-altruistically 
oriented people tending to weigh the costs and benefits to other people; and 
biospherically oriented people tending to weigh the costs and benefits to the biosphere 
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as a whole (De Groot and Steg 2007). Egoistically oriented people are more likely to 
value such things as social power, wealth, authority, influence and ambition; social-
altruistically oriented individuals are more likely to value such things as equality, peace, 
social justice and helping others; and biospherically oriented people are likely to value 
such things as unity with nature, respecting the Earth and pollution prevention (De 
Groot and Steg 2007 following Schwartz1992). In describing these value orientations it 
is convenient to talk in an idealised manner, implying that individuals act as if they 
were of either one orientation or another. In reality, value orientation is a continuous 
concept (Murphy et al. 2011) and is better conceived of as a spectrum upon which 
individuals exist, and exhibit a combination of orientations that can vary across time. 
The way information is framed can influence environmentally significant behaviour 
(Opdam et al. 2015), and when information is framed to align with a person’s values 
and beliefs, it has the greatest influence on behaviour (e.g. Hong and Zinkhan 1995; 
Chernev 2004; Florack and Scarabis 2006; Ku et al. 2012). While individuals of a pro-
social orientation (social-altruistic or biospheric) are more willing to engage in pro-
environmental behaviour, this is not the only pathway by which an interest in and value 
for conservation may be evoked (Ives and Kendal 2013). Communications about PLC 
provides an opportunity to present the case for participation not only to the biospheric 
and the socialaltruistic, but also to the egoistic by emphasising those benefits that flow 
to the landholder or to society (or both) as a result of participation. As such, we could 
expect congruence between the benefits emphasised in PLC communications and 
engagement by landholders with corresponding value orientations. For example, an 
egoistically oriented landholder may not be strongly engaged by the promise of 
conservation benefits, but may be motivated by wider benefits such as increased land 
productivity, a sense of achievement, the respect of peers, or greater opportunity for 
social interaction. By analysing the way PLC organisations frame the benefits of 
participation to landholders, we can gain insight into the breadth of the audience that are 
likely to be engaged. To ensure that communications are relevant and engaging to as 
broad a range of landholders as possible, the PLC sector ought to ensure that these three 
different kinds of benefits are included in their messaging.  
In this study, I examine the extent to which contemporary communications about PLC 
actively seek to engage individuals across the three value orientations. I make no 
assumptions about the dominant value orientation, if any, of rural landholders. In any 
case, a persons’ orientation may change over time. My motivation is to understand how 
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messages are currently framed to inform approaches that may improve rates of 
participation in PLC schemes. 
4.2 Methods 
Communications pertaining to PLC schemes were analysed to identify the apparent 
benefits of each scheme. These were subsequently categorised as ‘benefits to 
landholders’, ‘benefits to society’ or ‘benefits to conservation’, corresponding to the 
value orientations outlined above. A sample of 20 Australian PLC schemes representing 
a variety of scheme types were chosen for content analysis (Appendix I). This analysis 
involved identifying sentences on the PLC scheme’s websites (accessed between 
December 2013 and March 2014) that described a benefit of participation, and coding 
these as either a benefit to landholders, a benefit to society, a benefit to conservation or 
as any combination of these. The proportion of each type of benefit as a fraction of the 
total benefits described by each scheme was calculated and then averaged across all 
schemes to determine the relative proportion of each type of benefit described by the 
websites, across the Australian PLC sector. Websites were used as a convenient proxy 
for the wider communications by PLC schemes, noting that the Web is a useful source 
of information for farmers (Morrison et al. 2008), and that websites are increasingly the 
‘first point of contact’ for many businesses and organisations (Flannagan,2014; 
Musante, Bojanic and Zhang. 2009). 
I employed a directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) whereby the 
coding was based on the a priori identified benefit types derived from value orientation 
theory (see Appendix J for the coding guide). All schemes were coded by a single 
coder, with double coding by a secondary coder to measure reliability. Double-coding 
was conducted on 27% of sentences (324 out of 1209 total sentences coded). The 
secondary coder agreed with the primary coder for 83% (140 of 168 sentences) of ‘non-
benefit’ categorisations; 82.9% (63 of 76 sentences) of ‘pro-self’ (i.e. egocentric) 
categorisations; and 85.9% (85 of 99 sentences) of ‘pro-social’ (i.e. social-altruistic plus 
biospheric) categorisations. The ‘pro-social’ sentences were then coded to discriminate 
between explicit conservation related benefits and other social benefits more broadly (or 
as both). The double-coding by the second coder here consisted of 20% (53 of 266 
sentences) for which there was agreement with the primary coder of 81% (43 of 53 
sentences). 
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The initial count of landholder benefits included all apparent benefits, not all of which 
may rightly be considered as a ‘true’ benefit from the perspective of the egoistic value 
orientation. Many of these prima facie benefits are actually aimed at facilitating 
participation or removing barriers to participation, and do not offer a ‘true’ (egoistic) 
benefit in which a landholder would gain something from participation. For example, 
notional benefits such as minimal administration involved in participation, nil ongoing 
obligations, and free provision of additional fencing that may be required for 
participation may all be helpful in lowering the barriers to participation for landholders 
that already have an interest, yet offer no actual ‘reward’ for participation. Accordingly 
these types of benefits were identified and excluded, with 20% (59 out of 295) double 
coded, and both coders in agreement for 97% of instances (57 of 59 sentences). 
Rather than looking solely at the total count of the benefit sentences for each value 
orientation, it is more instructive to consider the relative proportions of all benefits for 
each scheme that are framed in each orientation. To calculate this, I first took the total 
number of benefit sentences of each value orientation, for each scheme separately, and 
calculated the relative proportions that these comprised of the total benefits described by 
each scheme. For example, if Scheme A had three benefit sentences coded ‘egoistic’, 
two coded ‘social-altruistic’ and four coded ‘biospheric’, then the relative proportion of 
each orientation for that scheme would be given by 3/9 (i.e. 0.33), 2/9 (i.e. 0.22) and 4/9 
(i.e. 0.44), respectively. By averaging these proportions across all schemes, the average 
relative proportion of each benefit type (i.e. value orientation) was calculated. 
4.3 Results 
The total number of sentences that describe a benefit of PLC, when categorised simply 
as pro-self, pro-social, or both, are strongly dominated by pro-social benefits (64% of 
all benefits). If we consider the benefit sentences framed in terms of the three value 
orientations, and account for the relative proportion of each category as a component of 
the total benefits described by the website for each scheme, and averaged across all 
schemes, we see that biospheric (conservation) benefits make up the greatest proportion. 
On average (across all schemes) biospherically framed benefits accounted for 48% of 
communications related to the benefits of participation, while egoistically framed 
(landholder) benefits made up 33% and social-altruistically framed benefits (to society) 
made up 19% (figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1. Average proportions of benefits that are framed as egoistic, social-altruistic 
and biospheric benefits. Solid bars show the proportion across 20 Australian PLC 
schemes. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Transparent bars show the proportion 
for 5 Australian market-based PLC schemes (n insufficient for error bar calculation). 
 
Five of the 20 schemes analysed were market-based schemes in which landholders 
competitively bid for funds to undertake specified conservation activities. These 
schemes are distinct from other PLC schemes in their reliance upon markets to find 
prospective participants, and are inherently designed to appeal to the more egoistic 
oriented landholder. Hence, I thought it would be interesting to see what the relative 
frequency of each benefit type was for these schemes, compared to the average for the 
sector. I note that this data should be used cautiously when drawing inferences about 
market-based schemes generally, as it is derived from a small sample of only five 
schemes. For the market-based schemes, biospherically framed (conservation) benefits 
made up 60% of communications that related to the benefits of participation, while 
egoistically framed (landholder) benefits made up 27% and social-altruistically framed 
benefits (to society) made up 13% (figure 4.1). 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
egoistic social-altruistic biospheric
av
e
ra
ge
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
e
ac
h
 s
e
n
te
n
ce
 t
yp
e
 p
e
r 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
t 
All schemes (N = 20) Market-based schemes (N = 5)
68   
4.4 Discussion 
Of the three benefit types examined in this study, biospheric (conservation) related 
benefits are the most common type emphasised by PLC websites in Australia. The 
potential consequence of this bias is that landholders with a strong egoistic value 
orientation are less likely to be engaged by content on PLC program websites because 
the benefits have not been communicated in a way that aligns with their primary 
production interests (this would also include corporate farming entities). To ensure that 
egoistic landholders (and not only biospheric oriented landholders) are engaged by PLC 
program websites, new communication strategies need to be devised which link 
conservation interests to primary production and/or personal interests. 
The under-representation of egoistic (landholder) benefits in PLC communications may 
stem from a cautious approach to the use of financial incentives in conservation. In 
certain circumstances, financial incentives have the ability to crowd-out intrinsic 
motivations for conservation practices, and can be counter-productive to promoting 
conservation land management practices over the longer term (e.g. Frey and Jegen 
2001; Reeson 2008; Rode, Gómez-Baggethun and Krause 2015). However, ‘joining the 
dots’ from conservation outcomes to public benefits can extend also to egoistic 
(landholder) benefits without the need for direct financial incentives. By explaining how 
certain conservation practices may aid or maintain productivity (Carvalheiro et al. 2011; 
Scherr and McNeely 2008) and allow increased diversification of income streams (e.g. 
from market-based schemes) that in turn provide some insurance against the threat of 
bushfire and drought, etc., conservation outcomes may be framed in a manner more 
receptive to the egoistic oriented landholder. In any case, there is evidence that financial 
incentives are important in recruiting production-based landholders to PLC schemes 
(Moon and Cocklin 2011). The risk of such incentives crowding-out intrinsic 
conservation motivations only exists where there is already an existing intrinsic 
conservation motivation (Stern 2006), which may not necessarily be the case for 
egoistic landholders. If the underlying motivation for production-based landholders is to 
generate profit from the land there may be little competing conservation motivation to 
be crowded-out. Rather, a financial incentive alone or in conjunction with other non-
financial landholder benefits, may provide the motivation required to retire marginally 
profitable land from cropping or grazing in preference for conservation. Whilst the 
communications of some schemes did make some of these connections, they were used 
infrequently. 
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Social-altruistic benefits (to society) were the least emphasised type of benefit, with 
more than twice as many biospheric (conservation) benefits emphasised. The social-
altruistic benefits (to society) portrayed on the websites of PLC schemes tended to be 
less explicit and generally harder to define than either the biospheric (conservation) or 
egoistic (landholder) benefits. Given the relative subtlety with which the biospheric 
value orientation distinguishes itself from the social-altruistic value orientation, and 
generally only in instances of conflict between a pro-social outcome and a pro-
environment outcome (De Groot and Steg 2007), this may be a missed opportunity to 
engage potentially receptive landholders. By explaining how conservation benefits will 
lead to, or could themselves be considered as public benefits, it may be possible to 
increase the emphasis of the social-altruistic benefits (to society). 
Market-based schemes 
The proportions of benefit types for the market-based schemes shows a similar 
distribution to that of the sector as a whole, although rather surprisingly, it is even more 
biospherically (conservation) framed, with such benefits making up a greater proportion 
of the communicated benefits (60% compared to 48%). This comes at the expense of 
social-altruistic benefits (to society) (13% compared to 20%), and egoistic (landholder) 
benefits (27% compared to 33%). While I note the low sample size for this data, it 
arguably represents a lack of strategic framing, given that by providing monetary 
incentives to undertake conservation, market-based schemes seek in part to appeal to 
those landholders who would not otherwise be likely to engage in conservation 
behaviour without such financial incentives. As such, the significant focus on biospheric 
(conservation) benefits is arguably misaligned to the interests of this target landholder 
audience. Blackmore and Doole (2013) found that landholders who participate in 
market-based PLC are typically of a conservation mindset and are likely to engage in 
pro-conservation practices anyway. These findings suggest that market-based schemes 
do not appear to strategically frame the benefits of participation in a way that would 
engage a broad range of landholders, particularly egoistic oriented landholders who are 
a key target audience. 
Framing failure 
This apparent failure of PLC scheme websites to make the case for conservation to 
those less biospherically oriented is consistent with criticisms that much of the 
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environmental movement continues to preach only to the converted (e.g. Hope 2014; 
Murray 2012) and is not engaging the ‘silent majority’. In discussing the importance of 
values in conservation messages, Ives and Kendal (2013, pp 71) point out that “many 
conservation messages fail to be as effective as they could be because the message is 
framed in a way that only a subset of people will find important” and thus 
communication strategies must be designed for the greatest effect. 
There is also a possibility that an emphasis on biospheric oriented (conservation) 
benefits may not be necessary in engaging landholders, given that consumers with 
positive attitudes toward the environment are equally receptive to weak as well as 
strong ‘green’ product claims (Tucker et al. 2012). It may be that biospheric oriented 
landholders are easily engaged by the conservation aspect of a PLC communication, 
even where the emphasis may not actually be on the biospheric (conservation) benefits. 
Meanwhile the over-emphasis of these benefits may fail to engage egoistic and social-
altruistic oriented landholders, However, Dayer et al. (2015) in a US case study found 
that in a setting in which financial incentives were emphasised, that inadequate 
participation resulted from landowners lack of appreciation of the conservation value of 
the targeted activity. This suggests value in using a range of complementary messages, 
rather than emphasis on any single benefit type. 
Future directions for PLC communications 
This is the first study that I am aware of which has attempted to analyse PLC message 
content, and further studies are required to show how pervasive this pattern is across the 
international PLC sector. Future research could adapt the novel approach used here to 
investigate the communications of specific categories of PLC schemes. Future 
investigations could examine the messages used by schemes within each type of PLC 
mechanism to understand the degree to which the framing of these benefits matches the 
value orientation of the landholders that the policy is designed to appeal to. This could 
provide further guidance for the strategic framing of PLC benefits and insight into the 
imbalance in the use of benefit types observed in this study. Future research could also 
consider the range of communications provided to landholders (website, printed, verbal, 
social media) and compare the similarities or differences between these framings. 
Finally, understanding how messages are currently framed is a good first step, but we 
also need research that tests the impact of alternatively framed PLC communications on 
landholders with different value orientations. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Here I have shown that there is a bias across the Australian PLC sector toward the 
framing of PLC participation benefits as conservation benefits. Increased use of egoistic 
and social-altruistic frames in emphasising both landholder and social benefits of PLC 
may be advantageous in engaging a wider range (and greater number) of landholders. 
Appealing to a wider range of landholders is potentially key to improving participation 
rates.  
However, I caution that any promised benefits must be reasonably achievable by the 
landholder through their participation; over-promising and under-delivering could be a 
sure-fire means of permanently deterring the participation of many landholders. 
Furthermore, we need to investigate the potential for unintended feedback effects of 
messages matched to other value orientations, for example, the potential for motivation 
crowding-out in egoistic (pro-self) messages. As a first step, I recommend PLC 
programs be aware of the value orientation frame implicit in their messages, and to 
consider whether this is a good match for their audience and their program’s goal. 
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5 DECLINE OF ‘BIODIVERSITY’ 
IN CONSERVATION POLICY 
DISCOURSE IN AUSTRALIA 
This chapter is an edited version of the submitted paper: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Review). Decline of 'biodiversity' 
in conservation policy discourse in Australia (submitted to Environmental Science & 
Policy). 
Abstract  
Market-based instruments, along with conceptualising the environment as a collection 
of ‘ecosystem services’, have become increasingly common within environmental and 
conservation policy. This kind of thinking is also increasingly prominent in the public 
discourse surrounding environment and conservation policy, particularly in the context 
of communicating the importance of policy measures. Language used in public 
discourse can have a powerful influence on how people engage with policy issues, and 
changes within the biodiversity and conservation discourse may have consequences for 
public engagement in conservation. I explored how these factors are changing with time 
by documenting the use of the terms ‘biodiversity’ and the prevalence of economic 
language in the text of 3553 media releases between 2003 and 2014 from the Australian 
Government environment portfolio, and 1064 media releases from the Australian 
Conservation Foundation (ACF). Results show that in the last decade, the term 
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‘biodiversity’ has become less prevalent whilst economic language has increased in 
both Australian Government and ACF communication. A further content analysis in a 
subsample of 745 media releases explored the prevalence of ecosystem services 
framing, results indicating that it has become a mainstream concept. While this may 
reflect a strategic response by these agencies to better engage with both the general 
public and decision makers within what is an increasingly dominant neoliberal 
paradigm, I argue it may also have unintended (possibly adverse) impacts on how 
people think about and engage with biodiversity conservation.  
5.1 Introduction  
How people think about an issue is significantly influenced by the way it is represented 
in the discourse within which it sits. Consequently, environmental discourse influences 
how ‘the environment’ is understood and addressed by society (Dryzeck 2013; 
Gustafsson 2013), including how it is governed (Fairclough 1992; Coffey 2015). Given 
that we are in the midst of a ‘biodiversity crisis’, this raises questions about how 
biodiversity is represented within the discourse concerning public environmental policy. 
Biodiversity loss is recognized as one of the most critical environmental problems 
(Gordon 2006; Gustafsson 2013) and remains so, despite global efforts to tackle it 
(Butchart et al. 2010). 
Public environmental policy sits within the (non-exclusive) remit of national 
governments via a range of policy tools. Many national governments have specific 
responsibilities for biodiversity conservation as signatories to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992). This makes environmental policy inherently political in its 
nature. It is also of central importance to conservation non-governmental organisations 
(NGO), some of which have direct roles in conservation programs, but most of which 
seek to play some role in conservation advocacy. It has been argued that environmental 
NGOs are uniquely suited to build the links and advocate for the actions needed to curb 
biodiversity loss (Gunter 2004). As a result, both governments and conservation NGOs 
provide a significant contribution to the public political discourse on environmental and 
conservation issues. Much of this discourse is in the form of media releases about 
prominent environmental policy issues of the day.  
One approach to analyzing discourse is to identify different ‘frames’. While there is no 
precise universal definition of what a ‘frame’ is (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; 
Druckman 2001), frames generally “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
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them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman 1993, pp 52). In this way frames 
can provide both a framework by which people “locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
information and events (Goffman 1974, pp 21) and thereby understand the world, and 
also provide a central organising idea which makes sense of relevant events, and 
highlights what is at issue (Gamson and Modigliani 1989).  All information exists 
within a frame of some kind, and it is well established that the way information is 
presented and framed can significantly affect the way people understand and respond to 
it (e.g. Harris 1973; Tverskey & Kahneman 1981; Gamson & Modiglian 1989; Entman 
1993; Druckman 2001). As such, understanding how issues within a discourse are 
framed can provide insight into the way issues are thought about by a society. 
Of interest to me is how the public environmental policy discourse has changed over the 
last decade, including the concept of ‘biodiversity’ and the use of economic rationales 
within the discourse. ‘Biodiversity’ is the contracted form of ‘biological diversity’ ‘and 
lacks precise definition, but is generally used to conceptualise heterogeneity at multiple 
levels of biology, such as within organisms, within populations, within communities 
and within biomes (Haila & Kouki 1994). As such, the same term can be used with 
different meanings within different contexts (Haila & Kouki 1994; Kaennel 1998), 
including as shorthand for ‘life on Earth’, or as a natural resource to be exploited (Haila 
& Kouki 1994). Biodiversity loss has become one of the key issues of the 
environmental movement (Takacs 1996) and is central to the discipline of conservation 
science. Arguably this connection has (at least previously) enabled biodiversity loss to 
remain a relevant public policy issue where concern for other environmental issues has 
been subject to the ‘issue-attention cycle’ (Hannigan 1995). However, concern about 
biodiversity loss has seen the term ‘biodiversity’ used across many disciplines 
(Väliverronen 1998) and in myriad ways, ensuring that it has become a more complex 
concept than its original ‘biological diversity’ (Takacs 1996). 
Concurrent with the evolution of biodiversity, is the genesis and increasingly prominent 
concept of ‘ecosystem services’. Ecosystem services are the useful and essential 
services that nature provides humans, for example, a supply of clean air, drinking water, 
food, building materials, pollination, etc. Originally developed in the 1970s as a 
communication tool to attract public interest in biodiversity conservation (Westman 
1977), it is arguably now “the dominant paradigm framing research and policy making 
in biodiversity, ecology and conservation biology” (Silvertown 2015, pp 641) and 
facilitates the valuation of biodiversity in monetary terms (Costanza 1997; Spash 2008; 
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Silvertown 2015). This is consistent with the broader rise of neoliberal ideology in 
public policy since the late 1970s (Purcell 2009), including within environmental policy 
(Coffey 2015).  
Here I ask whether there has been an increase in the use of ‘ecosystem services’ within 
environmental policy communication, similar to that which has occurred within policy 
making, and if so, whether this corresponds to an increase in economic arguments 
appearing alongside environmental arguments in the policy communication discourse. I 
was also interested in how the frequency of use of the term ‘biodiversity’ within 
environmental policy discourse compares with its use within the scientific discourse. As 
a starting point in tackling these complex issues, I used Australia as a case study and 
analysed the text of media releases from the Australian Government environment 
portfolio and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), a large conservation 
advocacy NGO. I tracked use of the term ‘biodiversity’ and the prevalence of economic 
language over the period 2003 to 2014. I also investigated the prevalence of ecosystem 
services framed rationales within a subsample from each organization. Because a 
discourse enables people to interpret information and create meaning and narratives 
about issues, changes in the frequency of terms and concepts may be indicative of a 
change in how they are understood.  
5.2 Methods  
In order to be able to understand how the data from the policy discourse compares with 
the scientific discourse, I first interrogated the Web of Science database (Web of 
Science 2016) and recorded the proportion of publications for each year that included 
the terms ‘biodiversity’ and ‘ecosystem services’  within title, abstract or keywords 
between 2003 and 2015. 
I then analyzed the policy discourse by first conducting a text search to document the 
prevalence of key terms in 4617 media releases. These comprised of 1064 media 
releases published by the Australian Conservation Foundation between 2004 and 2014 
and 3553 media releases published by Ministers within the Australian Government 
environment portfolio (‘Australian Government’) between 2003 and 2014. The ACF 
releases were downloaded from the ACF website (www.acfonline.org.au) and the 
Australian Government releases from 2003 to 2012 were provided by Department of the 
Environment staff and those from 2013 to 2014 were downloaded from the Department 
of the Environment website (www.environment.gov.au). The ACF provides an 
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appropriate NGO comparator to the Australian Government, as it campaigns on a 
national level and is one of the most prominent national environmental advocates in 
Australia, although it may not necessarily be considered a proxy for all Australian 
NGOs. 
All Individual media releases were subjected to key word searches. I searched for the 
term ‘biodiversity’ and for the term ‘econo’ as the root of ‘economic’, ‘economy’, and 
‘economist’, allowing the inference that the presence of these terms indicate that 
economic considerations are present in a media release (Fig 5.1). In order to compare 
use of these terms over time, I calculated the percentage of the total media releases that 
contained at least one instance of a term for each year, for both the ACF and the 
Australian Government media releases. Although the presence (or absence) of the term 
‘biodiversity’ or of economic language doesn’t give any information about the broader 
frame within which these concepts are used, changes in the frequency with which these 
concepts are used can provide an indication that the way in which these concepts are 
thought of or are communicated, have changed. 
I also conducted a more detailed content analysis on a subsample of 745 media releases. 
This comprised of 229 ACF (approximately 20% of all 1064 ACF releases) and 516 
Australian Government (approximately 15% of all 3553 Australian Government 
releases) media releases to identify those that framed the environment in terms of 
‘ecosystem services’ within any part of the document (Fig. 5.1). The specific term 
‘ecosystem services’ itself was unsurprisingly not present in the media releases, as this 
is a technocratic term with little meaning for the public with whom the media releases 
seek to communicate. However, I was interested in the presence of statements that used 
this conceptual logic (present in many releases), which necessitated a content analysis, 
rather than a simple text search. Content analysis was necessary as there is no keyword 
or phrase that could be considered diagnostic for the presence of ecosystem services 
logic or rationale. 
To be counted as including an ecosystem services concept, media releases had to refer 
to a human benefit being derived from nature. The mere mention of a primary industry 
(e.g. fishing, forestry, etc.) was not itself sufficient, but where a media release taken as a 
whole created a connection between the environment and a resulting provision of a 
human benefit, this was sufficient to be counted as containing an ecosystem services 
‘frame’. For example, the following would be counted: 
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“Australia’s marine environment generates $52 billion annually for the national 
economy in tourism, fisheries and other areas…” (ACF, Sept 13 2004). 
In contrast, the following would not be counted as an ecosystem service frame: 
“The Great Barrier Reef is one of our most significant environmental assets.” 
(Minister Garrett, June 18 2008). 
Although both examples attribute ‘value’ to the environment, the latter does not link the 
environment with the provision of any particular service or human benefit. The coding 
guide is presented in Appendix K. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Methodological flow chart for analysing media releases from the Australian 
Government environment portfolio and the Australian Conservation foundation (ACF). 
All releases were subjected to a text search for ‘biodiversity’ and ‘econo’ and a 
subsample of the releases were subjected to content analysis to identify use of 
ecosystem services logic. To ensure that the sub-sample of Australian Government 
environment portfolio releases were relevant, only those with at least one instance of the 
terms ‘ecosystem’, ‘ecolog’, or ‘conservation’ were selected. The ACF sub-sample was 
a random selection. 
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From time to time, there has been an inclusion of non-environmentally relevant areas of 
ministerial responsibility within the broader environment portfolio (e.g. this included 
heritage and the arts between 2010 and 2013). To ensure that the Australian 
Government releases included in the content analysis sub-sample were of a subject 
matter for which an ecosystem services frame could have relevance, these releases were 
screened such that only those that included at least one instance of the key words 
‘ecosystem’, ‘ecolog’, or ‘conservation’ were used. In contrast, all ACF releases were 
taken to have potential relevance for ecosystem services framing, and the sub-sample 
used for the content analysis was randomly generated. To ensure reliability of the 
coding, approximately 10% (77 out of 745) of the coded documents were reviewed by 
an independent coder who agreed with the primary coder in 92% (71 of 77) of cases. 
The method for calculating confidence intervals for proportions recommended by 
Newcombe and Altman (2000) was used to calculate 95% confidence intervals for the 
proportions of media releases that contained ecosystem services frames. 
5.3 Results  
References to ‘biodiversity’ over the last decade or so in the world wide scientific 
literature (available on Web of Science) have increased significantly from 671 out of 
1,024,674 publications in 1995 (0.07% of total publications) to 19,107 out of 3,806,894 
publications (0.5%) in 2015. References to ‘ecosystem services’ have also increased 
markedly over the same period, from just 5 instances of its use out of 1,024,674 
publications in 1995, to 2384 out of 3,806,894 publications in 2015. As a percentage of 
the total publications, this represents an increase form effectively zero to 0.06% (Fig. 
5.2).  
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Figure 5.2. Percentage of scientific publications containing ‘biodiversity’ and 
‘ecosystem services’ within the title, abstract or keywords. Data derived from Web of 
Science (http://apps.webofknowledge.com). 
 
In contrast, there was an overall decline in the use of the term ‘biodiversity’ in media 
releases from both the Australian Government environment portfolio (Fig. 5.3) and the 
ACF (Fig. 5.4). This decline is steeper for the Australian Government, although there is 
a small but noticeable increase in use of the term in government media releases from 
2014. This spike may be directly traced to a focus of the incoming Government at this 
time on threatened species, with 53% (17 of 32) of the 2014 releases that referred to 
‘biodiversity’ also including references to ‘threatened species’ which included 16% (5 
of 32) with specific reference to a newly appointed Threatened Species Commissioner. 
Interestingly, this coincides with a steeper decline in ‘biodiversity’ for the ACF releases 
between 2013 and 2014.  
In general, both ACF and the Australian Government tend to use economic language in 
their media releases more often than they use the term ‘biodiversity’ (Fig. 5.3 and 5.4). 
For the Australian Government this occurs after 2006, while for the ACF economic 
language was dominant for all years. Averaged across the 2004-2014 period, the ACF 
uses ‘biodiversity’ in only 9% of its media releases, yet it uses economic language in 
36%. Over a similar period (2003-2014), the Australian Government uses ‘biodiversity’ 
in 16% of media releases and economic language in 29%. 
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Figure 5.3. Percentage of 3553 Australian Government environment portfolio media 
releases that contain ‘biodiversity’, ‘econo’ and ecosystem services framing over time. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the ecosystem services framing sub-sample 
(n=516). 
 
Figure 5.4. Percentage of the 745 Australian Conservation Foundation media releases 
that contain ‘biodiversity’, ‘econo’ and ecosystem services framing over time. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals for ecosystem services framing (n=229). 
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Despite the increase in use of economic language, there is no clear trend in the use of 
‘ecosystem services’ framing which varies between 9% and 42% of the sampled 
releases for the Australian Government (Fig. 5.3) and 12% and 35% for the ACF (Fig. 
5.4) across the period, though there is a suggestion of a peak in ecosystem services 
framing around 2010 to 2011. The presence of economic language and of ecosystem 
services framing trace similar curves within each agency, although this is different for 
each agency and more similar for the ACF than the Australian Government. The 
ecosystem services and ‘biodiversity’ lines noticeably separate around 2009 (Australian 
Government) to 2010 (ACF), with ecosystem services framing subsequently more 
prevalent than ‘biodiversity’ through till 2014 where the dataset ends. The data for the 
ACF shows a consistent increase of ecosystem services framing across five years from 
2006 to 2011. This represents the most consistent trend across the data. 
5.4 Discussion  
The presence of ecosystem services framing in Australian Government media releases 
will partly be influenced by the public service practice of developing ‘standard words’ 
in relation to an issue. In such cases once approved language has been developed for a 
given issue, this same language tends to be re-used whenever the same issue is 
addressed, until it is eventually superseded by new language. As a result, if ecosystem 
services language is used in an initial release about an issue that remains topical, 
subsequent releases will likely also use this same language, reflecting a local peak in the 
data. For example, the 2010 peak in the Australian Government data is influenced by 
five separate releases concerning the ‘East Marine Region Assessment’ that each use the 
same ecosystem services language. A corresponding peak in the ACF data is dominated 
by releases concerning the Murray-Darling Basin, an important region for Australian 
Agriculture. 
While the temptation to over-interpret the data should be resisted, particularly owing to 
the large confidence intervals, it raises some important questions. Foremost, what is 
driving the observed decline in use of the term ‘biodiversity’ in the media releases? It is 
interesting that although use of ‘biodiversity’ is increasing in the scientific discourse, 
our results show its use declining in the policy discourse. This raises a question of 
whether this reflects a deliberate strategy by communication practitioners to replace 
‘biodiversity’ with alternative terms considered to be more effective for communicating 
policy. Perhaps owing to its lack of fixed definition and broad usage across disciplines, 
‘biodiversity’ is a concept that political communicators find unhelpful for engaging 
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people; it has even been suggested that  the term be deliberately avoided (Shanahan 
2008). However, our results (particularly in relation to the Australian Government 
releases) indicate not that ‘biodiversity’ is little used in such communications, but 
rather, that its usage has declined. This may reflect a change in the way ‘biodiversity’ is 
understood, or a change in the level of public or government support for biodiversity 
conservation, and likely also  corresponds to changes in the way biodiversity and 
similar concepts such as nature are framed. The rise of the biodiversity concept itself 
displaced similar (previously abundant) concepts such as ‘wilderness’ and ‘nature’ in 
conservation discourse (Takacs 1996), and perhaps it too is now falling from favour and 
currently in the process of being supplanted by an alternative concept. Alternatively, 
other environmental issues (climate change for example) may have come to occupy the 
limited discourse space available (Verissimo et al. 2014), and that the resilience to the 
issue-attention cycle of biodiversity loss (e.g. Hannigan 1995) has somehow been lost. 
Here I have only analysed for the presence and absence of the term ‘biodiversity’, but 
these results raise interesting questions that could be explored by future research 
specifically designed to interrogate these questions. 
Results also show that economic language is often (and increasingly) present in the 
policy discourse, and is more commonly used than the term ‘biodiversity’ (Fig. 5.3, 
5.4). This may be counter-productive to promoting conservation goals; a growing body 
of literature raises concerns about the way utilitarian framing of ecological concerns 
may influence human perceptions of and relations to nature in a manner 
counterproductive to conservation (Rees 1998; McCauley 2006; Spash 2008; Gomez-
Baggethun et al. 2010; Kosoy & Corbera 2010). It is well established that extrinsic 
rewards (typically monetary incentives) can ‘crowd-out’ intrinsic motivations for 
conservation behaviours and result in a reduction in targeted behaviors over the longer 
term (e.g. Frey & Jegen 2001; Stern 2006). Thus there is reason to expect that 
communications that simply mention an economic value for components of biodiversity 
may have similar effect (also see Chapter 3). Through emphasizing the financial 
benefits of nature, the intrinsic motivations for biodiversity that drive public interest in 
nature may become crowded-out and gradually eroded. The observed trend for 
conflating economics and conservation occurs in the context of the growing dominance 
of ‘ecosystem services’ (Silvertown 2015).  
Various authors have explained the lack of community support for biodiversity 
conservation as a result of the public’s lack of knowledge about the benefits of 
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biodiversity (Hunter & Brehm 2003; Buijs et al. 2008). The increase in economic 
considerations within the policy discourse may thus reflect a strategic approach to 
communication, based on this view. However, the inclusion of economic considerations 
within environmental policy communications implicitly supports the assumption that it 
is a lack of economic quantification of the environment that results in its destruction. 
This serves to reinforce the (neoliberal) view that nature is important only to the extent 
that it provides goods and services of economic value to humans (McCauley 2006). The 
unintended consequence of this view may be that through emphasising the value of 
biodiversity, an expectation is created whereby nature must be seen to have a 
demonstrable and quantifiable value in order for it to warrant protection. Such a 
worldview would make it even more difficult to motivate people to support the 
protection of ‘ugly’ and ‘useless’ biodiversity. 
5.5 Conclusions  
Although this study is centred on this limited Australian case study, the trends identified 
are worthy of note. Irrespective of the reasons behind these trends, because discourse is 
constructive as well as reflective (Fairclough 1992), such changes may both exert and 
reflect change. In reinforcing the view that nature is of economic value, such policy 
communiques unavoidably place biodiversity conservation within an economic frame. 
This arguably promotes an understanding of ‘biodiversity’ as a resource to be exploited 
and undermines its alternative understanding as the ‘life on Earth’ (e.g. Spash 2008). As 
it is well established that the way information is framed can significantly affect the way 
people understand and respond to it, it is likely that this will influence the public 
understanding and enthusiasm for biodiversity conservation. In my view, conservation 
communicators should strategically consider how to phrase and frame messages for 
greatest immediate impact, as well as also giving consideration to how this may shape 
the discourse over time. 
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6 STRATEGIC FRAMING FOR 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION MESSAGING 
This chapter is an edited version of the paper in preparation: 
Kusmanoff AM, Fidler F, Gordon A, Bekessy SA. (In Prep). Strategic framing for more 
effective biodiversity conservation messages. 
Abstract 
Because the conservation of biodiversity is a social and political process, conservation 
policies are more effective if they can create shifts in attitudes and/or behaviours. As 
such, communication and advocacy approaches that influence attitudes and behaviours 
will be key to addressing conservation problems. Research in communication, 
sociology, psychology, and political science has shown that the way an issue is ‘framed’ 
can influence how people view, judge, and respond to an issue. I contend that by 
strategically considering how conservation communications are framed, messages can 
be made more effective with little or no additional cost. Here I provide a practical guide 
and outline key considerations to aid communicators in framing their messages for 
greater effect. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Biodiversity loss is recognized as one of the most critical environmental problems 
(Gordon 2006; Gustafsson 2013). While it is common for ‘nature’ to be perceived as 
being separate from the controlled urban environment that most of the world’s 
population inhabit (particularly in Western societies) (Vining and Price 2008), human 
activities are the primary agent of biodiversity loss, driving key threatening processes 
such as habitat loss due to overexploitation of natural resources, agriculture, urban 
development, damage from introduction of invasive species and pollution, etc. 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Maxwell et al. 2016). As such, the 
protection of biodiversity is a social and political process, which must include changes 
in human behaviour (Brechin et al. 2002; Schultz 2011). This means that 
communication and advocacy approaches that better influence attitudes and behaviour 
will be key to addressing conservation problems. 
It is well established that the way information is presented and framed can significantly 
affect the way people understand and respond to that information (e.g. Harris 1973; 
Tverskey and Kahneman 1981; Gamson and Modiglian 1989; Entman 1993). ‘Framing’ 
is a broadly used term that refers to the way an issue is described or how a problem is 
conceived, articulated and approached. It is relevant at a variety of communication 
scales, such as the semantic e.g. referring to immigrants as ‘illegal’ versus 
‘undocumented’; see Merolla et al. (2013), to the framing of entire issues, such as 
climate change being framed as either an environmental issue, a public health issue or a 
national security issue (see Myers et al. 2012). While conceptually separate there is no 
clear delineation between framing at the semantic level and the issue level. And 
although framing has been used in health promotion campaigns and increasingly in 
energy and water conservation initiatives (e.g. Berk et al. 1980), it has not been well 
studied in biodiversity conservation communications, and is largely absent from the 
literature. There is also little or no guidance on how communicators can strategically 
think about and use various framing effects to enhance their communications, 
particularly in the context of biodiversity conservation. 
Much advocacy, including within conservation biology, has traditionally used the 
knowledge-deficit model, which essentially assumes that people will adopt the targeted 
behaviour if they can be educated and informed about that behaviour and why it is 
‘better’. This approach can be problematic, as human behaviour results from the 
interaction of numerous factors, notably a person’s values, attitudes and relevant social 
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and personal norms, rather than resulting simply from rational thought (Ajzen 1991). 
There is a growing awareness that various factors that influence behaviour can be 
leveraged by social ‘nudges’ in order to promote public policy (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 
2008), including biodiversity conservation (Akerlof and Kennedy 2013). Many of these 
factors also have potential to be leveraged by communications that are ‘strategically’ 
framed to emphasise (or minimise) relevant aspects of a given ‘reality’. 
In the context of biodiversity conservation, communication and advocacy is sometimes 
about providing information and seeking to influence attitudes over time, and is not 
always about motivating a particular behaviour or choice; often it is about generating 
popular support or acceptance of government policies or interventions, or even helping 
to make people more receptive to future messages to be targeted at a particular 
behaviour. By understanding how framing effects occur, messages can be strategically 
shaped to be more effective, either when messages are aimed generally, or at particular 
behaviours. This need not be limited to advocacy or to written media, but can be used to 
guide the framing of any kind of communication. Here I refer to this as ‘strategic 
framing’, and although I particularly focus on written media, which is of most use in 
reports, public advocacy, blogs and social media, much of this will also be relevant to 
audio-visual media including podcasts and videos. For example, Krantz and Monroe 
(2016) discuss an application involving strategically framed videos designed to appeal 
to forest landowners. 
Here I outline key elements that can help conservation communicators consider how 
best to strategically frame their messages. I do not seek to prescribe how strategic 
framing ought to be undertaken, but I provide a practical starting point for those wishing 
to improve the way they deliver their messages.  
6.2 Framing 
‘Framing’ is not a universal term and is used differently across disciplines (Cappella 
and Jamieson 1997; Druckman 2001). However, at its heart, framing is about 
emphasising (or obfuscating) certain aspects of an issue (Entman 1993; Myers et al. 
2012), whether intentionally or otherwise. Social surveys have demonstrated that minor 
differences in phrasing can result in significantly different answers. For example, in a 
study by Harris (1973), when respondents were asked, “How long was the movie?” the 
average answer of respondents was 130 minutes, but when asked, “How short was the 
movie?” the average answer was 100 minutes. Similar effects have been demonstrated 
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in other contexts, including with respect to ‘tall/short’, ‘frequently/occasionally’ and 
‘allow/forbid’ (Rugg 1941; Harris 1973; Loftus 1975; Schuman and Presser 1981). 
These examples demonstrate the power of words and demonstrate that differently 
phrased, yet objectively equivalent language can influence how people respond to 
information. Thus the language chosen to deliver information is important, and is much 
more than just a stylistic consideration. 
The classic example of framing comes from the work of Kahnemen and Tversky (1981, 
1984) and their well-known ‘Asian disease’ problem, as outlined in Chapter 1. This and 
similar work by Tversky and Kahneman led to their development of ‘prospect theory’, 
which proposes (amongst other things) that rather than being strictly rational, people 
tend to weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains. Subsequently, much framing 
research has centred on how to apply prospect theory to make messages more effective, 
asking when is it most effective to highlight risks versus benefits? (Levin, Schneider 
and Gaeth 1998; Myers 2010). Another well-known example is Meyerowitz and 
Chaiken’s (1987) study concerning breast self-examination (BSE). In this case the 
frame that highlighted the potential for loss (i.e. that not performing self-examination 
decreases the chance of finding a tumour in the early, more treatable stages of the 
disease) was more effective at influencing attitudes and behaviour than the frame that 
highlighted the gains. This results from prospect theory’s interaction with attitude to 
risk; positive frames that highlight gains tend to create a preference for definite 
outcomes (i.e. risk aversion), whereas negative frames that highlight loss will result in 
an increased preference for risky choices (i.e. encourage risk-taking) (Ku et al. 2012). 
(Note that in the BSE example the risky-choice is taken to be engaging in BSE, because 
this brings with it the potential distress (i.e. ‘risk’) of finding a tumour). 
However, framing is not limited to generating preferences for objectively equivalent but 
differently framed choices. For example, Gifford and Comeau (2011) demonstrated how 
appeals that emphasised the personal benefits of taking climate action (i.e. lifestyle and 
quality of life improvements) rather than emphasising the need for making sacrifices 
(i.e. drive less, use less power) were associated with greater climate change 
engagement, and behavioural intentions. Framing is also a broader concept than just 
placing an emphasis on losses versus gains; framing can also refer to the way issues are 
conceptualised, and how people “locate, perceive, identify, and label” information and 
events (Goffman 1974, pp 21). According to Hallahan (1999, pp 224) “[f]raming puts 
information into a context and establishes frames of reference so people can evaluate 
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information, comprehend meanings and take action”. This means that how an author 
frames information can influence the way that information is understood by the 
audience. This can be seen in the way that politicians seek to frame issues to serve their 
own interests; for example, the proposed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme of 2008 was championed by its proponents as an important environmental 
policy, but framed by its detractors as bad economic policy. This kind of framing is 
often referred to as ‘issue framing’ and can emerge in an ad hoc fashion, as well by the 
careful and strategic actions of high profile communicators (often referred to as ‘elites’) 
and the media (Entman 1993; Entman and Page 1994; Hallahan 1999). Framing can be 
undertaken by shaping different aspects of a communication, for example situations, 
attributes, choices, actions, issues, responsibility and news can all be the subject of 
framing (Hallahan 1999). Frames influence people’s preferences “because a 
substantively different consideration is brought to bear on the issue at hand” (Druckman 
2001, pp 235). 
In most ‘real world’ situations, the way information is communicated will rarely be 
applicable to a single discrete type of framing, in most cases several of the categories 
discussed above will apply (as discussed in Chapter 1). In addition, frames emphasised 
in one setting, for example the low-fat nature of a food product, interacts with other 
frames of reference. In this case the low-fat claim interacts with discourse on public 
health in which fatty foods have been labelled as problematic. This discourse on the fat 
content of food has been framed by various actors, including media and industry groups, 
with actors often presenting information within frames that support vested interests. 
Hence a range of actors, influences, and types of framing will be at play in most 
situations.  
6.3 Strategic use of framing 
All information exists within a frame of some kind, and there is no way to present 
information that is devoid of a frame; communicators can choose to be aware of the 
influence of framing and utilize it, or they can remain ignorant to it. The degree to 
which framing considerations influence the persuasive impact of a strategically framed 
message will depend on the types of benefits or harms contemplated, the emotive 
strength of the language used and the personal relevance to each message receiver 
(Spence and Pidgeon 2010). Framing effects often depend heavily on context, are 
complex and can be unreliable. But, given the influence that framing can have, 
90   
communicators should consider how to most strategically frame their message in order 
to enhance its effectiveness.  
For biodiversity conservation advocates, messages are going to interact with the 
contemporary framing of issues within the zeitgeist of the target audience; this includes 
the audience’s existing schema (i.e. mental framework), mental models and values 
(Myers et al. 2012). As such there is no ideal frame for all conservation issues, but there 
are some key considerations that can guide the framing of messages to be more 
engaging and effective for a given audience. Below I briefly outline key aspects that 
have been shown to influence attitudes and behaviour in the literature, and identify 
where strategic framing has the potential to enhance conservation messages. The 
process by which strategic framing can be practised is outlined in figure 6.1. These 
aspects are described in further detail below. 
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Fig. 6.1. Strategic framing is a process that can be applied to the shaping of any 
communication that considers how key aspects of framing may be leveraged or avoided 
in order that a message is as effective as possible for its purpose. This purpose need not 
be limited to advocacy, and the framing aspects considered need not be limited to those 
included in the figure. Understanding the intended audience should always be the first 
step and testing and reporting the message will occur last, however the remaining steps 
may be undertaken in any order. 
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1. Consider the target audience 
Consider whether you may use audience segmentation to better reach your audience and what your 
audience (or segments) are motivated by. 
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Audience 
A central principle of effective communications is the clear identification of the context 
and audience (e.g. Maibach and Parrott 1995). Particularly relevant to framing is a 
consideration of what is likely to engage or motivate the intended audience and how 
that audience will be reached. 
While it is tempting to think that one might craft a single perfect message and broadcast 
it (or put it on a webpage) and influence everyone in the same way, this is naïve. It is 
likely that the target audience comprises a variety of people, and thus messages should 
be tailored to the different interests and needs of the audience segments. There is 
already much in the marketing literature on this approach (e.g. see Maibach, Roser-
Renouf and Leiserowitz (2009) for an example of market segmentation for climate 
change) which typically uses demographic information to divide the general public into 
discrete and uniform groupings to facilitate marketing communication that best matches 
each subgroup. This is more efficient than a generic marketing approach that tries to 
speak to all subgroups simultaneously (Hine et al. 2014). Personalised messages 
(whether for individuals or specific groups) can be more effective and avoid possible 
adverse effects from a one-size fits all approach (e.g. La Rose et al. 2008). While 
resources may dictate that the available means of communication are limited, even a 
well-designed web-page is capable of providing differently framed messages on 
different pages with the aim of engaging a variety of audiences. However, if a 
communication is constrained to a single mode of broadcast or dissemination, 
communicators should think carefully about the audience with whom they most wish to 
reach and influence, and frame it with that group in mind. 
A part of knowing the audience is understanding what motivates them. While economic 
theory assumes rationality, wherein people choose the action that presents the greatest 
payoff, in reality individuals weigh different costs and payoffs differently. Broadly 
speaking, people may tend to act in ways that either maximise their own payoff (i.e. 
they are motivated by self-interest), or maximise the payoff to society (i.e. are motivated 
by altruism) (Garling 1999), or in the context of pro-environmental behaviour, to 
maximise payoff to the biosphere (i.e. an environmental motivation) (De Groot and Steg 
2007, 2008). While people do not necessarily act according to only one of these ‘value-
orientations’ in all situations, an individual’s orientation will likely influence the sorts 
of things they value more. For example, an individual motivated by self-interest is likely 
to value elements such as social power, wealth, authority, influence and ambition; while 
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those motivated by altruism are more likely to value equality, peace, social justice and 
helping others; and individuals motived by environmental wellbeing are likely to value 
unity with nature, respecting the Earth and pollution prevention (Schwartz 1992; de 
Groot and Steg 2007).  
Thus, by knowing an audience’s motivations, a message can be framed to capitalise on 
this. This not only ensures that the message is relevant to the audience, but motivational 
appeals used in conjunction with information has (in the public health arena) been 
shown to be effective at inducing behaviour change (Fisher et al. 1996). Because much 
of the behaviour changes advocated in conservation are about sacrifice (i.e. to consume 
less), motivational messages are important (Schultz 2011), but likely to be less effective 
for a self-interested audience.  Strategically framing a message to highlight personal 
benefits as opposed to social or environmental benefits may help engage such an 
audience more effectively than simply continuing to ‘preach to the converted’ (Chapter 
3; Kusmanoff et al. 2016). However, it has been shown that the engagement of one type 
of value can suppress opposing values (Maio et al. 2009), for example in appealing to 
self-interest, altruistic values may be suppressed. As such some environmental 
advocacy experts argue that communicators should generally avoid making self-
interested appeals at all (e.g. Blackmore et al. 2013). 
There is also evidence that framing information in a way that is familiar to a particular 
audience can be advantageous. For example, recent work by Connor et al. (2016) 
examined the influence of differently framed messages about climate change in a social-
network environment. They found that statements centred on ‘conventional’ issues (e.g. 
environmental impacts and human health) ‘survived’ longer (i.e. were passed between 
more users) than less conventional topics such as societal competence or development. 
This demonstrates a benefit in situating a message within already established frames 
that are both familiar and accepted by the audience. 
Biases 
Utilising the cognitive bias that gives rise to prospect theory is probably the most well-
known approach used to guide message framing, as described in the Asian disease 
problem (see Chapter 1). However, there are many other cognitive biases that can also 
inform strategic framing. Take the ‘endowment effect’, for example, which is the 
tendency for people to value something more highly when they own it than if they do 
not, even if they have only owned it for a brief period (Kahneman et al. 1990). This bias 
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was leveraged in the framing study by Nash and Stern (2009) who found that, in the 
context of selling laptop computers, by framing the concept of ownership in different 
ways, they could influence how agreeable purchasers were to a subsequent restriction of 
the laptop use rights the owners could enjoy (Chapter 2). Importantly, strategic framing 
is not simply about choosing a frame that makes the message more effective, but can 
also be about avoiding unhelpful framing effects. For example, if a message designed to 
promote a conservation policy that includes vegetation clearing restrictions was to 
(intentionally or inadvertently) highlight the corresponding restrictions in property use 
rights, it would likely evoke the endowment effect and adversely affect the audience’s 
attitudes to the policy (Chapter 2). 
Another well-known bias potentially useful for strategic framing is the ‘status quo bias’. 
This is the preference to avoid change, such that among alternatives, people display a 
bias for the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). As such, it may be 
advantageous to frame an advocated policy option as a continuation of some existing 
policy or principle. The ‘scarcity heuristic’ is also potentially useful, whereby things 
perceived to be in short supply are considered more desirable and therefore more 
valuable, particularly where the short supply is a result of high demand (Worchel, Lee 
and Adewole 1975). This is often used to sell products on infomercials with claims that 
“stocks are limited” and that consumers should “act now to avoid disappointment”. 
Although this is most obviously aligned with a marketing approach, creative 
communicators could strategically frame parts of messages to interact with this bias, 
where appropriate for a particular context and audience. 
Here I have provided a small number of examples, but there is ample room for creativity 
and imagination in how cognitive biases may be leveraged by strategic framing to give 
better effect to conservation messages. Whether or not biases can be leveraged for effect 
in a given communication, understanding these biases will allow strategic framers to 
avoid inadvertently activating them in a way that is counter-productive to their message. 
A comprehensive list of potential biases is available at: 
http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases. 
Emotional appeals 
Cognitive biases arise as mental short-cuts that allow humans to rapidly assess a 
situation and choose a course of action, rather than to pause while undertaking a 
thorough situation analysis before the appropriate course of action has been determined 
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(only to be eaten by a tiger) (Slovic et al. 2004). These ‘gut-reactions’ are inherently 
tied to emotion, making emotion (‘affect’) another prime target for the strategic framing 
of conservation messages. One simple example is the evocation of positive feelings 
through use of charismatic flagship species (Akerlof and Kennedy 2013), such as the 
World Wildlife Fund’s panda. The positive emotions brought forth by the panda and 
other ‘cute’ animals are driven by the ‘baby schema’ that tap into human instinct to care 
for infants (Lorenz 1943) and which influences the species that we prioritise for 
conservation (Smith et al. 2012). Thus, the emphasis of human-infant-esque attributes 
of less-charismatic species may be one mechanism to re-frame these species for greater 
likability, and thus for greater conservation support. Both positive and negative appeals 
can be effective at influencing attitudes, although negative attitudes (e.g. fear) have 
tended to be used more often in environmental campaigns (i.e. the impending doom of 
CFCs, climate change, etc.) and have potential to induce adverse effects (see Test (for 
adverse effects), below). It should also not be assumed that emotive appeals (or any 
specific frame) act in isolation. As Keller, Lipkus and Rimer (2003) showed, inducing a 
positive mood can increase the influence of loss-framed messages, whereas inducing a 
negative mood can enhance a gain-framed message. This has relevance for conservation 
messages; for example, a message that induces a bad mood, perhaps as a result of 
emphasising the adverse consequences of biodiversity loss, may be best paired with 
gain-framed benefits (i.e. ‘these are the benefits if we change’) rather than loss-framed 
(i.e. ‘if things don’t change, these losses will occur’).  
Where cognitive and affective assessments are different, affect (i.e. the felt emotions) 
will often have a greater influence on resultant behaviour, unless the individual has the 
resources and desire to make a deliberative evaluation (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). 
Because deliberative thinking requires conscious effort, a message framed to tug the 
heartstrings may be more effective than one that nudges cognition via biases, although 
this will depend on the audience. Increasing the vividness of an issue or outcome in the 
mind of the audience is one way to evoke stronger emotions and have greater influence 
(Loewenstein et al. 2001). Vividness can be increased by presenting information in an 
anecdotal form that relates to people and experiences, rather than as numbers and 
statistics (Loewenstein et al. 2001). It can also be enhanced by the way an issue is 
described. For example a statement that says “the palm oil industry fuels biodiversity 
loss” will not induce as strong an emotional reaction as compared to it being re-framed 
to say “palm oil producers are responsible for the widespread deforestation that kills, 
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injures and causes suffering to thousands of animals”. Note that this re-framing has also 
reduced the level of abstraction concerning the impact of palm oil (see Psychological 
distance, below). 
Frames that induce hope can be advantageous in promoting favourable attitudes and 
behaviours (Myers et al. 2012), as can frames that induce fear. However, fear may be 
ultimately counterproductive as it can lead individuals to avoid the fear-inducing 
information (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Commercial advertising is replete with examples 
of emotionally framed appeals, with both positive and negative emotions used to 
strategically target different audiences, e.g. ‘fear’ in the case of promoting the virtues of 
a life insurance policy to parents, and ‘fun’ in promoting soft drinks to young people. 
The question for conservation communicators to consider is what emotion their message 
will likely evoke, and whether this may be helpful or counter-productive. If the emotion 
in response to the message is likely to be counter-productive, can the communication be 
re-framed to ameliorate this, or even to induce an advantageous emotional response. 
Psychological distance 
‘Psychological distance’ concerns the distance from themselves in which they think 
about an object (i.e. a person, event, issue, outcome, etc.). When psychological distance 
is greater, people tend to think about the object in a more abstract fashion (Bar-Anan, 
Liberman and Trope 2006), and can be less motivated to take individual action (Spence, 
Poortinga and Pidgeon 2012; Jones, Hines and Marks 2016). In the context of 
messaging, reducing psychological distance can help a message better engage an 
audience about an issue (Jones, Hines and Marks 2016). The psychological distance 
between an audience and the problem being articulated includes geographic, temporal 
and social distance, and is also influenced by the relative certainty of an event 
occurring, with greater certainty reducing psychological distance (Bar-Anan, Liberman 
and Trope 2006). Thus, a message will tend to create a smaller psychological distance 
between the audience and the problem if it emphasises that a problem or event will 
affect the audience or people who are just like them, occur nearby, occur sometime 
soon, and is very likely to happen. This results in a more concrete and less abstract 
understanding of the issue. As in all aspects of strategic framing, this is something that 
could be purposely increased or decreased, depending upon the need. For example it 
could be advantageous to reduce the psychological distance between an audience and 
the effects of vegetation clearing (i.e. to make the consequences of habitat loss more 
tangible), but advantageous to increase the psychological distance between an audience 
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and feral cats (i.e. to promote the more abstract notion that cats are pests, not pets). 
Though not applicable to every message, these aspects can be emphasised (or 
minimised) to the extent that they apply, so as to increase (or decrease) the 
psychological distance as appropriate to the issue. 
As another example, if communicating the plight of southern right whales, one might 
say “the population of southern right whales continues to be threatened as a result of 
whaling in the Southern Ocean”. However, to reduce the psychological distance one 
might instead say (particularly to an Australian audience) “the southern right whales, 
that visit Australian coastlines each year and bring joy to whale watchers, are under 
threat from whalers who stalk and kill them in the Southern Ocean”. In this re-framing 
the physical distance is geographically reduced, as well as socially reduced by relating 
the whales to people (i.e. the whale watchers), as well as reducing the level of 
abstraction – the whales are ‘stalked and killed’, not merely ‘threatened’. There is 
plenty of room for additional framing elements, particularly semantic and emotive 
elements, and also promotion of the audience’s personal agency. Increasing emotional 
intensity reduces psychological distance (Van Boven et al. 2010), as can the 
construction of more concrete mental images of the object (e.g. a conservation problem) 
(Liberman et al. 2007). As such, the use of richer more emotive, vivid or descriptive 
language will likely help reduce psychological distance. However, where psychological 
distance is too small, it can become counter-productive at promoting behaviour 
(McDonald, Chai and Newell 2015) where, for example, ‘doom and gloom’ messages 
about impending extinctions could potentially undermine a person’s sense of agency 
(see ‘Norms and agency’ below).  
Norms and agency 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) is one of the most tested and successful 
theories for understanding human behaviour. The theory posits that attitudes, norms and 
personal agency (a person’s belief about their ability to undertake an action and achieve 
a favourable result) all influence a person’s intention to undertake a behaviour. The 
examples outlined above operate principally by influencing attitudes. While biodiversity 
conservation is not always concerned with advocating a specific behaviour, strategic 
framing can include these elements to the extent that they are relevant in any given 
context. Norms and personal agency interact with and influence attitudes, and the 
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influence of a message on attitudes will depend on the degree to which a person engages 
in the message and how the message fits with a person’s norms.  
Social norms are the codes of appropriate behaviour within a particular social group, 
and can have a strong influence on behaviour. For example, people are more likely to 
litter in an environment that is already littered because this indicates that littering is a 
normal behaviour in that context (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990). Although 
stemming from our needs as social beings, social norms can be invoked by printed 
words alone (Schultz, Kahzian and Zaleski 2008). However, care must be taken when 
doing so, because whilst normative information can direct behaviour in a target 
direction, it can also have unintended effects. This is demonstrated by Cialdini (2003) in 
the context of ‘wood’ theft from the Arizona Petrified Forest National Park. To combat 
the theft, managers had placed a sign that read: “Your heritage is being vandalized 
every day by theft losses of petrified wood of 14 tons a year, mostly a small piece at a 
time.” Unfortunately, by highlighting the problem, the sign established the theft as a 
social norm, making it less effective than it might have been, and possibly contributing 
to further theft. A subsequently installed sign that read: “Please don’t remove the 
petrified wood from the Park, in order to preserve the natural state of the Petrified 
Forest” and thus which did not ‘normalise’ the theft, was more effective (Cialdini 
2003). This is another example of where strategic framing can be about avoiding an 
unhelpful effect; the key lesson here is that simply highlighting the prevalence of an 
undesirable behaviour is likely to be counterproductive.  
Where a desirable behaviour is common, it can be highlighted to promote it as a norm. 
It is useful to distinguish between norms that describe a typical behaviour (known as 
descriptive norms) and also what is the approved behaviour (injunctive norms) (Cialdini 
2003). For example:  
 “Australians eat 25 kg of seafood per person each year… [i.e. descriptive] 
…but they also care that it is caught from sustainable fisheries [i.e. an injunctive 
norm].”  
Note that this is a hypothetical example for illustration only, and there are likely many 
ways in which this message could be optimised. Importantly from an ethical 
perspective, I have not simply made up these claims for the convenience of framing the 
message (see Australian Marine Conservation Society 2016); I do not advocate lying for 
the sake of increasing a strategic framing effect. 
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While it may not always be possible to strategically frame messages to take advantage 
of a social norm, it is worth considering, even if it is simply to ensure that the message 
does not inadvertently establish an undesirable behaviour as a social norm. This does 
not mean that communicators should necessary refrain from reporting the prevalence of 
adverse behaviour, but that the context in which it is done is important.  
This brings us to personal agency (sometimes referred to as self-efficacy), which is 
mostly of relevance to communicators interested in influencing a specific behaviour. A 
related concept is ‘response efficacy’ which is a person’s sense that their actions will 
achieve the intended outcomes (LaRose, Rifon and Enbody 2008; Morton et al. 2011). 
Building on the hypothetical seafood example above, to leverage self-efficacy and 
response efficacy, we could add the following sentence:  
“By ensuring that the seafood you buy is marked with the Sustainable Seafood 
logo… [i.e. enhancing self-efficacy by instructing the reader in an easily 
achieved behaviour] …you can be sure that you are helping support sustainable 
fisheries [i.e. enhancing response efficacy by suggesting that the behaviour will 
promote sustainability].”  
In this example the response efficacy is largely dependent on how believable the person 
finds the claim that the ‘Sustainable Seafood’ marked products will promote sustainable 
fisheries. As with social norms, strategic framing of a conservation communication may 
not necessarily include highlighting efficacy related aspects, however the message’s 
capacity to influence the audience’s sense of efficacy should be borne in mind. For 
example, many affective appeals such as those that induce hope or fear are likely to also 
influence efficacy. Hope appeals are well suited to promoting efficacy (Myers et al. 
2012) i.e. ‘this species can be saved if you do take this action’. However, this does not 
work in all cases, for example an optimistic message about recent progress in curbing 
carbon emissions was less effective than a pessimistic message because the emphasis on 
the ‘good news’ increased complacency (Hornsey and Fielding 2016). 
6.4 Test (for adverse effects) 
Even for carefully considered messages, there is a chance that it will result in 
unintended and possibly counter-productive effects. For this reason, wherever possible 
it’s important to test a message before dissemination. A common method for this is the 
use of focus groups (for which there is much guidance in the literature, e.g. Morgan 
(1996)), however the advent of highly capable web based survey platforms (e.g. 
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www.qualtrics.com; www.surveymonkey.com) provide convenient alternatives. Whilst 
far from a comprehensive list, below I outline several of the important adverse effects 
that should be considered when undertaking strategic framing. 
Boomerang effects 
Sometimes framing can have unforeseen ‘boomerang’ effects. For example, Myers et al. 
(2012) found that framing climate change as a national security issue was counter-
productive for engaging an audience that was usually dismissive of climate change, 
resulting in an angry backlash. In contrast, presenting climate change as a public health 
issue and emphasising the benefits of action was effective across a variety of audience 
segments. These interactions are also closely tied with emotions (and thus relevant to 
affect based framing). For example, messages that emphasise calamitous threats, though 
engaging, can ultimately be counter-effective (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). This 
may be particularly the case where the one message is received by multiple audience 
segments who react differently to the content (Myers et al. 2012).  
Misguided norms 
In discussing use of social norms above, the Arizona Petrified Forest National Park 
example (Cialdini 2003) demonstrates how highlighting a problematic descriptive norm 
can be counter-effective. I also pointed to the value of using aligned descriptive and 
injunctive norms for best effect. This point is further demonstrated in cases where a 
descriptive norm applied on its own can act as an anchor, with unhelpful results. For 
example, Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrate how an electricity consumption bill that 
includes information about neighbours’ average usage (i.e. a descriptive norm) can be 
effective at reducing consumption of higher consumption customers but also 
simultaneously influence lower than average usage customers to consume more. 
However, this was remedied by adding an injunctive norm to indicate social approval 
(where usage was less than average) and disapproval (where usage was greater than 
average) (Schultz et al. 2007).  
Crowding-out 
Motivational crowding-out is the process whereby intrinsic altruistic motivations for 
behaviour are replaced by extrinsic self-interested motivations when an external 
(generally monetary) reward is offered for the behaviour. The classic example is the 
child who is paid by her parents to complete a household chore; once the child expects 
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to receive money for the task, they are only willing to do it again if they receive a 
similar monetary reward (Frey and Jegen 2001). There is empirical evidence for 
motivational-crowding effects occurring across a range of settings including labour 
supply, service provision, common pool resources, and the law (see Frey and Jegen 
(2001) for a summary). This has led to concern about the use of monetary incentives in 
conservation (Bekessy and Cooke 2012; García-Amado et al., 2013 Rode, Gómez-
Baggethun and Krause 2015) such that, in the longer term, these may actually reduce 
the occurrence of the incentivised behaviour. Chapter 3 demonstrated that even 
economically framed information about the benefits of nature, without any external 
monetary reward, can itself result in the crowding-out intrinsic motivations to care for 
nature. Behaviours induced by external motivations (e.g. regulation, financial 
incentives, etc.) generally cease when they are removed, but this is not the case with 
intrinsic motivations (Akerlof and Kennedy 2013). Thus, emphasising the economic 
value of nature is an exercise in strategic framing and may enhance the effectiveness of 
the specific message for people with low intrinsic values for nature, but it may 
simultaneously undermine intrinsic value for nature in other audience segments, with 
adverse effects overall. 
It has also been suggested that promoting the economic benefits of nature whilst 
simultaneously appealing to nature’s emotional qualities, feels incongruent and possibly 
offensive (Futerra 2015). This likely interacts with cognitive dissonance (a cognitive 
bias) where discomfort arises within an individual when their beliefs or values are 
contrary to new information that conflicts with these beliefs/values, or when they 
perform an action contrary to the belief/values. In order to achieve consistency (and thus 
to reduce the dissonance), people may change their beliefs or their behaviour, or avoid 
situations that give rise to the inconsistency (see Festinger 1962). Refusal of climate 
change sceptics to accept the scientific consensus is a contemporary example (e.g. Stoll-
Kleemann, O’Riordan and Jaeger 2001). 
6.5 Report results 
Reporting the results of any testing undertaken prior to a communication campaign, or 
the effectiveness and outcomes of any campaign undertaken, will add to the body of 
knowledge that can inform future strategic communication of biodiversity conservation. 
This need not be limited to peer-reviewed journals, but may also include simple reports 
or datasets being made accessible online such as on conservation group site, blogs, etc. 
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By simply reporting the kind of framing that tends to be more effective, including for 
which contexts and audiences, all communicators can work together to support more 
effective conservation communication. 
6.6 Conclusion  
Influencing attitudes and behaviour is a key component of effective conservation. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of conservation messages can be critical to the successful 
implementation of policy interventions and campaigns. With this in mind, there are easy 
and low cost gains (and avoided losses) to be had by putting more effort into 
strategically framing messages. Here I have provided a guide to some key elements of 
strategic framing. However, not all elements will be always relevant, as strategic 
framing depends heavily on context, and neither are the elements of strategic framing 
limited to those outlined here. Although I have discussed these concepts as discrete 
elements, most conservation messages will include many elements of framing that use a 
variety of approaches targeted to different aspects of the message. Part of the process of 
strategic framing is to consider how a communication sits together as a whole. I do not 
suggest that strategic framing should seek to manipulate people, but rather, that 
information can be framed in multiple ways, and because it cannot be communicated 
without a frame of some, communicators should consider these effects when crafting 
their message. If the characteristics of the audience are known (or even estimated), and 
there is a clear understanding of what a message is trying to achieve, it’s likely that a 
strategically framed message will have greater influence. The guide I provide here gives 
communicators a solid foundation to begin to understand how strategically framing their 
communications can be advantageous, and provides an overview of important 
components of strategic framing. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this research was to develop an understanding of how framing concepts may 
be used strategically to improve the effectiveness of biodiversity conservation 
messages. Biodiversity loss is one of the most serious of contemporary environmental 
problems and occurs as a direct result of human activities (Gordon 2006; Butchart et al. 
2010; Maxwell et al. 2016). This means that changes to human behaviour must be an 
essential component of strategies that seek to achieve biodiversity conservation 
outcomes. It is well established that how information is ‘framed’ can influence the 
resulting judgements, attitudes and behaviours of those receiving the information (e.g. 
Harris 1973; Tverskey and Kahneman 1981; Gamson and Modiglian 1989; Entman 
1993). This means that communications intended to promote behaviour change in 
favour of biodiversity conservation may be made more effective through strategic 
consideration of how that information is framed. While a sizable framing literature 
exists across many research areas, there is little research on the use of framing to 
promote biodiversity conservation, and practically no guidance for conservation 
communicators.  
Framing and related concepts have long been used in advertising and marketing, which, 
by promoting the purchase of many products, have promoted the consumption of 
materials more generally, which is a key contributor to biodiversity loss (Maxwell et al. 
2016). While marketing, including framing, has begun to be applied to environmental 
issues, this tends to simply be an application of marketing concepts to environment 
related campaigns that target a single specific behaviour, for example promoting 
environmentally friendly products (e.g. Grankvist, Dahlstrand and Biel 2004; Tu, Kao 
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and Tu 2013), appeals to reduce water or energy use (e.g. van de Velde et al. 2010; 
Steinhorst, Klöckner and Matthies. 2015) or collecting donations (e.g. Futerra 2015). 
Few of these have been specifically related to biodiversity conservation, and have been 
limited in scope (biodiversity conservation specific examples that have directly tested 
alternative frames include: Gregory, Lichtenstein and MacGregor 1993; Wilson and 
Bruskotter 2009; McComas et al. 2015). By failing to strategically consider framing 
issues when communicating about biodiversity conservation, advocates do not avail 
themselves of potentially powerful tools. However, the task of ‘selling’ biodiversity 
conservation is much more difficult than selling products because there is rarely a single 
conservation behaviour that can be targeted, and thus it is more complex than simply 
applying marketing and framing concepts. The research presented in this thesis has 
tackled this challenge, exploring the concept of framing in the context of the promotion 
of biodiversity conservation. 
This research has begun to build an understanding of the use of framing in the context 
of biodiversity conservation by:  
 empirically testing several alternatively framed conservation communications;  
 investigating the degree to which framing is strategically used in the Australian 
private land conservation sector to promote conservation programs;  
 considering how the framing of biodiversity has changed over the last decade 
within public policy discourse; and  
 providing guidance to communicators on how to strategically frame messages 
for greater effect. 
Chapter 2 empirically tested how alternatively framed conservation messages 
influenced people’s attitudes toward regulations that would interfere with property 
rights in order to achieve conservation outcomes. The messages framed the concept of 
‘property’ in terms of a ‘discrete asset’ or alternatively as a ‘bundle-of-rights’. The 
results demonstrate that these alternative ‘property frames’ can influence attitudes, but 
only when used to activate cognitive biases (in this case the ‘endowment effect’, 
whereby people place greater value on something when they own it). This suggests that 
alternative property concepts alone are of little use from a strategic framing perspective, 
but may be used to activate cognitive biases in order to generate a framing effect in 
some circumstances. The overarching lesson for the strategic use of framing that arises 
here is: a) that cognitive biases other than prospect theory may be activated by issue 
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frames (in this case the endowment effect); and b) that where conservation participation 
interacts with property ownership rights (i.e. most likely in private land conservation 
scenarios), that the ‘strategic’ approach is to avoid evoking the endowment effect by the 
way in which property ownership is contemplated in any related communication. These 
findings demonstrate the value for communicators in understanding framing effects in 
communications; not only can framing be used to enhance the effectiveness of a 
message, but it can help avoid adverse framing effects. 
Chapter 3 showed that the inclusion of information about the economic contributions of 
whales and bees within a list of broader general information about these species, can 
influence the kinds of reasons that people give and consider most important for 
protecting them. When information about economic contributions are included in a list 
of general information, people gave more extrinsically motivated reasons, and ranked 
the extrinsically motivated reasons as more important, compared to when economic 
information was not included. These results show that, in the same way monetary 
incentives can crowd-out (i.e. displace) intrinsic motivations for performing hitherto 
intrinsic tasks, the use of economically framed ecosystem services information can also 
crowd-out intrinsic motivations for whale and bee conservation. This is perhaps the first 
demonstration that crowding-out effects can occur even in the absence of an actual 
external reward, and has implications for communication and advocacy generally. In the 
context of biodiversity conservation, the risk is that framing nature in terms of 
ecosystem services may create an expectation that the only nature worth preserving is 
that with a demonstrable and quantifiable anthropocentric value, with messages framed 
in terms of ecosystem services leading to the reduced care and concern of organisms 
and ecosystems that cannot demonstrate such value. This raises questions about the 
long-term effects of economically framed ecosystem-service based conservation 
messages on people’s motivations for protecting nature.  
Chapter 4 examines the content of the websites of a range of Australian private land 
conservation (PLC) schemes, categorising the stated participation benefits as either 
benefits to landholders, to society or to the environment. The results indicate a 
predominance of environmentally-framed benefits, which arguably indicates a lack of 
strategic framing by the Australian PLC sector in the promotion of their programs. The 
heavy reliance on environmentally-framed messages  is less likely to engage 
landholders who are more egoistically oriented. This is particularly the case with 
market-based schemes, which arguably should be even more strongly marketed toward 
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production-focussed landholders and others not already involved in conservation. This 
suggests that the way in which PLC benefits are currently articulated to landholders in 
Australia may not be particularly strategic, and that there may be some advantage in 
more carefully considering the way benefits of participation in PLC schemes are 
framed. In particular, this research suggests that framing the benefits of PLC more 
broadly (and appealing to people within all value orientations) could engage a greater 
diversity of landholders, aiding PLC recruitment. This research is not intended as a 
definitive statement on how PLC benefits are framed, or even how they ought to be 
framed, but as an initial step in understanding how they might be strategically re-framed 
for better effect. As a first step, I encourage PLC programs to be aware of the value 
orientation frame implicit in their messages, and to consider whether this is a good 
match for their audience and the goals of their program.  
Although I have argued in Chapter 4 that there ought to be a greater focus on landholder 
benefits in order to appeal to egoistic oriented landholders, Chapter 3 demonstrates that 
extrinsically motivated messages can crowd-out intrinsic motivations for conservation. 
As such there is a risk that the same could occur in the PLC context. However, in this 
case the message is not the end in itself, but is merely an initial invitation to a 
landholder to consider participation in the program. Those landholders whose interest is 
not piqued will not have been swayed (and thus there is no ‘controlling behaviour’ to 
lead to motivational crowding), while those who investigate further and potentially 
participate will embark upon a journey that goes beyond the messages on a scheme’s 
website, and thus beyond what can be speculated here. While this understanding may be 
reasonably surmised from current research, the prospect of deleterious effects arising 
from motivational crowding induced by egoistic framing of benefits is worthy of further 
research. 
Chapter 5 considers how the framing of biodiversity has changed over the last decade 
within public policy discourse by examining media releases from the Australian 
Government environment portfolio and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), 
specifically tracking the use of ‘ecosystem services’ logic, the term ‘biodiversity’, and 
the use of economic language. Although there was no obvious trend in the use of 
‘ecosystem services’ logic over the previous ten years of media releases from the 
Australian Government or from the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), it was 
by no means uncommon, indicating that it is a mainstream concept and not confined to 
researchers or policy makers. In addition, over the same period, use of the term 
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‘biodiversity’ has become less prevalent whilst use of economic language has increased, 
in both Australian Government and ACF media releases. This indicates a change in this 
public discourse over this time, which may be reflective of the way the environment and 
biodiversity are thought of (or may contribute to this change, or both). This may be a 
strategic response by these agencies to better engage with both the general public and 
decision makers within what is an increasingly dominant neoliberal paradigm, 
representing an example of the strategic use of framing as I have advocated throughout 
this thesis. However, being aware of the influence of framing generally, and of the 
power of discourse to reflect and influence how people think about and interact with 
issues, I contend that the trends identified risk adversely affecting how people think 
about and engage with biodiversity conservation. By engaging with economic 
considerations within the environmental policy space, these messages may be inducing 
a crowding-out effect similar to that observed in Chapter 3. While this is only 
speculative at this stage, further research exploring related trends across other sources 
and regions would help clarify the effect. In the meantime, I reiterate the value for 
communicators in the strategic consideration of how to phrase and frame messages for 
greatest immediate impact, but also caution that this be tempered by consideration of 
how this may in turn shape the discourse over time, and what the effect of this may be. 
Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of key elements of framing that may be used 
strategically to enhance the effectiveness of biodiversity conservation messages. This 
chapter provides an overview of the key aspects of framing identified throughout this 
research, both from the relevant literature and from the research described in this thesis. 
The intention is to provide useful, accessible and concise guidance for communicators 
to begin to strategically consider how to frame their communications. Although much of 
this guidance comes from the published literature, this research is drawn from a range of 
research areas not necessarily identified as relating to ‘framing’ or ‘conservation’, or 
even with ‘messaging’ and ‘communication’. As such, much information that could 
provide guidance to communicators about framing messages is not easily identifiable or 
accessible to them. The synthesis provided in Chapter 6 draws key concepts identified 
in the literature and underpinned by research described in the thesis, and describes their 
application to a message framing context in a useful and practical way, including with 
examples relevant to biodiversity conservation.  
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7.1 Further research 
Additional to the insights and conclusions outlined above, this research also gives rise 
to further questions. In particular, further research about the potential for unintended 
feedback effects of extrinsically framed appeals would be valuable to conservation 
communicators. The key question that arises from the research is: 
How can communicators leverage the power of extrinsically motivated appeals, 
without risk of crowding-out intrinsic motivations? 
Addressing this question has the potential to provide communicators with a valuable 
tool to guide future strategically framed conservation communications.  
In addition, the following specific questions arise directly from the present research: 
 Does the crowding-out of intrinsic motivations occur only when economic 
ecosystem services frames are used, or whenever anthropocentric ecosystem 
service frames are used? 
 How long does the crowding-out effect last, and is it cumulative? 
 How does ‘ecosystem services’ framing within the broader conservation 
discourse influence these crowding-out effects? 
 Can the emphasis of extrinsic motivations in the context of private land 
conservation result in the crowding-out of intrinsic conservation motivations for 
landholders to participate in conservation schemes? 
 What is the efficacy of appeals to multiple value-orientations, particularly in a 
PLC context?  
7.2 Closing remarks 
This research has provided some valuable insights about the importance of framing in 
communications. Although focussed on promotion of biodiversity conservation, many 
of these insights may also be valuable more generally.  
I also hope that this research will empower conservation advocates to embrace strategic 
framing and to consider it in all communications. Whilst I do not have all the answers, I 
hope that my work provides an approach that will encourage and enable strategic 
thinking about how best to frame conservation issues for a given audience in a given 
context. 
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In addition, I hope that this work will encourage a new research direction focussed on 
unpacking the many nuanced ways that framing influences the messages that they 
communicate. The outlook for this is promising, as already a number of research 
colleagues within the Environmental Decisions Group (www.edg.org.au) and more 
broadly within the Society for Conservation Biology 
(https://conbio.org/groups/working-groups/conservation-marketing-working-group) 
have begun to explore further aspects of conservation framing research.  
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Appendix A 
College Human Ethics Advisory Network letters of approval for the studies reported in 
Chapter 2. 
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Appendix B 
Participant information form for the research reported in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please read this 
sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to participate. If 
you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators. 
  
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
 
Project Title: Property frames and public policy attitudes 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey about how the way information is framed affects people’s 
attitudes towards public policy. Your time is greatly appreciated!   
 
This study is being conducted by Alex Kusmanoff (PhD student), supervised by Associate Professor Sarah 
Bekessy at RMIT University, contact details are provided below.  The RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee has approved this project, also see details below. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research because you are registered as a worker on Mechanical 
Turk. You must be aged 18 years or older and reside in Australia to participate in the survey. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
The survey should take around 5 minutes.  We do not ask for any identifying information (you do not need 
to give us your name and email address!). We will ask for basic, non-identifying demographic information 
(e.g., age, gender and postcode).  The survey itself asks for your reaction to a hypothetical local 
government policy.  There are no right or wrong answers and we are interested only in your intuitive 
feelings toward the policy. 
 
The survey may be also be completed online at [weblink removed]. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
Responses will be collated and stored in a spreadsheet as group data, then subjected to statistical 
analyses. Results from these analyses will be used in Alex Kusmanoff’s PhD thesis and may also be 
published in academic journals and presented at academic conferences. Only summary information will be 
disseminated.  Again, no identifying information will be collected as part of the survey.  Once we have 
completed our data collection and analysis, we will import the data we collect to the RMIT server where it 
will be stored securely for five (5) years. 
 
Following your participation, you may contact Alex (alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au) to obtain a summary of 
the results (expected to be available towards the end of 2014). 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions about your participation, please contact Alex Kusmanoff on (03) 9925 9944 or 
alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au. 
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Investigators: 
 
Associate Professor Dr Sarah Bekessy (Supervisor) 
School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, 
RMIT University 
(03) 99251858 
sarah.bekessy@rmit.edu.au 
 
Alex Kusmanoff (PhD Candidate) 
School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, 
RMIT University 
(03) 9925 9944 
alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au 
  
This study is jointly funded by the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Environmental 
Decisions and by the National Environmental Research Program. 
  
  
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not wish to discuss with the 
researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, Research Integrity, Governance and Systems, RMIT University, 
GPO Box 2476V  VIC  3001. Tel: (03) 9925 2251 or email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au 
   
 
Your consent to participate in this research is indicated by the completion and submission of 
the attached survey. 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaires used for the research reported in Chapter 2. 
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Appendix D 
College Human Ethics Advisory Network letter of approval for the studies reported in 
Chapter 3. 
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Appendix E 
Participant information form for the research reported in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please read this 
sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to participate. If 
you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators. 
  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
 
Project Title: Why do people want to conserve bees? 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey about the reasons that people have for wanting to conserve bees 
in the ocean environment. Your time is greatly appreciated!  [Note that this heading and line was 
substituted for an equivalent line about whales for participants in that version of the survey]. 
 
This study is being conducted by Alex Kusmanoff (PhD student), supervised by Associate Professor Sarah 
Bekessy at RMIT University, contact details are provided below.  The RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee has approved this project, also see details below. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research because you are registered as a worker on Mechanical 
Turk. You must be aged 18 years or older may participate in the survey. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
The survey should take around 5 minutes.  We do not ask for any identifying information (you do not need 
to give us your name and email address!). We will ask for basic, non-identifying demographic information 
(e.g., age, gender and postcode). The survey itself asks you to read some information about bees, and 
then to list some reasons for preserving them. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
Responses will be collated and stored in a spreadsheet as group data, then subjected to analyses. Results 
will be used in Alex Kusmanoff’s PhD thesis and may also be published in academic journals and 
presented at academic conferences. Only summary information will be disseminated.  Again, no identifying 
information will be collected as part of the survey. Once we have completed our data collection and 
analysis, we will import the data we collect to the RMIT server where it will be stored securely for five (5) 
years. 
 
Following your participation, you may contact Alex (alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au) to obtain a summary of 
the results (expected to be available towards the middle of 2016). 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions about your participation, please contact Alex Kusmanoff on (03) 9925 9944 or 
alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au. 
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Investigators: 
 
Associate Professor Dr Sarah Bekessy (Supervisor) 
School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, 
RMIT University 
(03) 99251858 
sarah.bekessy@rmit.edu.au 
 
 
Alex Kusmanoff (PhD Candidate) 
School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, 
RMIT University 
(03) 9925 9944 
alex.kusmanoff@rmit.edu.au 
  
This study is jointly funded by the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Environmental 
Decisions and by the National Environmental Research Program. 
  
  
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not wish to discuss with the 
researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, Research Integrity, Governance and Systems, RMIT University, 
GPO Box 2476V  VIC  3001. Tel: (03) 9925 2251 or email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au 
   
 
Your consent to participate in this research is indicated by the completion and submission of 
the attached survey. 
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Appendix F 
 
Economically framed ecosystem service information was provided to one group only in 
each survey. The sources used to compile this information are shown below, but were 
not provided to participants. 
 
Information provided to participants 
 Whales Bees 
 
Economically 
framed ecosystem 
service 
information 
 
(ES present 
conditions only) 
Whale-watching is a growing 
industry and, is estimated to 
have generated nearly three 
billion dollars worldwide in 
2008. These profits are far in 
excess of those obtained from 
hunting whales.1 
 
A report for the International 
Fund for Animal Welfare shows 
that the value of a single whale 
to local Australian coastal 
economies can be as high as 
$1.25 million.2 
It is estimated that bees and 
other pollinating insects 
contributed $29 billion to farm 
income in the USA in 2010.5 
 
A third of all the plants we eat 
have been pollinated by bees,6 
and more than half of the 
                                  
from oilseeds such as cotton, 
rape, sunflower, coconut, 
groundnut and oil palm, which 
rely on or benefit from 
pollination by bees.7 
 
Non-conservation 
oriented  
interesting 
information 
 
(all groups) 
Whales are complex, often 
highly social and intelligent 
creatures. 3 
 
 Some whale species live, at 
times, in very complex social 
structures and have been 
shown to socialise, forage, care 
for their young and travel 
together in groups just as 
humans do.3 
 
Whales have existed on Earth 
for a long time, having evolved 
from land mammals that lived 
in warm salty waters about 55 
million years ago.3 
 
The Blue Whale is the largest 
creature ever to have lived on 
earth with their tongues alone 
weighing as much as an 
elephant, and their hearts, as 
much as a car.4 
Bees have a surprising capacity 
to learn and remember things 
and to make complex 
calculations on distance 
travelled and foraging 
efficiency.8 
 
Honey bees have 170 smell 
receptors, compared with only 
62 in fruit flies and 79 in 
mosquitoes. Because of this, 
their sense of smell is so precise 
they can distinguish between 
hundreds of flower varieties 
and tell whether a flower 
carries pollen or nectar from 
metres away.8 
 
Bees have existed on Earth for 
more than 30 million years.6 
 
A bee's wings stroke very fast, 
about 200 beats per second, 
which is what generates their 
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Like humans, whales are 
mammals, which mean whale 
                             
milk. A Blue Whale calf drinks 
more than 600 litres of milk 
each day and gains about 90kg 
every day for its first year.4 
 
It is thought that whales feel 
emotions.4 
 
Blue whales are one of the 
loudest animals on the planet, 
communicating with each other 
using a series of low frequency 
pulses, groans, and moans. It is 
thought that in good conditions 
blue whales can hear each 
other over distances of up to 
1,600km.4 
distinctive buzz. A honey bee 
can fly for around 10 
kilometres, and as fast as 24 
kilometres an hour. 6 
 
During winter, honey bees feed 
on the honey they collected 
during the warmer months. 
They form a tight cluster in their 
hive to keep the queen and 
themselves warm.8 
 
Honey is the only food that 
includes all the substances 
necessary to sustain life, 
including enzymes, vitamins, 
minerals, and water.8 
 
There is some evidence that 
bees experience anxiety and 
other emotions.9 
 
Bees communicate by smells 
                           
                            6 
 
Sources 
1. New South Wales Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts. 
2013. Why People Love Whales. Wild About Whales. Online 
www.wildaboutwhales.com.au/news-and-events/news/why-people-love-whales 
accessed March 2015. 
2. K                   R  2011  W                   V                          
Whale Day, a report for the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). 
Economists at Large, Melbourne, Australia. 
3. Australian Government Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the 
Arts. 2010. Whale Protection (brochure). Online 
www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/0bc1c82b-0a06-4113-9704-
2cce2b13af83/files/fs-whale-protection.pdf accessed March 2015. 
4. OneKind. 2010. Whale (Blue). Online 
www.onekind.org/be_inspired/animals_a_z/whale_blue/ accessed March 2015. 
5. Ramanujan K. 2012. Insect pollinators contribute $29 billion to U.S. farm income. 
Cornell Chronicle. Online at www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2012/05/insect-
pollinators-contribute-29b-us-farm-income January 2016. 
6. Bee Healthy. 2010. Fun facts about honey bees online at www.bees4kids.org.uk/fun-
facts-about-honey-bees/ accessed January 2016. 
7. Bradbear N. 2009. Bees and their role in forest livelihoods: a guide to the services 
provided by bees and the sustainable harvesting, processing and marketing of their 
products. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 
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8. Benefits-of-Honey. 2011. 20 amazing honey bee facts! Online www.benefits-of-
honey.com/honey-bee-facts.html accessed January 2016. 
9. Castro J. 2011. Do bees have feelings? Scientific American. Online 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-bees-have-feelings/ accessed January 2016. 
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Appendix G 
 
Questionnaire used for the research reported in Chapter 3. 
 
 
1. Please indicate your age 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 
3. On the scale below, please indicate how much do you care about whales/bees? 
(where 1 is very little, and 10 is a great deal) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
4. On the scale of 1 to 10 below, please indicate how much you know about 
whales/bees? (where 1 is very little, and 10 is a great deal) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
5. Please read the following collection of facts about whales/bees:  
 
[refer to Appendix F] 
 
6. Please take a couple of minutes to list all of the reasons that you can think of 
for protecting whales/bees. You may list as many as you like, but please try and 
list at least 3. 
 
7. Now, please list the reasons you gave above, in the order of most important to 
least important. 
 
8. Please rank the following reasons for protecting whales/bees in order of most 
important to least important: [note this order was counter-balanced] 
o Because they have the right to exist 
o Because they help the economy  
o Because they provide humans with natural goods and services  
o Because they are important to the health of the ecosystem  
 
9. Please indicate the topic of this survey: [this is an attention-check question. 
Note the order of response options was counterbalanced] 
o Bees 
o Politics 
o Whales 
o Corporations 
  
150   
  
 Appendices 
   151 
Appendix H 
A final question (question 8 in Appendix G above) asked participants to rank the 
following reasons for protecting whales or bees in order of most important to least 
important: (i) because they have the right to exist; (ii) because they help the economy; 
(iii) because they provide humans with natural goods and services; or (iv) because they 
are important to the health of the ecosystem. There was no apparent framing effect on 
these rankings arising from whether respondents received information that contained 
economically framed ecosystem services information (ES present) or not (ES absent). 
 
 
Figure H.1 Proportion of respondents that selected each reason for caring for whales as 
the most important reason for doing so, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Fig H.2 Proportion of respondents that selected each reason for caring for bees as the 
most important reason for doing so, with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix I 
List of schemes analysed in the research reported in Chapter 4. 
Jurisdiction Organisation Program name Website 
 
 
 
 
National 
Australian 
Government 
 
Environmental 
Stewardship 
Program 
http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/previous/stewardship/index.html 
 
 
Landcare 
Australia 
Landcare 
 
http://www.landcareonline.com.au/?page_id=26 
 
Humane Society 
International 
Wildlife Land 
Trust 
Wildlife Land 
Trust Sanctuary 
 
 
http://www.wildlifelandtrust.org.au/index.php/about  
 
 
 
New South 
Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
Nature 
Conservation 
Trust NSW 
Conservation 
Agreements 
 
http://nct.org.au/supporting-land-owners/legal-protection-for-land/ 
 
 
Office of 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Conservation 
Agreements 
 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/cpp/ConservationAgreements.htm 
 
 
Office of 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Biobanking 
 
 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biobanking/index.htm 
 
 
Office of 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Wildlife refuges 
 
 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/cpp/WildlifeRefuges.htm 
 
 
Northern 
Territory 
 
Territory Natural 
Resource 
Management 
Territory 
Conservation 
Agreements 
http://www.territorynrm.org.au/funding/tcas 
 
 
Queensland 
 
 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Protection 
Nature refuges 
 
 
 
http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/ecosystems/nature-refuges/the_nature_refuges_program.html 
 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Protection 
Nature Assist 
 
 
 
http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/ecosystems/nature-refuges/natureassist/ 
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South Australia 
 
 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment, 
Water and 
Natural Resources 
 
Heritage 
agreements 
 
 
 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/managing-natural-
resources/Native_vegetation/Managing_native_vegetation/Heritage_Agreement_Scheme 
 
 
 
Tasmania 
 
 
 
Dept. Primary 
Industries, Parks, 
Water and 
Environment 
Land for 
Wildlife 
 
 
http://www.dpipwe.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/DRAR-7T8VRQ?open 
 
 
 
Tasmanian Land 
Conservancy 
 
Midlands 
Landscape 
Project 
http://www.tasland.org.au/majorprogrammes/midlands/ 
 
 
Victoria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment and 
Primary Industries 
BushTender 
 
 
http://www.depi.vic.gov.au/environment-and-wildlife/environmental-action/innovative-market-
approaches/bushtender 
 
Trust for Nature 
 
Conservation 
covenants 
 
http://www.trustfornature.org.au/conservation-planning/conservation-covenants/ 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment and 
Primary Industries 
Land for 
Wildlife 
 
http://www.depi.vic.gov.au/environment-and-wildlife/community-programs/land-for-wildlife 
 
 
Dept. 
Environment and 
Primary Industries 
Landcare 
 
 
http://www.depi.vic.gov.au/environment-and-wildlife/community-programs/landcare/about-the-
victorian-landcare-program 
 
Western 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
The National 
Trust of Australia 
(WA) 
Conservation 
covenants 
 
http://www.nationaltrust.org.au/wa/natural-heritage 
 
 
Dept Parks and 
Wildlife 
 
Conservation 
covenants 
 
http://www.dpaw.wa.gov.au/management/off-reserve-conservation/nature-conservation-covenant-
program 
 
Dept Parks and 
Wildlife 
 
Healthy 
Wetland 
Habitats 
http://www.dec.wa.gov.au/management-and-protection/conservation-on-other-lands/healthy-
wetland-habitats.html  
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Appendix J 
This is the guide developed for coding the conservation participation benefits analysed 
in the research reported in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Benefit category 
 
Specific benefit theme or outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benefits to the landholder  
(i.e. egoistic value orientation) 
Improvements in amenity 
Participation in good land management 
 Native vegetation management 
 Practicing environmental citizenship 
 Land stewardship (production focussed) 
Social interaction and inclusion 
Achievement 
Education/empowerment 
Recognition and respect 
Measures to encourage/facilitate participation 
 Low administrative burden 
 Flexibility to shape initial commitment 
 Flexibility to alter ongoing commitment 
 Contracts and other means of ensuring certainty 
 Participation cost reimbursement 
 In-kind support (i.e. help with fencing, developing management plans, 
etc) 
Measures to compensate  for participation 
 Tax incentives 
 Council rate reductions 
Financial security 
 Income stream (i.e. stewardship payments) 
o Income diversification 
 Increase in property value 
 Land productivity 
                  (                                 ) 
Property security 
 Sustainable land management  
 Increased productivity 
 Protection from competing land use (i.e. mining) or advocacy on behalf 
of landholder 
 
 
 
 
 
Benefits to the public good  
(i.e. altruistic value orientation) 
Value for public money 
Community benefits 
 Community Inclusiveness  
 Community awareness/education 
 Community empowerment 
 Community amenity 
 Other community benefits 
Natural resource management 
 Improvement in farmland quality 
 Balance between productive land use and conservation 
Greenhouse abatement (including adaptation) 
Cultural and heritage protection/benefits 
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Benefits to conservation  
(i.e. biospheric value 
orientation) 
Biodiversity conservation outcomes 
 Protect ecosystems 
 Protect endangered species 
 Protect habitat 
 Protect native vegetation 
 Removal of introduced species (including stock) 
 Build/enhance resilience 
 Revegetation 
Landscape conservation 
 Waterways 
 Erosion control 
 Fire management 
 Salinity 
 Connectivity 
 general 
Long term security of conservation (e.g. from covenants) 
Environmental appreciation 
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Appendix K 
These guidelines were used to code media releases as having ecosystem services logic 
present or absent, for the research reported in Chapter 5. 
 
Coding Guide 
                                                                                            
                                             se.  
                                    (E )                       (             )               
nature provides humans, for example, supply of clean air, drinking water, food, building 
materials, pollination, etc. (Costanza et al. 1997), and has been described in  the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) as "the functions and products of ecosystems that benefit 
humans, or yield welfare to society". 
G                                                                                            
individual releases in order to determine whether an ecosystem services concept is present 
within the release.  
Coding 
For a press release to be considered as having an ecosystem services concept (i.e. to be coded 
 E          )                                          applied: 
 A benefit to humans is mentioned; and 
 This benefit is derived from nature/the environment. 
This may be taken from a specific statement within the press release, or constructed from 
reading the press release as a whole. 
If these elements are prese                    E                                              
ES concept dominates or forms a substantial part of the media release, it is sufficient that this 
                                                          E            
In practice 
Coding in practice is rarely as easy as applying an arbitrary script. Following are notes on how 
to apply the coding criteria. 
G                                                                            E           
        H                        E            something more than the mere mention of a 
primary industry (fishing, forestry, etc) is required. That is, there must be within the context of 
the release taken as a whole, or within the specific words, some nexus between the 
environment and the human benefit. 
                                                       E               : 
“                                        $52                                   
                                             …” (          13 2004) 
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For another example, the following statement in a media release about drought recovery 
                           E               : 
“         j                                                                            
they will help protect the long-term productivity of rural l    ” (M        K     28 
March 2003) 
However, a counter-example is provided by the following: 
The Great Barrier Reef is one of our most significant environmental assets. (Minister 
Garrett June 18 2008) 
                                     E                 Although it infers that the environment 
   q                                                                                             
A further counter-example is provided in the following: 
“          B                                                 rnments to protect its 
unique values – both as an important grazing and mining province and its great natural 
                     L    E                       L                             
   q                     ” (M        K     J    10 2004) 
This s                               E                                                      
having a number of values and places these values and the environment adjacent to one 
another, it does not sufficiently link these values to the environment such that the values flow 
necessarily from the environment. 
H                                                E                                          
below from a media release below concerning management of the Great Barrier Reef: 
Both Governments recognise the significant environmental and economic value of the 
    … (M        G                B         M        J          2 2009)  
Although not dramatically different to the preceding example, this statement (and the context 
of the media release as a whole) sufficie                                                      
of the Great Barrier Reef. 
         (                )                                                                    
                                                    E                      k between the 
                          q                                                          (   
industries derived from these services) is not sufficient.  
B                                                                                         ES 
                                                                                      
behaviour and are not directly an ecosystem service.  
         E                           E                                                          
between the service and the environment, it is not sufficient that a document simply to refer 
                                               
The table below shows some of the kinds of statements classified as ES frames, and others that 
were not. 
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Some specific concepts and statements that are to be included and excluded as an ES frame 
Included Excluded 
 Primary industry (e.g. eco-tourism, fisheries, 
etc so long as there is a connection made 
between these as a benefit of nature, not 
simply stating their existence. 
 
 Carbon capture from carbon farming, where 
there is a sufficient link made between, re-
vegetation and carbon storage, for example. 
 
 Statements along the lines of:  
o                                       
o                                   
o                                     
 
 A mere mention of a relevant primary 
industry (e.g. fishing, forestry, eco-tourism, 
etc.) insufficient. 
 
                                          
                                           
insufficient. 
 
             G     B       R        future 
             (         )               
 
 Heritage conservation for the purposes of 
economic stimulus. 
 
 Tax rebates for conservation covenants and 
similar benefits that result from policy rather 
than directly from nature. 
 
 
